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ABSTRACT
NETWORK GAME THEORY MODELS OF SERVICES
AND QUALITY COMPETITION WITH APPLICATIONS
TO FUTURE INTERNET ARCHITECTURES AND
SUPPLY CHAINS
SEPTEMBER 2016
SARA SABERI
B.Sc., SHIRAZ UNIVERSITY
M.Sc., ISFAHAN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY PUTRA MALAYSIA
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Anna Nagurney
The Internet has transformed the way in which we conduct business and perform
economic and financial transactions. One key challenge of the Internet is the inefficiency
of the mechanisms by which technology is deployed and the business and economic
models surrounding these processes (Wolf et al. (2014)). Equilibrium models for the
Internet generally assume basic economic relationships. However, in new paradigms
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for the Internet and in supply chain networks, price is not the only factor; quality of
service (QoS) is also of increasing importance.
Supply chains networks, which give us the means to manufacture products and
deliver them to points of demand across the globe, are also under many pressures to
offer differentiated products and services (Nagurney (2014)). It is well-known today
that success is determined by how well the entire supply chain performs, rather than
the performance of its individual entities.
This dissertation contributes to the analysis, design, and management of the future
Internet and supply chain networks with a focus on price and quality competition in
service-oriented networks.
Specifically, I focus on economic models for the Internet of the future by developing
both a basic and a general network economic game theory model of a quality-based
service-oriented Internet to study competition among service providers. To study and
analyze the underlying dynamics of the various economic decision-makers, subsequently,
I develop a dynamic network economic model of a service-oriented Internet with price
and quality competition using projected dynamical systems theory. Then, to assess the
prices for various contract durations at the demand markets, I consider a game theory
model of a service-oriented Internet in which the network providers compete in usage
service rates, quality levels, and duration-based contracts. Finally, I construct a model
that captures the competition among manufacturers and freight service providers in a
supply chain network. This model is the first one in the literature that handles both
price and quality competition with multiple modes of shipment from both equilibrium
and dynamic perspectives.
For each model, I derive the governing equilibrium conditions and provide the
equivalent variational inequality formulations. In order to illustrate the modeling
viii
framework and the algorithm, I present computed solutions to several numerical
examples for each model as well as sensitivity analysis results.
This dissertation is heavily based on the following papers: Saberi, Nagurney, and
Wolf (2014), Nagurney et al. (2014a), Nagurney et al. (2015b), and Nagurney et al.
(2015a) as well as additional results and conclusions.
ix
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH MOTIVATION
Using certain protocols, rules, and policies, networks provide the infrastructure for
connectivity and operations for service providers in our societies (Nagurney, Dong,
and Zhang (2002)). For instance, communication networks facilitate the spreading of
information at speeds never before imagined. Transportation networks give us the
means for mobility, shipment, and delivery of goods as fast as overnight or within the
day (see Sheffi (1985), Nagurney (2006b), and United States Patent (2015)).
Logistical and supply chain networks enable firms to look at the overall movement
of products from start to end, allowing organizations to see the value in creating
partnerships and in working together to ensure the best possible service provided
to the end-customer. In other words, supply chains are networks of suppliers,
manufacturers, transportation service providers, storage facility managers, retailers,
and consumers at the demand markets (Nagurney (2006a)). Supply chains are the
backbones of our globalized network economy and provide the infrastructure for the
production, storage, and distribution of goods and associated services as varied as
food products, pharmaceuticals, vehicles, computers and other high tech equipment,
building materials, furniture, clothing, toys, and even electricity (Nagurney (1999)).
In addition to these positive roles, today’s networks have downsides such as
their large-scale nature and complexity and increasing congestion, especially in, but
not limited to, transportation and telecommunications networks. Also, alternative
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behaviors of the networks’ users, which can lead to paradoxical phenomena (cf. Braess,
Nagurney, and Wakkolbinger (2005)), as well as interactions between the networks
themselves are some realities of today’s networks. The decisions made by the entities
in the networks, in turn, may affect not only themselves but others as well, in terms
of profits and costs, the timeliness of deliveries, and the quality of services (Nagurney
(1999, 2006a)).
In this competitive global market, to maintain an edge, every business needs to
achieve optimum levels of efficiency (Forker, Mendez, and Hershauer (1997)). Creating
a variety of products and taking into consideration quality of products (Millen and
Maggard (1997)) have been recognized as one of best ways to maintain a competitive
edge in different supply chain networks. In fact, quality is the business of doing
business (Murthy (2001)).
Communication networks, in particular the Internet, represent the essential in-
frastructure for business, government, and personal communication. They provide
the backbone for numerous economic transactions and social interactions and have
transformed manufacturing, transportation, and finance. Almost 40% of the world
population has an Internet connection today, in comparison with 1995, when the
percentage was less than 1% (Internet Live Stats (2016)). There are now approximately
3.4 billion Internet users out of a global population of 7.3 billion (Miniwatts Marketing
Group (2016)). However, emerging technologies and applications have pushed the
capabilities required of the Internet beyond what the current infrastructure can provide.
To address these limitations, the networking research community has taken up the task
of designing new architecture for the future Internet, accompanied by proper economic
pricing mechanisms in order to make them manageable (see Wolf et al. (2012)).
The future Internet needs to live up to the diversified requirements of next-
generation applications and new users’ requirements comprising mobility, security,
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and flexibility. Zhang et al. (2010) point out that economic relationships are far
more mysterious than the underlying technology, as the business relationships that
give rise to observed connections are mostly hidden from view. Our knowledge drops
even further when we face services offered over a new paradigm that have the ability
to create new functionalities that let users choose winners and losers. While there
has been dramatic success in infrastructure research, resulting in a high bandwidth
Internet backbone supporting simple end-to-end connections, there has been less
success in terms of service-oriented Internet pricing research (Faizullah and Marsic
(2005)). In fact, economic complexity in designing the next generation Internet (NGI)
is advancing the role of pricing models including quality competition (see Jain, Durresi,
and Paul (2011) and Wolf et al. (2012)).
Pricing models have been structured to consider quality and quantity to satisfy new
requirements of applications and demand markets. However, pricing based on quality
and the amount of usage, and, as is now typical, contracts of one to two years duration,
may result in network congestion since network resource utilization may change over
time, unless there are network upgrades. Furthermore, consumers may desire more
flexibility and more choices, depending upon their location, and the type of viewing or
other experience desired. Hence, it is expected that contract duration will become an
important feature in the pricing of network services with shorter duration contracts
garnering greater interest (Hwang and Weiss (2000)).
In general, the success of the entire supply chain is determined by the performance
of all entities in the chain, rather than that of individual one. Quality has become one
of the most essential factors in the success of supply chains of various products
from food and agro-based products to other perishable products such as blood
(Nagurney and Masoumi (2012)), pharmaceuticals (Masoumi, Yu, and Nagurney
(2012)), medical nuclear supply chains (Nagurney and Nagurney (2012)), durable
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manufactured products, including automobiles (see Shank and Govindarajan (1994))
to high tech products, such as microprocessors (see Goettler and Gordon (2011) and
Goettler and Gordon (2014)) and services associated with the Internet (see Kruse
(2010) and Nagurney et al. (2013a)). Quality and price have also been identified
empirically as critical factors in transport mode selection for product/goods delivery
(cf. Floden, Barthel, and Sorkina (2010) and Saxin, Lammgard, and Floden (2005)).
Poor freight service quality can lead to damaged and perished goods as Wang and
Mozur (2014) noted for China’s biggest electronic commerce shopping day known as
Singles’ Day as the biggest shopping day of the year in China with steep discount.
The result was major delivery problems and costs associated with shipping in China
exceeding even shipments from China to the US because of logistical challenges. Hence,
the interplay between product quality and price and that of freight service quality and
price, with respect to consumer demands, as well as specific product requirements,
are not well-known.
On the other hand, the impact of traffic congestion, including wasted time,
frustration, and losses in productivity is not insignificant and its effects on energy
consumption and environmental emissions is immense. Congestion is also highly
relevant in cities in terms of freight distribution and last mile deliveries. The US is
experiencing a freight capacity crisis that threatens the strength and productivity
of the US economy. According to the American Road & Transportation Builders
Association (see Jeanneret (2006)), nearly 75% of US freight is carried in the US on
highways, and bottlenecks are causing truckers 243 million hours of delay annually
with an estimated associated cost of $8 billion.
In this dissertation, I contribute to the modelling, analysis, and design of com-
munication and supply chain networks with a focus on quality of service and price
competition between decision-makers in the Internet and in freight shipment networks.
4
Specifically, after providing an introduction and research motivation as well as the
foundational methodologies in Chapters 1 and 2, I construct a generalized network
framework in Chapter 3 to focus on quality of service for all service providers in a
future Internet multi-tier network. All providers with different functionalities and
services are competing to set their prices and quality of service to maximize their
profits. Then, in Chapter 4, I propose a dynamic adjustment process, which models
how different service providers in the future Internet network adjust their prices,
along with how the service providers define the quality of their services to satisfy the
heterogeneous demands of consumers/demand markets for the Internet services.
In Chapter 5, I subsequently address the issue of contract duration in existing
markets associated with the Internet that requires customers be locked-in for extended
periods of time. Such inflexibility is detrimental to the users and may also impede
innovation in Internet services. A general question that arises is how will the quality
and the duration of Internet network contracts affect the pricing? For this issue, I
formulate a model that captures the flexibility of contract duration as well as quality
for Internet services. Then, I focus on another logistic network – that of the freight
transportation network in Chapter 6. In that setting, I develop a supply chain network
design model with multiple manufacturers and freight service providers competing on
price and quality, while multiple modes of shipment for each freight service provider
are considered.
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.1 includes an overview of the next
generation Internet and the ChoiceNet project as a new network architecture for NGI.
In Section 1.2 and Section 1.3, I describe freight services in supply chain and quality
of service in the Internet and the supply chain. An appropriate literature review is
provided in Section 1.4, and, finally, in Section 1.5, I present a dissertation overview.
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1.1. Next Generation Internet
Without a doubt, the Internet has changed the world. It has developed from a
small communication network among a few scientists to the most important medium
for information exchange and the dominant communication environment for business,
educational, entertainment, and social interactions. The Internet now is much more
than it was ever envisaged to be (Paul, Pan, and Jain (2011)). It has become the
backbone of modern society, rather than simply a communication system. Today,
services, which were not even envisioned early in the Internet age, such as cloud
computing and video streaming, are becoming mainstream (Wolf et al. (2012)).
In spite of its good –not perfect– functionality, there are recognized problems that
cannot be patched within the constraints of the current architecture of the Internet
(Donnet, Iannone, and Bonaventure (2008)). Few of the most relevant problems for
which the present Internet architecture has failed to supply a satisfactory solution
have been discussed in Jain (2006).
As our reliance on a highly dependable and secure information technology infras-
tructure continues to increase, it is no longer clear that the emerging and future needs
of our society can be met by the current Internet infrastructure (Trossen (2009)). In
addition, recent trends in technology and network use have pushed the capabilities
required of the Internet beyond what can be provided by the currently deployed
infrastructure (Labovitz et al. (2010)). Research initiatives, therefore, have been
launched to study the design and development principles of the next generation
Internet.
If history is a guide, the potential of the future Internet will be primarily driven by
innovative services and applications (Man-Sze (2009)). The Directorate for Computer
and Information Science and Engineering (CISE) has formulated a program to stimulate
innovative and creative research to explore, design, and evaluate trustworthy Future
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Internet Architectures (FIA). In the United State of America, the National Science
Foundation (NSF) funded four projects as a part of this program in 2010 summer1
and the fifth one (ChoiceNet) in 2011. The FIA projects include “Named Data
Networking”2 (focusing on security of content in the future Internet), “MobilityFirst”3
(working on robustness and trustworthy networks), “NEBULA”4 (developing new
trustworthy data to support cloud computing model for network services), “eXpressive
Internet Architecture”5 (enabling flexible context-dependent mechanisms for estab-
lishing trust between the communicating principals), and “ChoiceNet”6 (developing
a new architecture to enable sustained innovation in the core of the network, using
economic principles).
In Europe, the Future Internet Research and Experimentation (FIRE)7 is addressing
this need by creating a multidisciplinary research environment for investigating and
experimentally validating highly innovative and revolutionary ideas for new networking
and service paradigms. Typical E.U. projects include ECRYPT II8 (working on future
encryption technologies), INTERSECTION9 (focusing on the vulnerabilities at the
1NSF FIA, 2014, NSF Future Internet Architecture Project, http://www.nets-fia.net.
2Named Data Networking (NDN) Project, http://www.named-data.net.
3Mobility First Future Internet Architecture Project, http://mobilityfirst.winlab.rutgers.edu.
4NEBULA: Future Internet Architecture, http://nebula.cis.upenn.edu.
5eXpressive Internet Architecture, http://www.cs.cmu.edu/∼xia.
6Choicenet: Network Innovation through Choice, https://code.renci.org/gf/project/choicenet,
and choicenet.info.
7Future Internet Research & Experimentation, http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/fire.
8European Network of Excellence in Cryptology II, European Union 7th Framework Program,
http://www.ecrypt.eu.org.
9INfrastructure for heTErogeneous, Resilient, SEcure, Complex, Tightly Inter-Operating Networks,
European Union 7th Framework Program, http://www.intersection-project.eu.
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interaction point of different service providers), AWISSENET10 (concentrating on
security and error resilience on wireless ad-hoc networks and sensor networks), and
SWIFT11 (focusing on future cross-layer identity management framework).
One of the critical concerns in designing the future Internet architecture is how to
integrate new technologies into an ecosystem that involves users, service providers,
and developers in such a way that new ideas can be deployed and used in practice in
a sustainable fashion. To answer this question, investigators from the University of
Massachusetts Amherst and three other institutes have worked on the architectural
design of an economy plane for the Internet in the form of ChoiceNet project.
1.1.1 ChoiceNet
Competition is necessary for promoting the long-term economic viability of networks.
It provides incentives for continual innovation and investment in network operators’
and service providers’ facilities. Therefore, “design for competition” must be an
important principle for any future Internet architecture (Chuang (2011)). This is
the main ambition of the ChoiceNet project. ChoiceNet is an FIA project with
four institutions, including the University of Massachusetts Amherst as the lead, the
University of Kentucky, North Carolina State University, and the University of North
Carolina/RENCI.
The key element of the ChoiceNet project is “choices” that can drive innovations
necessary for future networks. Designing for choice is similar to designing for
competition (Clark et al. (2005)) which enables entities to select among a range
10Ad-hoc personal area network & WIreless Sensor SEcure NETwork, European Union 7th
Framework Program, http://www.awissenet.eu.
11Secure Widespread Identities for Federated Telecommunications, European Union 7th Framework
Program, http://www.ist-swift.org.
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Figure 1.1. ChoiceNet Principle
of alternative services that may differ in functionality, performance, and cost. By
creating the “economy plane”, ChoiceNet aims to create an environment to allow
more innovation within the Internet architecture. As a matter of fact, any global-
scale distributed communications infrastructure, such as the future Internet, requires
significant capital investments; therefore, appropriate incentives must exist for the
network owners to have a sustainable investment in new facilities and services (Chuang
(2011)).
Compared to other studies focusing on economic aspects of networking, ChoiceNet
integrates the economic interactions between networking technologies and the economic
effects in the network architecture itself by offering three key principles (Figure 1.1).
Other studies (see McKnight and Bailey (1998)) look at networking technology and
economic effects as separate issues (e.g., analysis of economic behavior based on the
given Internet structure and technologies (Semret et al. (2000)). To that end, the first
principle of an economy plane in ChoiceNet is to “encourage alternatives” by creating
different types of services and alternative services of the same type. Once alternatives
are available, users can evaluate their choices as they “know what happened”. Using
this information, users can “vote with their wallet” and choose services that are most
suitable for them or continue using a particular service. For complete information
about ChoiceNet see Wolf et al. (2012).
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As part of my doctoral dissertation, I have developed economic game theory models
and pricing for the next generation Internet under the ChoiceNet project.
1.2. Supply Chains and Freight Services
The efficiency of a supply chain has the power to make or break a business. If the
systems are fine-tuned, this translates into a business gaining a competitive advantage
in the marketplace. As global supply chains become more complex year by year
companies must adapt to these changes and alter their strategies accordingly. In
addition, optimizing supply chain productivity requires a commitment to quality from
every entity and the use of process excellence techniques (Nagurney, Li, and Nagurney
(2013)) to maximize efficiency and minimize costs (DeBenedetti (2015)).
The shipping environment in the supply chain can be a complex system in which
decision-makers do not have full visibility into the different parties that exist and the
roles that they serve (Nagurney (2014) and Liu and Nagurney (2012)). Nagurney
(2004) stated that transportation networks and their efficient management have been
studied since ancient times. For instance, Romans imposed controls over chariot traffic
during different times of day in order to deal with congestion (see Banister and Button
(1993)).
Since transportation and logistics involve activities associated with the movement
of products and information to, from, and between the members of the supply chains,
transportation network equilibrium is applied to formulate general supply chains
(Nagurney (2006b), Nagurney, Liu, and Woolley (2007), and Nagurney (2007)), power
supply chains (Wu et al. (2006) and Nagurney et al. (2007)), and financial networks
with intermediation (Liu and Nagurney (2007)).
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More recently, efficient transportation has been recognized as an essential de-
termining factor in providing consistent service to beneficiaries and reducing cost
substantially. Many decision-makers struggle with a seemingly simple question of the
best way to get their specific product to their desired destinations, as it depends on a
variety of shipment criteria and carrier capabilities (Coyle et al. (2012)).
When a consignee pays for the freight, customers may select their carrier (Samir
(2014)). Specifically, for online shopping, the retailers can increase the sale and
customer satisfaction when they expand the flexibility of shipping options - including
shipping rates, shipping modes, and shipping speeds (UPS (2014)).
For instance, in pharmaceutical and food supply chains, professionals struggle
with the shipment of temperature-sensitive products so that they will remain in the
appropriate temperature range and arrive at the suitable time (Yu and Nagurney
(2013)). Additional concerns of security affect nearly every carrier with a product in a
supply chain (Nagurney and Nagurney (2012), Nagurney and Masoumi (2012), and
Masoumi, Yu, and Nagurney (2012)), but are of special concern to distributors with a
high value product that criminals find an easy market for, such as over the counter
medicine medicine, apparel, jewelry, non-alcoholic beverages, and other industries
plagued by their popularity as criminal targets (Coughlin (2012)).
The growth of intercontinental multi-channel distribution, containerization, direct
to business, and direct to customer shipping has led to fierce competition among freight
service providers who are subjected to pricing pressures and increased expectations to
handle more complex services (Hakim (2014) and DHL (2014)). To maintain their
competitive edge, freight service providers are increasingly focusing on positioning
themselves as more than just a commodity business. These providers may offer
flexibility to meet customer needs of safety and/or traceability and, furthermore,
differentiate themselves from the rest of the competition; thereby, migrating towards
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being more value-oriented than cost-oriented (Bowman (2014) and Glave, Joerss, and
Saxon (2014)).
As consumers’ demands have become more diversified and personalized, mass
production has taken a backseat to customized production and faster delivery times
has put transport systems under pressure. Since the 1980s, an express industry has
been developed to satisfy the resulting need for small, frequent-batch and door-to-
door transportation. The online retailer Amazon.com recently submitted a patent
(United States patent (2013)) for anticipatory and speculative shipping. In this patent,
based on advanced forecasts of customer behavior (e.g. previous purchases, behavior
during homepage visits, and demographics), they actually ship the products before
the customer orders it! The product is shipped towards a region where a purchase is
expected and is redirected during transport when the order is placed, thus, allowing
almost instant deliveries (Bensinger (2014)).
In the era of global trade, issues surrounding competition, opportunities, investment,
and outsourcing have induced transport and logistics companies to look for different
services to grow and improve their competitive advantage. In general, a good transport
system is defined according to the number of “rights” of supply. This involves getting
the products at the right time, in the right condition, and via a cost effective manner
accompanied with desired level of service quality (Nagurney and Li (2014a)). Transport
owners that cannot offer the desired level of quality are forced to leave the market,
as was the case when the intermodal company CargoNet withdrew from the Swedish
rail market, claiming unreliable infrastructure as one of the main reasons (Floden
and Woxenius (2013)). In fact, quality of service is driving logistics performance in
both developed and emerging economies. Clearly, quality in freight service is gaining
in importance (Kormnyos and Ta`nczos (2007), Achou (2010), Deflorio, Perboli, and
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Tadei (2010), and Hao and Lin (2013)) and carriers must take quality into account in
shipping the products to be able to survive in the current market.
The next section focuses on quality of service in communication and transportation
networks.
1.3. Quality of Service
In today’s world of fierce competition, there are severe pressures on any organization
to find new ways of creating and delivering value to customers through supply chain
management and carriers are no exception to this (Kannan, Bose, and Kannan (2012)).
Carriers can transport either data through information networks such as in the case of
network service providers in the Internet or ship goods via different modes of transport
in a supply chain.
1.3.1 QoS in the Internet
During the dramatic development of the Internet within the past several years,
electronic commerce has been penetrating all aspects of the business world and leading
to the appearance of a new business economy (Stahl, Dai, and Whinston (2001)). With
greater involvement of the Internet in the commercial world, it has been realized that
in spite of its attractive capability and versatility, it still has some notable limitations
to meet the requirements of all business activities, such as security and quality of
service (Gibbens and Kelly (1999)).
The Internet was historically built on the simple concept of Best Effort (BE).
Best Effort means that there is only one class of service to which all traffic belongs
while there is no delivery confirmation and no guarantee for timely delivery and
there is a possibility of traffic loss. The diversification of users’ demand after the
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commercialization of the Internet forced Internet providers to offer different levels of
services (Shin, Weiss, and Correa (2004)). In addition, critical real-time and business-
oriented applications require improved levels of services, or quality of service from the
network.
The relationship between Best Effort and QoS is similar to that of regular mail
and priority mail for which users pay a higher price than regular mail. However,
guaranteeing QoS in the Internet is not that easy. Initially, QoS was introduced in
telecommunications to measure how well a particular service performs (Hardy (2001)).
In the Internet, quality of service for various traffic types is the ability to provide
different priorities of content transmission. It can guarantee a certain level of
performance of a data flow and its reliability. The main categories of data traffic in
the Internet are real-time traffic such as voice services, interactive data and streaming
traffic such as web browsing, and delay-tolerant traffic such as e-mail and file transfer.
Depending on the type of data streaming, various services make different demands on
the network (Daviesa, Hardtb, Kelly (2004)).
The efficiency of each service type is measured by several parameters including
bounds on the packet delay, delay variation, loss rate (Fulp et al. (1998)), and
jitter (Shin, Weiss, and Correa (2004)) either qualitatively (relative) or quantitatively
(absolute). QoS is assured by reserving resources, primarily bandwidth and sometimes
buffer space (Zhao, Olshefski, and Schulzrinne (2001)).
By requiring QoS to be geared to the end user’s expectations, we may expect new
legislation and rules to create a new reliable and yet more expensive service-oriented
Internet, which is different from the Best Effort type of network that we have known
(Altman et al. (2012)). In a service-oriented architecture (SOA), business processes
can be realized by comprising various services, which autonomously provide a more
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complex functionality (cf. Krafzig, Banke, and Slama (2004)) with more intricate
economic relationships between providers.
The next generation Internet is expected to be service-oriented with each provider
offering specific services. In the Internet of services with comparable functionalities,
but varying quality levels, services are available at different costs in the service
marketplace, so that users can decide which services from which service provider to
select (Wolf et al. (2012)). NGI, typically, includes multi-tier service providers. For
example, a content service provider is a website that handles the distribution of online
content such as blogs, videos, music or files, whereas a network service provider is
an entity that provides network access or long-haul network transport. These offer
equal or rather similar services at different QoS levels and different costs. This gives
users the opportunity to select those services which meet their anticipations and QoS
requirements best (Schuller et al. (2010)).
Quality of service is not limited to Internet and telecommunication services. The
next section focuses on quality of service in the supply chain.
1.3.2 QoS in the Supply Chain
In today’s world of fierce competition, the service sector has become important
in the economies of countries all over the world and services will continue to be a
dominant force in the world economy in the future as well. All businesses today are
part of supply chains. Supply chains are like the circulatory system that encompasses
all flows of product services, information, and finance between entities. As a natural
progression to this thought, every entity in the supply chain focuses on contributing
quality, value, and satisfaction to the immediate customer which may result in greater
profit for all entities (Kamakoty and Sohani (2013)). That is why service quality has
been a major area of research for almost three decades in any organization and is
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not limited to the Internet and communication services (Kannan, Bose, and Kannan
(2012)).
In any supply chain, the ultimate success of a firm will depend on its managerial
ability to deliver high quality services which results in customers’ satisfaction. Quality
may mean the quality of tangibles/intangibles, the quality of logistics, the quality of the
processes, the quality of peripheral services, the quality of the service provider/service
user, and the operational/technical quality. The relationship of service quality with
improved supply chain performance is widely accepted (Mentzer, Flint, and Kent
(1999), Mentzer, Flint, and Hult (2001), and Perry and Sohal (1999)). Meanwhile,
quality of service in logistics is recognized as a critical factor in gaining a competitive
advantage (Seth, Deshmukh, and Vrat (2006a-b)) and a key for subsistence and success
(Kannan, Bose, and Kannan (2012)).
In food and agricultural supply chains, food products are required by European
Council-regulation to be traceable from producer to end customer in order to withdraw
perished food (Folinas, Manikas, and Manos (2006)). To enable food traceability,
Ringsberg and Mirzabeiki (2013) suggested use of advanced technologies such as RFID-
tagging to provide the required high quality transport. It is stated that there is a
growing expectation that quality assurance will dominate the process of production and
distribution in food chains in the future (Trienekens and Zuurbier (2008)). Therefore,
a diagnostic model for quality control in agro supply chain logistics has been developed
based on real-time product quality information (Van der Vorst, van Kooten, and
Luning (2011)). The notion of quality controlled logistics hypothesizes that the flow
of goods can be controlled and supply chain designs can be altered in real-time or
pro-actively if the quality of the product can be predicted at each echelon of a supply
chain.
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The quality of service in a logistic supply chain can be defined as reliability, adhering
to emission standards, cargo handling competency, or quality of in-house infrastructure
and vehicles. Quality in DHL logistics, is defined as having no errors in shipments, low
product damage, on-time orders, high productivity, excellent alignment with customer
requirements, and full regulatory compliance (DHL (2015)).
In this dissertation, for freight service providers, I define and quantify quality as
the quality conformance level, that is, the degree to which a specific service conforms
to a design or specification (Nagurney and Li (2014b), Gilmore (1974), and Juran and
Gryna (1988)). Hence, quality may vary from a 0% service level to a 100% service
level (see, e.g., Juran and Gryna (1988), Campanella (1990), Feigenhaum (1983), and
Shank and Govindarajan (1994)). When the quality of a freight service is at 0% level,
the shipment has no specific quality, while a 100% service level demonstrates that the
shipment is at perfect possible quality.
While there is a plethora of rich and continuous research literature available on how
to measure quality of service in different supply chains (e.g., Mentzer, Flint, and Kent
(1999), Mentzer, Flint, and Hult (2001), Perry and Sohal (1999), Seth, Deshmukh,
and Vrat (2006a-b), and Gupta and Singh (2012)), the area of quality competition in
the logistic component of a supply chain network is still in its infancy.
1.4. Literature Review
In this section, I present a review of the existing models in which service providers
are competing to set quantity, price, and quality of their services in a service-oriented
network. I emphasize in this section the fact that existing models are either designed
for a monopoly service provider or one level of providers. Also, they missed the fact
that each provider in a network provides a quality of service which will affect the
consumers’ demand. To the best of my knowledge, there is no study that considers
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the effect of a flexible contract and quality of service for all providers on the pricing
strategy in a network.
In fact, the existing models are not general and strong enough to demonstrate the
complexity of the competitive relationships between service providers in the service-
oriented networks such as the Internet and supply chains. Therefore, the construction
of general game theory models for these networks that consider an oligopoly of service
providers, quality of service for all providers in a multi-tier network, and heterogeneous
demand markets is of importance and relevant.
1.4.1 Price and Quality Competition Among Service Providers
Pricing for any corporation has to be in line with its strategic goals (Farm and
McCarthy (1999)). Generally, pricing policy defines how a company sets the prices
of its products and services. The pricing model in an oligopoly market goes back to
the “Bertrand” equilibrium model (Bertrand (1883)) in which firms set their prices
first and then their customers choose quantities at the prices set. For example, this
pricing model has been used in power supply chains to price electricity (Hobbs (1986),
Rudkevich, Duckworth, and Rosen (1998), Brennan and Melanieb (1998), Hobbs,
Metzler, and Pang (2000), Gan and Shen (2004), Lise et al. (2006), and Soleymani,
Ranjbar, and Shirani (2008)).
In contrast to the Bertrand competition model, companies may independently
compete on the quantity of their products or services a la “Cournot” competition
(Cournot (1838)) and consumers pay for their amounts of orders. Cournot competition
is applied extensively in different supply chains of products to set the right amounts
of quantity in the network, including but not limited to food supply chains (Nagurney
et al. (2013b) and Yu and Nagurney (2013)), pharmaceutical supply chains (Masoumi,
18
Yu, and Nagurney (2012)) and medical nuclear supply chains (Nagurney and Nagurney
(2012) and Nagurney, Nagurney, and Li (2015)).
Since the 1990s, quality has emerged as one of the major competitive issues and
higher quality goods have led to increasing returns (Balachander and Srinivasan (1994)).
For instance, Japanese firms made dramatic gains in market share in industries such as
automobiles, semiconductors, and consumer electronics because of the superior quality
and reliability of their products, while American manufacturers lost their markets
since their products were perceived by consumers as offering poorer quality than
equivalently priced foreign products (Banker, Khosla, and Sinha (1998)). Applying
this to the Internet network, the timing and bandwidth requirements of multimedia
demanded new ways of dealing with data in communication systems (Hutchison,
Mauthe, and Yeadon (1997)) and, therefore, it urged the incorporation of quality into
Internet services and its effect on pricing of services. Kelly, Maulloo, and Tan (1998)
addressed the issue of fair pricing within a large-scale broadband network and how
available bandwidth should be shared between competing streams of traffic with an
optimization framework.
Early pricing approaches for the Internet include Paris metro pricing (Odlyzko
(1999)), responsive pricing (MacKie-Mason, Murphy, and Murphy (1997)), smart-
market pricing (MacKie-Mason and Varian (1995)), two-tier market pricing (Semret et
al. (2000)), and edge-pricing (Shenker et al. (1996)). Gibbens, Mason, and Steinberg
(2000) assessed Paris metro pricing in a network with competition between subnetworks
who provide multiple services in the presence of congestion. For pricing of Internet
services, a number of researchers assume a monopoly of service provider. For instance,
Dasilva, Petr, and Akar (2000) discussed static pricing policies for a service provider
in multi-service networks. The service provider could offer the incentives for each user
to choose the service that best matches her needs. See Gibbens (2000) for a survey on
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controlling and pricing in communication networks and effective and fair allocation of
scarce resources in the Internet.
In addition, equilibrium models for Internet networks generally assume basic
economic relationships and consider price as the only factor that affects demand (cf.
Kausar, Briscoe, and Crowcroft (1999), Laffont et al. (2003), Zhang et al. (2010),
Altman, Hanawal, and Sundaresan (2010), and Musacchio, Schwartz, and Walrand
(2011)). For instance, Zhang et al. (2010) proposed a two-stage Stackelberg game
with Cournot and Bertrand competition. The price of a service offered by a content
provider (CP) is determined as a function of the user’s demand and the network access
price. The network providers NPs charge CPs by maximizing their profit as a function
of market share and the CPs’ marginal cost. Laffont et al. (2003) modeled Bertrand
competition with two network providers, multi-content providers, and heterogeneous
users. A new pricing mechanism “off-net cost pricing principle” was proposed to
find the optimum price to charge users and content providers. They analyzed the
impact of an access charge on welfare and profit. The outcomes showed that the
access charge determines the allocation of communication costs and affects the level
of traffic. Economides and Tag (2012) also investigated what price network providers
should charge users and content providers in order to maximize profits. Their analysis
showed that the NP and the users are better-off while the CPs and the social surplus
are always worse-off under network freedom (a non-neutral network).
However, in new paradigms for the Internet, price is not the only factor, and
quality of service, as the ability to provide different priorities to applications, users, or
data flows, is rising to the fore, due, in part, to increasingly demanding consumers.
Considering quality as a delay cost function, Mieghem and Mieghem (2002) presented a
quantity-quality-based framework which integrates technology and economics to derive
mutually consistent pricing and scheduling of differentiated services for a heterogeneous
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market of users. By combining the robustness and fairness of generalized processor
sharing approach with the optimality and incentive-compatible pricing of generalized
µ rule (Gcµ), they proposed a new scheduling rule, called “Gcµ-PS”. Cao et al. (2002)
modeled a leader-follower cooperative game between one Internet service provider and
its users to price the services considering QoS. They concluded that the solution to a
leader-follower cooperative game is not Pareto optimal.
Other researchers focused on price competition in an oligopoly market of service
providers. He and Walrand (2003) proposed a generic model for pricing Internet
services in a multi-provider network. The results demonstrated that a noncooperative
game can be unfair and discourage future upgrades of the network. A revenue-sharing
policy, on the other hand, would be more efficient and encourages service providers to
collaborate without cheating. Hermalin and Katz (2007) modeled the simultaneous
choice of network providers for charging households and content providers, when the
NP is able to offer several levels vs. one level of service quality. They concluded that
restricting the network provider to supplying one level of quality has more negative
outcomes. To control traffic in a congested network and analyze the bounds on the
efficiency of oligopoly equilibria, Ozdaglar (2008) studied price competition between
some service providers who own the routes in a network and set prices to maximize
their profits. In a two-sided market framework, Njoroge et al. (2009) developed a
game theoretic model to analyze the competition between two interconnected Internet
service providers that compete in quality and prices for both heterogenous content
providers and consumers. Musacchio, Schwartz, and Walrand (2011) investigated
a two-sided market where content providers and network providers invest jointly in
the network infrastructure and share the revenue. Users’ demand is determined as a
function of the product of CPs’ and NPs’ investment (can be assumed as their quality)
and decreases exponentially if the price goes up.
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The pricing models are not limited to communication networks. Various studies
have been instrumental in including competition and decision-making at each stage
of a supply chain and, later, integrating them to form a unified structure. Some of
the pioneers in the study of quality competition are: Akerlof (1970), Spence (1975),
Sheshinski (1976), and Mussa and Rosen (1978), who discussed firms’ decisions on
price and quality in a quality differentiated monopoly market with heterogeneous
customers. Dixit (1979) and Gal-Or (1983) initiated the study of quantity and quality
competition in an oligopolistic market with multiple firms, where several symmetric
cases of oligopolistic equilibria were considered. Brekke, Siciliani, and Straume (2010)
investigated the relationship between competition and quality via a spatial price-
quality competition model. Others who have contributed to the topic of quality
competition include: Ronnen (1991), Banker, Khosla, and Sinha (1998), Johnson and
Myatt (2003), and Acharyya (2005).
Yamada et al. (2011), building on the work of Nagurney, Dong, and Zhang (2002),
focused on constructing a supply chain-transport supernetwork equilibrium model
based on the behavior of freight carriers. The model accounts for the interaction
between freight carriers and transport network users and endogenously determines
the transportation costs generated in the supply chain networks. The study primarily
focuses on road transportation. Xia and Ma (2012) developed a multimodal and
multiproduct transportation network model that includes spatial aspects in order to
offer a methodology to forecast the transportation demand and the freight flows in
the transportation network while maximizing profit.
In addition, Hasan (2009) implemented an international freight simultaneous
transportation equilibrium model developed by the UN economic and social commission
for Western Asia. The multimodal multicommodity model makes cost and flow predic-
tions; thereby, facilitating path/link redistribution between origin-destination pairs to
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minimize costs. Yamada et al. (2009) proposed a model for strategic transport planning,
particularly in freight terminal development and interregional freight transport network
design. The modeling is undertaken within the framework of bilevel programming,
where a multimodal multiclass user traffic assignment technique is incorporated within
the lower-level problem, and the upper-level problem determines the best combination
of actions such that the freight-related benefit-cost ratio is maximized. Holgun-Veras
et al. (2011) conducted an experimental economic investigation (in the US and the UK)
of shipper-carrier interactions on choice of mode and shipment size in freight transport.
The theoretical and empirical evidence from this study concluded that freight mode
choice can be best understood as the outcome of shipper-carrier interactions and to a
large extent is due to shipment sizes.
1.4.2 Time-Based Competition Between Internet Service Providers
Initially, the Internet was government-funded and, thus, free to the users. Later,
two pricing models were developed: one, where a flat fee was charged, and the second,
where a basic charge covered a certain time and quantity of data with additional
time/data charged incrementally. More than a decade ago, it was realized that such
pricing models may not be applicable in a rapidly changing Internet (Faizullah and
Marsic (2000)). For example, in the US, Comcast differentiates its monthly charge
for business users based upon the desired download and upload speeds12. Mediacom
Cable not only differentiates among speeds, but adds a limit to the total quantity
of data transfer13. In Canada, Rogers also offers similar pricing schemes14. For an
overview of earlier Internet pricing models see Stiller, Reichl, and Leinen (2001).
12http://www.comcast.com
13http://mediacom.com
14http://Rogers.com
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There exist several early mathematical models in which duration and quality of
services are included in the pricing of Internet services. For example, Wang, Peha,
and Sirbu (1997) examined the optimal pricing problem for guaranteed, integrated
services in a network with capacity limitation. Demand elasticity for the service and
the opportunity cost of providing that service are used to determine the optimal price
for each service. Their model is a time-varying price schedule instead of a single
price, since price is a function of time of day and demand for network services usually
changes with time of day.
For a broadband multiservice network, Kelly (1997) addressed the issue of charging
and examined the relationship between various fairness criteria and smart market
approaches for dynamic pricing. He determined how a user chooses the charge per
unit time that the user is willing to pay and then the optimality of the system is
achieved when the user’s choice of charge and network choice of allocated rates are in
equilibrium. Courcoubetisaib and Siris (1999) investigated a framework for managing
and pricing differentiated services that offers some level of performance guarantees
which is called service level agreements (SLA). The framework defines and prices the
amount of resources used by a specific SLA and, therefore, a manager can decide the
number of such contracts that can be offered simultaneously based on the available
bandwidth for the network. In this way, the pricing method can provide users with an
incentive to select traffic contracts that reflect their actual needs and maximize the
sum of utilities of users (social welfare) while maintaining a certain level of SLA. The
proposed framework is quite general and can be used with a variety of mechanisms
for implementing differentiated services.
Some scholars proposed two part pricing. For instance, Ferrari and Delgrossi
(1998) derived a pricing formula from some charging policies. In order to satisfy
these policies, the charging formula contains two parts: reservation charges and
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usage charge. The reservation charges are the prices per unit time assigned to the
buffer space, computing capacity, and schedulability for each type of service while the
usage charge depends on real-time vs. non-real-time communications. In the same
fashion, Jormakka, Grgic, and Siris (2001) proposed a charging mechanism for network
connectivity services which includes a subscription component and a usage component.
The subscription component of a charging mechanism is a one-time site connection
fee, which is paid once when the user is connected to the provider and is related to
the cost of equipment and labor necessary for connecting. The usage component,
on the other hand, is associated with resource reservation and consumption in the
backbone. It might depend on measures of resource usage such as the duration (time),
the volume transferred, and the class of quality. This mechanism can describe a wide
range of pricing schemes that are applied in the current telecommunications market
for quality guaranteed services and Best Effort services.
To address dynamic bandwidth management, Hwang, Kim, and Weiss (2002)
formulated an economic model as an optimization problem for dynamically provisioned
differentiated service networks. This optimization problem is based on economic
edge-pricing theory. Applying the price data of bandwidth commodity markets,
they proposed a way to capture the opportunity cost as a part of edge-pricing for
differentiated services. The price and cost of services are calculated in a dynamic
profit maximization problem. Another type of edge-pricing algorithm which is based
on the effective bandwidth concept is an ex-post charging mechanism, developed
by Bailey, Gamvros, and Raghavan (2007), to prevent frequent congestion in the
network. Effective bandwidth is defined by a scalar that summarizes resource usage
on a communications link and presents the capacity of the outgoing link. It is called
“ex-post” since the charging algorithm is determined in advance while the actual charge
is calculated thereafter. As they mentioned, this pricing mechanism can penalize
customers with high utilization and/or bursty traffic and charges customers with
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higher prices that demand better quality (determined by lower probability of packet
loss) for their traffic.
1.5. Dissertation Overview
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. An overview of the motivation for,
contributions, and background literature to the research that I have conducted is
provided in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 provides a thorough review of the methodologies,
foundational models and theories, including variational inequality theory and Projected
Dynamical Systems (PDS) theory, that this research is based on.
In Chapter 3 of the dissertation, according to the discussion of Section 1.3, I
consider an Internet with a service-oriented architecture, in which content and network
providers interact and compete in prices and quality of services. There are two models,
a basic model and a general one. The methodology is inspired, for the first model, by
Altman, Legout, and Xu (2011) and, for the second model, by El Azouzi, Altman, and
Wynter (2003). Altman, Legout, and Xu (2011) studied the effect of side payments,
while taking into account the different levels of quality offered by a network provider in
the Internet with one content provider, one network provider, and one demand market.
With a basic model, I complete Altman, Legout, and Xu (2011)’s model by including
the quality of both providers into the demand function and assuming a production cost
function for the content provider. El Azouzi, Altman, and Wynter (2003) modeled an
oligopoly market of content providers and one network provider in a bi-criteria Nash
equilibrium competition between content providers. Their model restricts the network
to one network provider and quality for only the content providers’ service. Therefore,
it cannot reveal the competition among the network providers for users. In contrast,
my model overcomes these limitations by including multiple providers, multiple users
(demand markets), and demands as a function of the prices and quality levels of all
26
providers. On top of that, this model presents a general framework for modeling
alternative cost functions and demand functions associated with the services and the
demand markets. This chapter is based on Saberi, Nagurney, and Wolf (2014).
I develop a projected dynamical system model of a service-oriented Internet in
Chapter 4. Such dynamical systems were introduced by Dupuis and Nagurney (1993)
and have been used in a variety of applications from transportation, spatial economic
and oligopolistic market problems (see Nagurney and Zhang (1996), Nagurney (1999),
and the references therein) to supply chain network problems (cf. Nagurney (2006a),
Nagurney, Cruz, and Toyasaki (2008), and Cruz (2008)) and finance (see Nagurney
(2008)). In addition, PDSs have been applied in population games by Sandholm (2010)
and in neuroscience by Girad et al. (2008). More recently, PDSs have been utilized to
capture the dynamics of oligopolistic competition with the inclusion of quality (see
Nagurney and Li (2014a)) and to model the dynamics of a service-oriented Internet
with only quality associated with content provision by Nagurney et al. (2013a), and
also to capture that associated with network provision by Nagurney and Wolf (2014).
Here, for the first time, I model the dynamics of both price and quality competition of
both content providers and of network providers. This work is an attempt to complete
both the latter models in terms of price setting while considering quality of service
for both content and network provision. The continuous-time dynamic model that I
propose describes the evolution of prices charged by the content providers and the
network providers, as well as their quality levels of content and network transport
provision, respectively. I provide qualitative results, including stability analysis, and
also present a discrete-time algorithm for iterative computation and tracking of the
prices and quality levels until a stationary point, equivalent to an equilibrium state
is achieved. This work extends and completes the static Internet network economic
model of Saberi, Nagurney, and Wolf (2014) by describing the underlying dynamic
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behavior, accompanied by qualitative analysis, and with the provision of additional
numerical examples. This chapter is based on Nagurney et al. (2014a).
In Chapter 5 of the dissertation, I formulate a competitive oligopoly market of
Internet network providers, motivated by ChoiceNet (cf. Wolf et al. (2012) and Wolf
et al. (2014)), although not limited to it, and the economic relationships among
them. The entities are able to offer different network services and to create contracts
for their users according to the users’ desires and needs. The model developed in
this chapter is straightforward enough to understand for both users and network
providers and creates an opportunity to control the total charge for a communication
by a modification of the parameters. The users/demand markets select contracts
based on three main criteria: the amount of usage contracted per period of time
(the usage rate) during the contract duration, the quality level of service, and the
contract duration. Here I consider a reserved usage amount per unit of time. The
earlier work on the network economic game theoretical modeling of future Internet
architectures focused on introducing quality, with an emphasis on service provision,
which is maintained through network transport/provision in Nagurney et al. (2013a),
and also on capturing the behavior of both content providers and network providers,
with the latter competing on price and quality in Nagurney and Wolf (2014). In
Nagurney et al. (2014a), the dynamics are associated with content and network
provider competition where consumers respond to the prices and the quality of both
content provision and network provision. Here, in contrast, my goal is to extend the
game theoretical modeling of competitive network providers and services by including
not only quality of service but also contract durations as strategic variables, in addition
to the reserved usage rates. This chapter is based on Nagurney et al. (2015b).
In Chapter 6, I focus on the development of game theory models in both equilibrium
and dynamic settings for a supply chain network with multiple manufacturers and
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multiple freight service providers handling freight transportation. The decision-
makers including manufacturers and freight service providers at each echelon are
competing in both prices and quality. Quality of the product is traced along the supply
chain with consumers differentiating among the products offered by manufacturers.
Also, quality of freight service shipment is accounted for in the model. Heretofore,
the integration of price and quality competitive behavior with both manufacturers
and freight service providers has not been examined in a rigorous theoretical and
computationally tractable framework. This framework is inspired, in part, by the work
of Nagurney et al. (2013a) and Saberi, Nagurney, and Wolf (2014). The former studied
a network economic game theory model of a service-oriented Internet with choices
and quality competition. In addition, Saberi, Nagurney, and Wolf (2014) proposed a
network economic game theory model of service-oriented Internet architectures with
price and quality competition between content and network providers. Here, I allow
for multiple modes of transportation and each freight service provider can have a
different number of mode options. I consider a mode in a general way in that it can
correspond to intermodal transportation. This chapter is based on Nagurney et al.
(2015a).
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the obtained results and presents the conclusions.
Suggestions and directions for future research are also presented.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODOLOGIES
This chapter provides an overview of some of the fundamental theories and
methodologies that are utilized in this dissertation. I first recall variational inequality
theory, which is utilized throughout this dissertation as the basic methodology, and is
applied in Chapters 3 to 6. Variational inequality theory is a powerful methodology
that can be applied to numerous problems to solve network economic equilibrium
models and is applied in this dissertation to analyze the equilibria of price and quality
competition in the Internet and in supply chain networks.
After the review of variational inequality theory, I present projected dynamical
systems theory, which is used in Chapters 4 and 6, to analyze the associated dynamics.
Following that, I discuss the relationships between variational inequalities and
game theory as well as the qualitative properties of the variational inequality model of
Nash equilibrium. Finally, I recall the Euler method, which is induced by the general
iterative scheme of Dupuis and Nagurney (1993) and employed in this dissertation to
solve variational inequalities and projected dynamical systems. It is a computational
algorithm and provides discrete-time realizations of the continuous-time adjustment
processes associated with projected dynamical systems.
Further details and proofs of theorems concerning variational inequalities and
projected dynamical systems can be found in Nagurney (1999), Dupuis and Nagurney
(1993), and Nagurney and Zhang (1996).
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2.1. Variational Inequality Theory
In this section, I briefly overview the theory of variational inequalities, which
is used throughout this dissertation to solve finite-dimensional network equilibrium
problems. Then, I present qualitative results, specifically concerning the existence and
uniqueness of solutions. All definitions and theorems are taken from Nagurney (1999)
except where noted. Variational inequality theory was first defined over an infinite-
dimensional space by Hartman and Stampacchia (1966). Then, finite-dimensional
theory was advanced when Dafermos (1981) recognized that traffic network equilibrium
conditions, as stated by Smith (1979), had a structure of a variational inequality. For
further discussion and proofs see Nagurney (1999). We assume here that all vectors,
except where noted, are column vectors.
Definition 2.1
The finite-dimensional variational inequality problem, VI(F,K), is to determine a
vector X∗ ∈ K ⊂ Rn, such that
〈F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (2.1)
where F is a given continuous function from K to Rn and K is a given closed convex
set. Note that 〈·, ·〉 is an inner product in n-dimensional Euclidean space, such that
〈F (X∗), X −X∗〉 =
n∑
i=1
Fi(X
∗)× (Xi −X∗i ). (2.2)
The variational inequality problem is a general formulation that encompasses a set
of mathematical problems, including nonlinear equations, optimization problems, com-
plementarity problems and fixed point problems (see Nagurney (1999)). Optimization
problems, including constrained and unconstrained, can be formulated as variational
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inequality problems. The following is a brief discussion of the relationship between
the variational inequality problem and the optimization problem. All the proofs of
the following variational inequality theorems can be found in Nagurney (1999) (see
also Kinderlehrer and Stampacchia (1980)).
Proposition 2.1
Let X∗ be a solution to the optimization problem:
Minimize f(X) (2.3)
subject to:
X ∈ K,
where f is continuously differentiable and K is closed and convex. Then X∗ is a
solution of the variational inequality problem:
〈∇f(X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (2.4)
where ∇f(X) is the gradient vector of f with respect to X, that is
∇f(X) =

∂f(X)
∂X1
∂f(X)
∂X2
. . .
∂f(X)
∂Xn

. (2.5)
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Proposition 2.2
If f(X) is a convex function and X∗ is a solution to VI(∇f,K), then X∗ is a solution
to the optimization problem (2.3). In the case that the feasible set K = Rn, then the
unconstrained optimization problem is also a variational inequality problem.
In the case where a certain symmetry conditions holds, the variational inequality
problem can be reformulated as an optimization problem. I now present the definitions
of positive semidefinite, positive-definite and strongly positive-definite.
Definition 2.2
An n× n matrix M(X), whose elements mij(X); i, j = 1, ..., n, are functions defined
on the set S ⊂ Rn, is said to be positive-semidefinite on S if
vTM(X)v ≥ 0, ∀v ∈ Rn, X ∈ S. (2.6)
It is said to be positive-definite on S if
vTM(X)v > 0, ∀v 6= 0, v ∈ Rn, X ∈ S. (2.7)
It is said to be strongly positive-definite on S if
vTM(X)v ≥ α‖v‖2, for some α > 0, ∀v ∈ Rn, X ∈ S. (2.8)
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Theorem 2.1
Assume that F (X) is continuously differentiable on K and that the Jacobian matrix
∇F (X) =

∂F1
∂X1
. . . ∂F1
∂Xn
... . . .
...
∂Fn
∂X1
. . . ∂Fn
∂Xn
 (2.9)
is symmetric and positive-semidefinite. Then, there is a real-valued convex function
f : K 7−→ R1 satisfying
∇f(X) = F (X) (2.10)
with X∗ the solution of VI(F,K) also being the solution of the mathematical program-
ming problem:
Minimize f(X)
subject to:
X ∈ K,
where f(X) =
∫
F (X)Tdx, and
∫
is a line integral.
The variational inequality problem can be reformulated as a convex optimization
problem when the Jacobian matrix of F (X) is symmetric and positive semidefinite.
Historically, many equilibrium problems were reformulated as optimization problems,
under precisely such an assumption of symmetry. The assumption, however, in terms
of applications was restrictive and precluded the more realistic modeling of multiple
commodities, multiple modes and/or classes in competition.
However, the variational inequality is the more general problem formulation that
can also handle a function F (X) with an asymmetric Jacobian (see Nagurney (1999)).
This fact allows VIs to be utilized to study a broad range of equilibrium problems.
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Existence of a solution to a variational inequality problem follows from continuity
of the function F entering the variational inequality, provided that the feasible set K
is compact, as stated in Theorem 2.2. I now provide qualitative properties, specifically,
the conditions for existence and uniqueness of a solution.
Theorem 2.2
If K is a compact convex set and F (X) is continuous on K, then the variational
inequality problem admits at least one solution X∗.
In the case that the feasible set K is unbounded, we have
Theorem 2.3
VI(F,K) admits a solution if and only if there exists an R > 0 and a solution of
VI(F,S), X∗R, such that ‖X∗R‖ < R, where S = {X : ‖X‖ ≤ R}.
Given certain monotonicity conditions, the qualitative properties of existence and
uniqueness can be obtained easily. Next, I utilize certain monotonicity conditions
to discuss the qualitative properties of existence and uniqueness. I recall some basic
definitions.
Definition 2.3 (Monotonicity)
F (X) is monotone on K if
〈F (X1)− F (X2), X1 −X2〉 ≥ 0, ∀X1, X2 ∈ K. (2.11)
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Definition 2.4 (Strict Monotonicity)
F (X) is strictly monotone on K if
〈F (X1)− F (X2), X1 −X2〉 > 0, ∀X1, X2 ∈ K, X1 6= X2. (2.12)
Definition 2.5 (Strong Monotonicity)
F (X) is strongly monotone on K if
〈F (X1)− F (X2), X1 −X2〉 ≥ α‖X1 −X2‖2, ∀X1, X2 ∈ K, (2.13)
where
α > 0.
Definition 2.6 (Lipschitz Continuity)
F (X) is Lipschitz continuous on K if there exists an L > 0, such that
〈F (X1)− F (X2), X1 −X2〉 ≤ L‖X1 −X2‖2, ∀X1, X2 ∈ K. (2.14)
L is called the Lipschitz constant.
Theorem 2.4 (Uniqueness Under Strict Monotonicity)
Suppose that F (X) is strictly monotone on K. Then the solution to the VI(F,K)
problem is unique, if one exists.
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Theorem 2.5 (Uniqueness Under Strong Monotonicity)
Suppose that F (X) is strongly monotone on K. Then there exists precisely one solution
X∗ to VI(F,K).
From the above theorems, in the case of an unbounded feasible set K, strong
monotonicity of the function F guarantees both existence and uniqueness because
existence follows from the fact that strong monotonicity implies coercivity whereas
uniqueness follows from the fact that strong monotonicity implies strict monotonicity.
On the other hand, if the feasible set K is compact, then continuity of F guarantees
the existence, and the strict monotonicity condition is sufficient to provide uniqueness.
2.2. Projected Dynamical Systems
In this section, I present the definition of a projected dynamical system (cf. Dupuis
and Nagurney (1993), Nagurney and Zhang (1996)), and then discuss the relationship
between projected dynamical systems and variational inequality problems. I also recall
some fundamental qualitative properties of the solution to the ordinary differential
equation that defines such a projected dynamical system, as well as stability analysis.
All the definitions and theorems can be found in Nagurney and Zhang (1996) and
Nagurney and Siokos (1997), except where noted.
Definition 2.7 (Vector Projection)
Given X ∈ K and v ∈ Rn, define the projection of the vector v at X (with respect to
K) by
ΠK(X, v) = lim
δ→0
(PK(X + δv)−X)
δ
(2.15)
with PK denoting the projection map:
PK(X) = argminX′∈K‖X ′ −X‖, (2.16)
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where ‖ · ‖ = 〈x, x〉.
Projected dynamical systems are different from classical dynamical systems in
that the right-hand side, which is a projection operator, is discontinuous, due to the
imposed constraints of each specific application. One can easily notice that if X lies
in the interior of the feasible set K, then the projection in the direction v is simply
v. The class of ordinary differential equations that are of concern in this dissertation
take on the following form:
X˙ = ΠK(X,−F (X)), X(0) = X0 ∈ K, (2.17)
where X˙ denotes the rate of change of vector X, K is closed convex set, corresponding
to the constraint set in a particular application, and F (X) is a vector field defined on
K. I refer to the ordinary differential equation in (2.17) as ODE(F,K).
The classical dynamical system, in contrast to (2.17), is of the form:
X˙ = −F (X), X(0) = X0 ∈ K. (2.18)
Definition 2.8 (The Projected Dynamical Systems)
Define the projected dynamical system (referred to as PDS(F,K)) X0(t) : K ×R 7→ K
as the family of solutions to the Initial Value Problem ( IVP) (2.18) for all X0 ∈ K.
Definition 2.9 (An Equilibrium Point)
The vector X∗ ∈ K is a stationary point or an equilibrium point of the projected
dynamical system PDS(F,K) if
X˙ = 0 = ΠK(X∗,−F (X∗)). (2.19)
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In other words, X∗ is a stationary point or an equilibrium point if, once the
projected dynamical system is at X∗, it will remain at X∗ for all future times.
Definition 2.9 establishes that X∗ is an equilibrium point of the projected dynamical
system PDS(F,K) if the vector field F vanishes at X∗. Since in the case that X∗ lies
on the boundary of K, one may have F (X∗) 6= 0. The contrary is only true when X∗
is an interior point of the constraint set K. Note that for classical dynamical systems,
the necessary and sufficient condition for an equilibrium point is that the vector field
vanish at that point, that is, −F (X∗) = 0.
Theorem 2.6 (see Dupuis and Nagurney (1993)), establishes the equivalence between
the set of equilibria of a projected dynamical system and the set of solutions of a
variational inequality problem.
Theorem 2.6
Assume that K is a convex polyhedron. Then the equilibrium points of the PDS(F,K)
coincide with the solutions of VI(F,K). Therefore, X∗ ∈ K satisfies
X˙ = 0 = ΠK(X∗,−F (X∗)) (2.20)
also satisfies
〈F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K. (2.21)
Based on the following fundamental assumption which is implied by Lipschitz
continuity (Definition 2.6), I now address the issues of existence and uniqueness of an
equilibrium pattern through the theory of projected dynamical systems.
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Assumption 2.1 (Linear Growth Condition)
There exists a B < ∞ such that the vector field −F : Rn 7→ Rn satisfies the linear
growth condition ‖ F (X) ‖≤ B(1+ ‖ X ‖), X ∈ K, and also
〈−F (X) + F (y), X − y〉 ≤ B ‖ X − y ‖2, ∀X, y ∈ K. (2.22)
Theorem 2.7 (Existence, Uniqueness, and Continuous Dependence)
Assume Assumption 2.1. Then
(i) For any X0 ∈ K, there exists a unique solution X0(t) to the initial value problem;
X˙ = ΠK(X,−F (X)), X(0) = X0; (2.23)
(ii) If Xn → X0 as n→∞, then Xn(t) converges to X0(t) uniformly on every compact
set of [0,∞).
The second statement of the Theorem 2.7 is sometimes called the continuous
dependence of the solution path to the ODE(F,K) on the initial value. As a result,
whenever Assumption 2.1 holds, the PDS(F,K) is well-defined and inhabits K, and is,
therefore, a sufficient condition for the fundamental properties of projected dynamical
systems as stated in Theorem 2.7.
I now turn to addressing the stability of the system (see Nagurney and Zhang
(1996)).
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Definition 2.10 (Stability of the System)
The system defined by equation (2.23) is stable if, for every X0 and every equilibrium
point X∗, the Euclidean distance ‖X∗ − X0(t)‖ is a monotonically non increasing
function of time t.
The equilibrium point X∗ is unstable, if the system defined by equation (2.23) is
not stable.
2.3. The Relationships between Variational Inequalities and
Game Theory
I briefly recall some of the relationships between variational inequalities and game
theory in this section. All the definitions and theorems can be found in Nagurney
(1999), except where noted.
The seminal work by Nash (1950, 1951) formally developed the theory of the
noncooperative game, which consists of multiple players, each of whom acts in his/her
own interest. In particular, consider a game with m players, each player i having
a strategy vector Xi = {Xi1, ..., Xin} selected from a closed, convex set Ki ⊂ Rn.
Each player i seeks to maximize his/her own utility function, Ui: K 7→ R, where
K = K1 × K2 × . . . × Km ⊂ Rmn. The utility of player i, Ui, depends not only on
his/her own strategy vector, Xi, but also on the strategy vectors of all the other players,
(X1, . . . , Xi−1, Xi+1, . . . , Xm). An equilibrium is achieved if no one can increase his/her
utility by unilaterally altering the value of its strategy vector. I first recall the formal
definition of the Nash equilibrium.
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Definition 2.11 (Nash Equilibrium)
A Nash equilibrium is a strategy vector
X∗ = (X∗1 , . . . , X
∗
m) ∈ K, (2.24)
such that
Ui(X
∗
i , Xˆ
∗
i ) ≥ Ui(Xi, Xˆ∗i ), ∀Xi ∈ Ki, ∀i, (2.25)
where Xˆ∗i = (X
∗
1 , . . . , X
∗
i−1, X
∗
i+1, . . . , X
∗
m).
In other words, under Nash equilibrium, no unilateral deviation in strategy by any
single player makes her better off.
It has been shown (cf. Hartman and Stampacchia (1966) and Gabay and Moulin
(1980)) that the Nash equilibrium problem with continuously differentiable and concave
utility functions can be formulated as a variational inequality problem defined on K.
Theorem 2.8 (Variational Inequality Formulation of Nash Equilibrium)
Under the assumption that each utility function Ui is continuously differentiable and
concave, X∗ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if X∗ ∈ K is a solution of the variational
inequality
〈F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, X ∈ K, (2.26)
where F (X) ≡ (−∇X1U1(X), . . . ,−∇XmUm(X))T, is a column vector and where
∇XiUi(X) = (∂Ui(X)∂Xi1 , . . . ,
∂Ui(X)
∂Xin
).
I now introduce conditions for existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium.
Rosen (1965) demonstrated existence under the assumptions that K is compact and
each Ui is continuously differentiable.
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Theorem 2.9 (Existence Under Compactness and Continuous
Differentiability)
Suppose that the feasible set K is compact and each Ui is continuously differentiable.
Then existence of a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed.
Karamardian (1969a-b) proved existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium
under the strong monotonicity condition.
Theorem 2.10 (Existence and Uniqueness Under Strong Monotonicity)
Assume that F (X), as given in Theorem 2.8, is strongly monotone on K. Then there
exists precisely one Nash equilibrium X∗.
Additionally, based on Theorem 2.5, uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium can be
guaranteed under the assumptions that F (X) is strictly monotone and an equilibrium
exists.
Theorem 2.11 (Uniqueness Under Strict Monotonicity)
Suppose that F (X), as given in Theorem 2.8, is strictly monotone on K. Then the
Nash equilibrium, X∗, is unique, if it exists.
2.4. Algorithm - The Euler Method
In this section, I consider the computation of a stationary point of (2.18). The
algorithm that is proposed is the Euler method, which is induced by the general
iterative scheme of Dupuis and Nagurney (1993). It has been applied to-date to solve
a plethora of dynamic network models (see, e.g., Nagurney and Zhang (1996) and
Nagurney and Dong (2002)). The algorithm not only provides a discretization of the
continuous time trajectory defined by (2.18) but also yields a stationary, that is, an
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equilibrium point that satisfies variational inequality (2.1). The Euler method will
be used throughout this dissertation for the computation of equilibria in the case of
dynamic models. In the case of this method, we have:
Fτ (X) = F (X) ∀τ ∈ T, and X ∈ K, (2.27)
where, at iteration τ , the algorithm solves the strictly convex quadratic programming
problem:
Xτ+1 = min
X∈K
1
2
〈X,X〉 − 〈Xτ − aτF (Xτ ), X〉, (2.28)
where τ denotes an iteration counter.
The procedure of the Euler method at iteration τ takes the form:
Xτ+1 = PK(Xτ − ατF (Xτ )), (2.29)
where F is the function in (2.1), and PK denotes the operator of projection (see
Nagurney (1999)) onto the closed convex set K, defined by
PK(X) = argminX′∈K‖X
′ −X‖. (2.30)
I now provide the complete statement of this algorithm.
Step 0: Initialization
Set X0 ∈ K.
Let τ = 1 and set the sequence {ατ} so that
∑∞
τ=1 ατ = ∞, ατ > 0 for all τ , and
ατ → 0 as τ →∞.
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Step 1: Computation
Compute Xτ ∈ K by solving the variational inequality subproblem:
〈Xτ + ατF (Xτ−1)−Xτ−1, X −Xτ 〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K. (2.31)
Step 2: Convergence Verification
If |Xτ − Xτ−1| ≤ , with  > 0, a pre-specified tolerance, then stop; otherwise, set
τ = τ + 1, and go to Step 1.
Convergence conditions for this method can be found in Dupuis and Nagurney
(1993) and have been studied in a variety of network-based problems in Nagurney and
Zhang (1996) and the references therein. This concludes Chapter 2 of this dissertation.
45
CHAPTER 3
A SERVICE-ORIENTED INTERNET NETWORK
ECONOMIC MODEL WITH PRICE AND QUALITY
COMPETITION IN BOTH CONTENT AND NETWORK
PROVISION
In this chapter, I develop game theory models in equilibrium settings for multiple
service providers in a next generation Internet architecture. There are two types of
service providers, content and network service providers, who are competing with each
other to set the price and quality level of their services. They share the same demand
market, so that, not only they have price and quality competition with peer providers
but also with other types of providers. The users in demand markets have different
preferences and would like to pay differently. The contributions to the literature are:
• I include quality levels, in addition to prices, for both network and content
providers, as they engage in competition for users at the demand markets.
• Consumers have more choices in that they can select network and content
providers.
• I handle heterogeneity in the providers’ cost functions and in the users’ demands
and do not limit myself to linear demand functions.
• I provide a natural underlying set of adjustment processes until the equilibrium,
or equivalently, the stationary point, is achieved.
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• The theoretical framework is supported by a rigorous algorithm that is well-suited
for implementation.
• I perform sensitivity analysis in order to investigate the impact of the transfer
prices on the providers’ prices, quality levels, and their utilities, which reflect
their profits.
This chapter is based on Saberi, Nagurney, and Wolf (2014) and is organized as
follows. In Section 3.1, a basic model of a service-oriented Internet and its analysis
are presented. A game theory model of service providers (CPs and NPs) is then
constructed and analyzed in Section 3.2 to show the competitive behavior of content
and network providers in prices and quality of services and their interactions with the
users at the demand markets. This model extends the work of Nagurney et al. (2013a)
and Nagurney and Wolf (2013) in that quality of both content and of network provision
is captured. In addition, I allow for side payments and utilize direct demand functions
(rather than their inverses). I demonstrate that the Nash equilibrium conditions
are equivalent to the solution of variational inequality problems. The closed form
expressions yielded by the Euler method (Dupuis and Nagurney (1993) and Nagurney
and Zhang (1996)) is described in Section 3.3 for the price and quality of each provider.
The algorithm is then applied to compute solutions to several examples in Section
3.4, accompanied by sensitivity analysis, in order to provide insights into the network
economics. I summarize and present my conclusions in Section 3.5.
3.1. The Basic Model
In this section, a basic model is presented for illustration purposes. Figure 3.1
shows the structure of the content flows and Figure 3.2 depicts the structure of the
financial payments in a basic (preliminary) model of a quality-based service-oriented
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Internet, which consists of a single content provider, CP1, a single network provider,
NP1, and one demand market (user) u1. For simplicity, a user refers to a market of
users.
CP1Content Provider
?NP1Network Provider
?u1Demand Market
Figure 3.1. Network Topology for the Basic Model’s Content Flow
The network provider and the content provider determine the equilibrium price
and quality for their services offered to the user. According to Figure 3.2, the network
provider charges the user a price ps1 for transferring a unit of content while maintaining
the quality at qs1 . The user is also charged by the content provider a price pc1 for
each content of quality qc1 that he receives through the network provider.

I
CP1Content Provider
?
pt1
pc1NP1Network Provider
6ps1
u1Demand Market
Figure 3.2. The Network Structure of the Basic Model’s Financial Payment Flows
I consider a usage base price, rather than a flat rate price, for both network and
content provision since I am modelling a service-oriented Internet in which all providers
offer different services at various prices and quality. The user signals his preferences
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via a demand function d111 (3.1), for the content produced by CP1 and transferred
by NP1, which depends on the price and the quality of both network and content
provision, as follows:
d111 = d0 − αps1 − βpc1 + γqs1 + δqc1 . (3.1)
The α, β, γ, and δ are all ≥ 0. d0 is the demand at zero usage based on the price
and the best effort service delivery (i.e., qs1 = qc1 = 0). Based on this demand function,
the user will request more service as the price goes down or the quality increases in
network and content provision. The α and β reflect the sensitivity of the user to the
network and content provider’s prices, respectively. I consider different price sensitivity
for content and network provider charges according to the assumption that there is
an intrinsic value in the network besides the services offered by the content providers;
otherwise, α and β would be equal. The γ and δ illustrate the effect of the quality
of service of the network and the content providers on the user’s demand. In this
simple, illustrative service-oriented Internet model, the network provider also charges
the content provider a transfer price pt1 per unit of content transfers for the right to
access end users. By charging a transfer price pt1 I have a two-sided market. I also
assume that the demand function is monotonically decreasing in price but increasing
in quality.
The quality of the network, qs1 , can be defined by various metrics such as latency,
jitter, or bandwidth. Latency is a measure of the delay that the traffic experiences as
it traverses a network and jitter is defined as the variation in that delay. Bandwidth
is measured as the amount of data that can pass through a point in a network over
time (see Smith and Garcia-Luna-Aceves (2008)). Here, I define the quality as the
“expected delay”, which is computed by the Kleinrock function (see Altman, Legout,
and Xu (2011)) as the reciprocal of the square root of delay:
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qs1 =
1√
Delay
=
√
b(d111, qs1)− d111, (3.2)
where b(d111, qs1) is the total bandwidth of the network and is a function of demand
and quality, that is:
b(d111, qs1) = d111 + q
2
s1
. (3.3)
Therefore, the greater the demand at higher quality, the larger the amount of
bandwidth used. The network provider incurs a cost of transferring the demand while
supporting qs1 for data shipment, denoted by CS1. I assume a convex, continuous,
and differentiable transfer function for NP1:
CS1 = CS1(d111, qs1) = R
(
d111 + q
2
s1
)
, (3.4)
where R is the unit cost of bandwidth. The quality of content provided can be specified
for a specific domain of content, e.g., video streaming. In this case, quality is defined
as the quality of videos produced by the content provider and CP1’s production cost,
CC1, is a convex and continuous function of quality of service:
CC1 = CC1(qc1) = Kq
2
c1
. (3.5)
This model is different from the model of Altman, Legout, and Xu (2011) since
I introduce quality and a cost function for content provision. Based on the network
structure, the user demand would be equal to the content provider’s supply and
the network provider’s shipments. I assume that there is competition between
the noncooperatively competing CP1 and NP1 and I seek to determine the Nash
equilibrium price and quality that maximize their respective utilities. The network
provider’s income in a two-sided market would be the summation of the revenue of
transferring services from the content provider to the user and providing Internet
access for users.
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Let SCP denote the price and quality strategies of CP1 where SCP ≡ {(pc1 , qc1) |
pc1 ≥ 0 and qc1 ≥ 0}. The utility of the content provider, UCP1 , which corresponds to
his profits, is the difference between his revenue and his cost, and is given by:
UCP1 = UCP1(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1) = (pc1 − pt1)d111 −CC1 = (pc1 − pt1)d111 −Kq2c1 . (3.6)
Let SNP denote the price and quality strategies of NP1 where SNP ≡ {(ps1 , qs1) |
ps1 ≥ 0 and qs1 ≥ 0}. The utility of the network provider, UNP1 , represents his profits
and also is the difference between his revenue and his cost:
UNP1 = UNP1(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1) = (ps1+pt1)d111−CS1 = (ps1+pt1−R)d111−Rq2s1 . (3.7)
Here, since the basic model builds on the model of Altman, Kegout, and Xu (2011),
and to enable the subsequent analytics in Section 3.1.1, I assume that the demand
function is linear as in (3.1). In Section 3.2, I relax this assumption in this general
model.
3.1.1 The Analysis of Two-Sided Pricing in the Basic Model
In this game, the two noncooperative agents, CP1 and NP1, seek to maximize their
individual utilities with respect to their prices and quality. CP1 maximizes his utility
with respect to pc1 and qc1 :
Maximize UCP1(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1) = (pc1 − pt1)d111 −Kq2c1 . (3.8)
NP1 also maximizes his utility but with respect to ps1 , and qs1 :
Maximize UNP1(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1) = (ps1 + pt1 −R)d111 −Rq2s1 , (3.9)
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with all the prices and the quality levels being nonnegative.
Although the network provider needs to determine the transfer price, pt1 , to charge
the content provider, he cannot maximize his utility with respect to pt1 simultaneously
with ps1 . Note that the utilities are linear functions of pt1 (with the same derivatives
with respect to pt1 but different sign), so that if pt1 is under the control of one of the
providers, it would simply be set at an extreme value and, subsequently, lead to zero
demand and zero income (see Kesidis (2012) and Altman, Legout, and Xu (2011)). As
a result, I need to fix the pt1 and maximize both UNP1 and UCP1 regarding the 4-tuple
(ps1 , qs1 , pc1 , and qc1). However, a subsequent and important question would be how
large the side payment should be and whether NP1 can get any benefit by charging
CP1. To overcome this issue, after optimizing the utility of CP1 and NP1, I check
whether NP1’s profit is strictly increasing in pt1 at pt1 = 0 and under what conditions.
Definition 3.1: Nash Equilibrium in Prices and Quality
A price and quality level pattern (p∗c1 , q
∗
c1
, p∗s1 , q
∗
s1
) ∈ SCP × SNP is said to constitute a
Nash equilibrium if:
UCP1(p
∗
c1
, q∗c1 , p
∗
s1
, q∗s1) = max(pc1 ,qc1 )∈SCP
UCP1(pc1 , qc1 , p
∗
s1
, q∗s1), (3.10)
UNP1(p
∗
c1
, q∗c1 , p
∗
s1
, q∗s1) = max(ps1 ,qs1 )∈SNP
UNP1(p
∗
c1
, q∗c1 , ps1 , qs1). (3.11)
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Theorem 3.1: Variational Inequality Formulations of Nash Equilibrium in
Prices and Quality
Assume that the content provider’s profit function, UCP1(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1), is concave
with respect to the variables (pc1 , qc1) and is continuous and continuously differentiable.
Assume, also, that for the network provider’s profit function, UNP1(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1),
is concave with respect to the variables (ps1 , qs1) and is continuous and continuously
differentiable.
Then (p∗c1 , q
∗
c1
, p∗s1 , q
∗
s1
) ∈ SCP × SNP is a Nash equilibrium according to Definition
3.1 if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality problem:
−∂UCP1(p
∗
c1
, q∗c1 , p
∗
s1
, q∗s1)
∂pc1
× (pc1 − p∗c1)−
∂UCP1(p
∗
c1
, q∗c1 , p
∗
s1
, q∗s1)
∂qc1
× (qc1 − q∗c1)
−∂UNP1(p
∗
c1
, q∗c1 , p
∗
s1
, q∗s1)
∂ps1
× (ps1 − p∗s1)−
∂UNP1(p
∗
c1
, q∗c1 , p
∗
s1
, q∗s1)
∂qs1
× (qs1 − q∗s1) ≥ 0,
∀(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1) ∈ SCP × SNP , (3.12)
or, equivalently, the variational inequality problem:
(−d111 + β(p∗c1 − pt1))× (pc1 − p∗c1) + (2Kq∗c1 + δ(pt1 − p∗c1))× (qc1 − q∗c1)
+(−d111 +α(p∗s1 + pt1 −R))× (ps1 − p∗s1) + (2Rq∗s1 +γ(R− p∗s1 − pt1))× (qs1 − q∗s1) ≥ 0,
∀(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1) ∈ SCP × SNP , (3.13)
where d111 in (3.13) is evaluated at (p
∗
c1
, q∗c1 , p
∗
s1
, q∗s1).
Proof: (3.12) follows directly from Gabay and Moulin (1980) and Dafermos and
Nagurney (1987). In order to obtain (3.13) from (3.12), I note that:
−∂UCP1(p
∗
c1
, q∗c1 , p
∗
s1
, q∗s1)
∂pc1
= −d111 + β(p∗c1 − pt1), (3.14)
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−∂UCP1(p
∗
c1
, q∗c1 , p
∗
s1
, q∗s1)
∂qc1
= 2Kq∗c1 + δ(pt1 − p∗c1). (3.15)
Similarly, I note that
−∂UNP1(p
∗
c1
, q∗c1 , p
∗
s1
, q∗c1)
∂ps1
= −d111 + α(p∗s1 + pt1 −R), (3.16)
−∂UNP1(p
∗
c1
, q∗c1 , p
∗
s1
, q∗s1)
∂qs1
= 2Rq∗s1 + γ(R− p∗s1 − pt1). (3.17)
Making the substitutions for the marginal utilities in (3.12) given by (3.14) – (3.17)
yields variational inequality (3.13).2
Theorem 3.2: Uniqueness of the Nash Equilibrium Satisfying Variational
Inequality (3.12)
The Nash equilibrium (p∗c1 , q
∗
c1
, p∗s1 , q
∗
s1
) ∈ SCP × SNP satisfying variational inequality
(3.12) is unique, if the function F is strictly monotone over the feasible set SCP ×SNP ,
under the imposed assumptions (see Definition 2.4) with the function F consisting
of minus the marginal utility functions of the providers w.r.t their price and quality
variables.
I now provide some insights as to under what conditions F for the simple model
will be strictly monotone. I note that Jacobian of F , since F = −∇U(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1),
in view of the demand function, the revenue functions, and the cost functions, is given
by:
∇F =

−∂2UCP1
∂p2c1
− ∂2UCP1
∂qc1∂pc1
− ∂2UCP1
∂ps1∂pc1
− ∂2UCP1
∂qs1∂pc1
− ∂2UCP1
∂pc1∂qc1
−∂2UCP1
∂q2c1
− ∂2UCP1
∂ps1∂qc1
− ∂2UCP1
∂qs1∂qc1
− ∂2UNP1
∂pc1∂ps1
− ∂2UNP1
∂qc1∂ps1
−∂2UNP1
∂p2s1
− ∂2UNP1
∂qs1∂ps1
− ∂2UNP1
∂pc1∂qs1
− ∂2UNP1
∂qc1∂qs1
− ∂2UNP1
∂ps1∂qs1
−∂2UNP1
∂q2s1

=

2β −δ α −γ
−δ 2K 0 0
β −δ 2α −γ
0 0 −γ 2R

.
(3.18)
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I know that if ∇F is positive-definite, then F is strictly monotone for this model and
the solution to variational inequality (3.12) is unique. Of course, if the Jacobian is
strictly diagonally dominant then it will be positive-definite.
Theorem 3.3
The network provider, NP1, will benefit from charging the content provider, CP1, if
4αR > γ2 and the user is more sensitive to the price that NP1 charges him than the
price that CP1 charges him. In other words, if 4αR− γ2 > 0, and α > β, then NP1
would set a positive pt1 to increase his profit.
Proof: According to the Nash equilibrium, the best response of NP1 and CP1 can
be found when the derivatives
∂UNP1
∂ps1
,
∂UNP1
∂qs1
,
∂UCP1
∂pc1
, and
∂UCP1
∂qc1
are all zero, under the
assumption that the associated variables are all positive. Then, I will have:
ps1 =
d0 − βpc1 + γqs1 + δqc1 − α(pt1 −R)
2α
, (3.19)
qs1 =
γ(ps1 + pt1 −R)
2R
, (3.20)
pc1 =
d0 − αps1 + γqs1 + δqc1 + βpt1
2β
, (3.21)
qc1 =
δ(pc1 − pt1)
2K
. (3.22)
By substituting (3.22) into (3.21) and then substituting the resultant equation and
(3.20) into (3.19), at the Nash equilibrium, the following expressions are obtained:
p∗s1 = Max{0,
2RKβ[d0 −Rα− (β − α)pt1 ]
αR(4βK − δ2) + βK(2αR− γ2) +R− pt1}, (3.23)
q∗s1 = Max{0,
Kγβ[d0 −Rα− (β − α)pt1 ]
αR(4βK − δ2) + βK(2αR− γ2)}, (3.24)
p∗c1 = Max{0,
2RKα[d0 −Rα− (β − α)pt1 ]
αR(4βK − δ2) + βK(2αR− γ2) + pt1}, (3.25)
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q∗c1 = Max{0,
Rδα[d0 −Rα− (β − α)pt1 ]
αR(4βK − δ2) + βK(2αR− γ2)}, (3.26)
d111 = Max{0, 2RKαβ[d0 −Rα− (β − α)pt1 ]
αR(4βK − δ2) + βK(2αR− γ2)}. (3.27)
Hence, the utilities of the network and content providers are:
UNP1 =
RK2β2(4Rα− γ2)[d0 −Rα− (β − α)pt1 ]2
[αR(4βK − δ2) + βK(2αR− γ2)]2 , (3.28)
UCP1 =
KR2α2(4Kβ − δ2)[d0 −Rα− (β − α)pt1 ]2
[αR(4βK − δ2) + βK(2αR− γ2)]2 . (3.29)
I now have the utility functions based on pt1 . To determine whether NP1 should
charge CP1 or not, I obtain the derivative of UNP1 w.r.t pt1 and check if it is increasing
when pt1 = 0.
∂UNP1
∂pt1
= (α− β)[d0 −Rα− (β − α)pt1 ]
2RK2β2(4αR− γ2)
[αR(4βK − δ2) + βK(2αR− γ2)]2 . (3.30)
When pt1 = 0,
∂UNP1
∂pt1
would be:
(α− β)[d0 −Rα] 2RK
2β2(4αR− γ2)
[αR(4βK − δ2) + βK(2αR− γ2)]2 . (3.31)
With the assumption of a large d0,
∂UNP1
∂pt1
is positive if 4αR− γ2 > 0 and α > β. 2
3.2. The Network Economic Game Theory Model of Price
and Quality Competition in a Service-Oriented Internet
In this section, I develop a network economic game theory model for a multi-
provider service-oriented network with heterogeneous markets of users. The network
structure of the problem, which depicts the direction of the content flows, is given
in Figure 3.3. See Figure 3.4 for a graphic depiction of the financial payments
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in this general model. I assume m content providers, a typical one denoted by
CPi; {i = 1, . . . ,m}, n network providers, denoted by NPj; {j = 1, . . . , n}, and o
markets of users, denoted by uk; {k = 1, . . . , o}. These providers compete under the
Nash concept of noncooperative behavior to set their prices and quality levels so as to
maximize their utilities, which are in the form of profits.
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Figure 3.3. The Network Structure of the Multi-Provider Model’s Content Flows
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To receive a unit of content service from CPi with quality qci , which is transmitted
by NPj with quality qsj , a user pays pci and psj to the CPi and NPj, respectively.
The content providers also pay the network providers for transferring their content to
the users. Each network provider NPj has a fixed transmission fee ptj that he charges
the CPs per unit of content. I group the ptj , psj , qsj , pci , and qci for i = 1, . . . ,m;
j = 1, . . . , n, into vectors pt, ps, qs, pc, and qc, respectively.
The users are heterogeneous in their demands and signal their preferences through
a demand function dijk for the content produced by content provider i and transmitted
by NPj to demand market k:
dijk = dijk(pc, qc, ps, qs), ∀i, j, k. (3.32)
In this game theory model, the demand dijk does not only depend on the price and
quality of CPi and NPj , but also on the prices and quality levels of the other content
and network providers as a result of competition among the providers. Moreover,
unlike the specialized, illustrative model in Section 3.1, the demand functions above
need not be linear, as in (3.1), and in the work of Altman, Legout, and Xu (2011) and
El Azouzi, Altman, and Wynter (2003).
Herein, if psj and pci (qsj , and qci) decrease (increase), dijk naturally goes up, but
it decreases if the price (quality) of the other providers decreases (increases). I now
describe the behavior of the content providers.
Each content provider CPi produces distinct (but substitutable) content of specific
quality qci , and sells at a unit price of pci . The total supply of CPi, SCPi, is given by:
SCPi =
n∑
j=1
o∑
k=1
dijk, i = 1, . . . ,m. (3.33)
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Each CPi has a production cost, CCi, which is a function of his supply and his
quality of service:
CCi = CCi(SCPi, qci), i = 1, . . . ,m. (3.34)
I assume that the production cost functions are convex, continuous, and continuously
differentiable functions.
Also, I assume that the content providers are profit-maximizers, where the profit
or utility of CPi; i = 1, . . . ,m, which is the difference between his total revenue and
his total cost, is given by the expression:
UCPi = UCPi(pc, qc, ps, qs) =
n∑
j=1
(pci − ptj)
o∑
k=1
dijk − CCi. (3.35)
Let K1i denote the feasible set corresponding to CPi, where K1i ≡ {(pci , qci) | pci ≥
0 and qci ≥ 0}.
I now describe the behavior of the network providers.
A network provider NPj; j = 1, . . . , n, is distinguishable by means of his quality
qsj , the fee ptj that he charges each content provider to transfer one unit of content to
the users, and the fee psj that he charges users to transfer them one unit of content. By
charging ptj , I have a two-sided market. Here, as in Section 3.1, the ptjs are assumed
to be an exogenous parameter in this multi-provider model. I assume that all content
providers are connected to all network providers and, subsequently, to all users. The
total amount of content of services transported by NPj, TNPj, is given by:
TNPj =
m∑
i=1
o∑
k=1
dijk, j = 1, . . . , n. (3.36)
NPj incurs the cost, CSj , of maintaining his network based on the offered quality and
the total traffic passing through his bandwidth:
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CSj = CSj(TNPj, qsj), j = 1, . . . , n. (3.37)
Similar cost functions were used in Altman, Legout, and Xu (2011), where it was noted
that the (transport) network provider has to cover the costs of operating the backbone,
the last mile, upgrades, etc. I also assume that these cost functions are convex,
continuous, and continuously differentiable functions. The utility of NPj ; j = 1, . . . , n
is defined as the difference between his income and his cost, that is:
UNPj = UNPj(pc, qc, ps, qs) = (psj + ptj)TNPj − CSj. (3.38)
Let K2j denote the feasible set corresponding to NPj, where K2j ≡ {(psj , qsj) | psj ≥
0 and qsj ≥ 0}.
I now consider the Nash equilibrium that captures the providers’ behavior.
Definition 3.2: Nash Equilibrium in Price and Quality
A price and quality level pattern (p∗c , q
∗
c , p
∗
s, q
∗
s) ∈ K3 ≡
∏m
i=1K1i ×
∏n
j=1K2j , is said to
constitute a Nash equilibrium if for each content provider CPi; i = 1, . . . ,m:
UCPi(p
∗
ci
, pˆ∗ci , q
∗
ci
, qˆ∗ci , p
∗
s, q
∗
s) ≥ UCPi(pci , pˆ∗ci , qci , qˆ∗ci , p∗s, q∗s), ∀(pci , qci) ∈ K1i , (3.39)
where
pˆ∗ci ≡ (p∗c1 , . . . , p∗ci−1 , p∗ci+1 , . . . , p∗cm) and qˆ∗ci ≡ (q∗c1 , . . . , q∗ci−1 , q∗ci+1 , . . . , q∗cm), (3.40)
and if for each network provider NPj; j = 1, . . . , n:
UNPj(p
∗
c , q
∗
c , p
∗
sj
, pˆ∗sj , q
∗
sj
, qˆ∗sj) ≥ UNPj(psj , ˆp∗c , q∗c , p∗sj , qsj , qˆ∗sj), ∀(psj , qsj) ∈ K2j , (3.41)
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where
pˆ∗sj ≡ (p∗s1 , . . . , p∗sj−1 , p∗sj+1 , . . . , p∗sn) and qˆ∗sj ≡ (q∗s1 , . . . , q∗sj−1 , q∗sj+1 , . . . , q∗sn). (3.42)
According to (3.39) and (3.41), a Nash equilibrium is established if no provider can
unilaterally improve upon his profits by selecting an alternative vector of quality levels
and prices.
Theorem 3.4: Variational Inequality Formulations of Nash Equilibrium for
the Service-Oriented Internet
Assume that the provider utility functions are concave, continuous, and continuously
differentiable. Then (p∗c , q
∗
c , p
∗
s, q
∗
s) ∈ K3 is a Nash equilibrium according to Definition
3.2 if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality:
−
m∑
i=1
∂UCPi(p
∗
c , q
∗
c , p
∗
s, q
∗
s)
∂pci
× (pci − p∗ci)−
m∑
i=1
∂UCPi(p
∗
c , q
∗
c , p
∗
s, q
∗
s)
∂qci
× (qci − q∗ci)
−
n∑
j=1
∂UNPj(p
∗
c , q
∗
c , p
∗
s, q
∗
s)
∂psj
× (psj − p∗sj)−
n∑
j=1
∂UNPj(p
∗
c , q
∗
c , p
∗
s, q
∗
s)
∂qsj
× (qsj − q∗sj) ≥ 0,
∀(pc, qc, ps, qs) ∈ K3, (3.43)
or, equivalently,
m∑
i=1
[
−
n∑
j=1
o∑
k=1
dijk−
n∑
j=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂pci
×(p∗ci−ptj)+
∂CCi(SCPi, q
∗
ci
)
∂SCPi
· ∂SCPi
∂pci
]
×(pci−p∗ci)
+
m∑
i=1
[
−
n∑
j=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂qci
× (p∗ci − ptj) +
∂CCi(SCPi, q
∗
ci
)
∂qci
]
× (qci − q∗ci)
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+
n∑
j=1
[
−
m∑
i=1
o∑
k=1
dijk−
m∑
i=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂psj
×(p∗sj+ptj)+
∂CSj(TNPj, q
∗
sj
)
∂TNPj
·∂TNPj
∂psj
]
×(psj−p∗sj)
+
n∑
j=1
[
−
m∑
i=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂qsj
× (p∗sj + ptj) +
∂CSj(TNPj, q
∗
sj
)
∂qsj
]
× (qsj − q∗sj) ≥ 0,
∀(pc, qc, ps, qs) ∈ K3. (3.44)
Variational inequality (3.44) can be put into standard form (cf. (2.1)): determine
X∗ ∈ K3 such that:
〈F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (3.45)
where F (X) is a continuous function such that F (X) : X 7→ K ⊂ RN , and K is a
closed and convex set. The term 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product in N -dimensional
Euclidean space. I define X ≡ (pc, qc, ps, qs), and F (X) ≡ (Fpc , Fqc , Fps , Fqs). The
specific components of F are given by: for i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 1, . . . , n:
Fpci =
∂CCi(SCPi, qci)
∂SCPi
· ∂SCPi
∂pci
−
n∑
j=1
o∑
k=1
dijk −
n∑
j=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂pci
× (pci − ptj), (3.46)
Fqci =
∂CCi(SCPi, qci)
∂qci
−
n∑
j=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂qci
× (pci − ptj), (3.47)
Fpsj =
∂CSj(TNPj, qsj)
∂TNPj
· ∂TNPj
∂psj
−
m∑
i=1
o∑
k=1
dijk −
m∑
i=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂psj
× (psj + ptj), (3.48)
Fqsj =
∂CSj(TNPj, qsj)
∂qsj
−
m∑
i=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂qsj
× (psj + ptj), (3.49)
where K = K3 and N = 2m+ 2n.
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3.3. Explicit Formulae for the Euler Method Applied to Vari-
ational Inequality (3.45) with F (X) Defined by (3.46) –
(3.49)
For computational purposes, the Euler method (cf. Section 2.4), which is a discrete-
time algorithm serving as an approximation to the continuous-time trajectories, is
utilized.
The elegance of this procedure for the computation of solutions to this network
economic model of the service-oriented Internet can be seen in the following explicit
formulae. Indeed, variational inequality (3.44) yields the following closed form
expressions, at each iteration, for the price and quality levels of each content and
network provider i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 1, . . . , n:
pτ+1ci = max
{
0, pτci+aτ (
n∑
j=1
o∑
k=1
dijk+
n∑
j=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂pci
×(pτci−ptj)−
∂CCi(SCPi, q
τ
ci
)
∂SCPi
·∂SCPi
∂pci
)
}
,
(3.50)
qτ+1ci = max
{
0, qτci + aτ (
n∑
j=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂qci
× (pτci − ptj)−
∂CCi(SCPi, q
τ
ci
)
∂qci
)
}
, (3.51)
pτ+1sj = max
{
0, pτsj+aτ (
m∑
i=1
o∑
k=1
dijk+
m∑
i=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂psj
×(pτsj+ptj)−
∂CSj(TNPj, q
τ
sj
)
∂TNPj
·∂TNPj
∂psj
)
}
,
(3.52)
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qτ+1sj = max
{
0, qτsj + aτ (
m∑
i=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂qsj
× (pτsj + ptj)−
∂CSj(TNPj, q
τ
sj
)
∂qsj
)
}
. (3.53)
Notice that all the functions to the left of the equal signs in (3.50)-(3.53) are
evaluated at their respective variables computed at the τ -th iteration.
I now provide the convergence result. The proof is direct from Theorem 5.8 in
Nagurney and Zhang (1996).
Theorem 3.5: Convergence
In this service-oriented Internet model, assume that F (X) = −∇U(pc, qc, ps, qs) is
strongly monotone. Also, assume that F is uniformly Lipschitz continuous. Then,
there exists a unique equilibrium price and quality pattern (p∗c , q
∗
c , p
∗
s, q
∗
s) ∈ K3 and any
sequence generated by the Euler method as given by (3.50)-(3.53), where {aτ} satisfies∑∞
τ=0 aτ =∞, aτ > 0, aτ → 0, as τ →∞ converges to (p∗c , q∗c , p∗s, q∗s).
3.4. Numerical Examples and Sensitivity Analysis
I implemented the Euler method (cf. (3.50) - (3.53)) to compute solutions to
service-oriented Internet network problems using Matlab programming. For the
computations, I utilized a DELL XPS Series laptop with an Intel Core Duo processor
with 3 GB RAM. The Euler method was considered to have converged if, at a given
iteration, the absolute value of the difference of each price and each quality level
differed from its respective value at the preceding iteration by no more than  = 10−6.
The sequence {aτ} was: .1(1, 12 , 12 , 13 , 13 , 13 . . .). I initialized the algorithm by setting
p0ci = q
0
ci
= p0sj = q
0
sj
= 0.00, ∀i, j.
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Example 3.1
In this example, I have two content providers, CP1 and CP2, one network provider,
NP1, and one market of users, u1 (see Figure 3.5).
CP1Content Providers
@
@
@R
CP2
 
 
 	NP1Network Provider
?u1Demand Market
Figure 3.5. Network Topology of Content Flows for Example 3.1
The demand functions are as below:
d111 = 100− 2.8ps1 − 2.1pc1 + 1.3pc2 + 1.62qs1 + 1.63qc1 − .42qc2 ,
d211 = 112− 2.8ps1 + 1.3pc1 − 2.7pc2 + 1.62qs1 − .42qc1 + 1.58qc2 .
The cost functions of the content providers, CP1 and CP2, are:
CC1 = 1.7q
2
c1
, CC2 = 2.4q
2
c2
.
The cost function of the network provider, NP1, is:
CS1 = 2.2(d111 + d211 + q
2
s1
).
The utilities of the content providers are:
UCP1 = (pc1 − pt1)d111 − CC1, UCP2 = (pc2 − pt1)d211 − CC2.
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The utility of the network provider is:
UNP1 = (ps1 + pt1)(d111 + d211)− CS1.
Here, pt1 = 33.
The Jacobian of F (X) =-∇U(pc1 , qc1 , pc2 , qc2 , ps1 , qs1), denoted by
J(pc1 , qc1 , pc2 , qc2 , ps1 , qs1), is
J(pc1 , qc1 , pc2 , qc2 , ps1 , qs1) =

4.2 −1.63 −1.3 .42 2.8 −1.62
−1.63 3.4 0 0 0 0
−1.3 .42 4.5 −1.58 2.8 −1.62
0 0 −1.58 4.8 0 0
.8 −1.21 1.4 −1.16 11.2 −3.24
0 0 0 0 −3.24 4.4

.
Since the symmetric part of J(pc1 , qc1 , pc2 , qc2 , ps1 , qs1), (J + J
T )/2, has only positive
eigenvalues, which are: 1.54, 2.80, 3.11, 4.65, 6.89, and 13.51, the F (X) in Example
3.1 is strongly monotone since ∇F (X), as above, is positive-definite. Thus, according
to Theorem 3.5, there exists a unique equilibrium, which, according to Theorem 3.7
in Nagurney and Zhang (1996) is also globally exponentially stable for the utility
gradient process.
The Euler method required 1922 iterations and 12.79 CPU seconds for convergence.
The computed equilibrium solution is:
p∗c1 = 75.68, p
∗
c2
= 63.62, p∗s1 = 0,
q∗c1 = 20.46, q
∗
c2
= 10.08, q∗s1 = 22.68,
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with incurred demands of:
d111 = 89.64, d211 = 82.68.
The utility of NP1 is 4175.73, that of CP1 is 3114.25, and that of CP2 is 2288.16.
It is interesting that the network provider NP1 is better off by not charging the user,
that is, p∗s1 = 0, and only charges the CPs for transferring the content to the user.
Meanwhile, the users’ demand for services offered by CP1 is higher (d111 > d211) in
comparison with that of CP2, since CP1 provides content services at a higher quality
(q∗c1 > q
∗
c2
).
Example 3.2
The network topology of Example 3.2 is given in Figure 3.6. I have one content
provider, CP1, two network providers, NP1 and NP2, and one market of users, u1.
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Figure 3.6. Network Topology of Content Flows for Example 3.2
The demand functions are:
d111 = 100− 1.8ps1 + .5ps2 − 1.83pc1 + 1.59qs1 − .6qs2 + 1.24qc1 ,
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d121 = 100 + .5ps1 − 1.5ps2 − 1.83pc1 − .6qs1 + 1.84qs2 + 1.24qc1 .
The network providers’ cost functions are:
CS1 = 1.7(d111 + q
2
s1
), CS2 = 1.8(d121 + q
2
s2
).
The cost function of CP1 is:
CC1 = 1.84
(
d111 + d121 + q
2
c1
)
.
The utility function of CP1 is:
UCP1 = (pc1 − pt1)d111 + (pc1 − pt2)d121 − CC1.
The utility functions of the network providers are:
UNP1 = (ps1 + pt1)d111 − CS1, UNP2 = (ps2 + pt2)d121 − CS2.
I set pt1 = pt2 = 0.
The Jacobian of -∇U(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1 , ps2 , qs2), denoted by J(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1 , ps2 , qs2),
is
J(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1 , ps2 , qs2) =

7.32 −2.48 1.3 −.99 1 −1.24
−2.48 3.68 0 0 0 0
1.83 −1.24 3.6 −1.59 −1 .6
0 0 −1.59 3.4 0 0
1.83 −1.24 −.5 .6 3 −1.84
0 0 0 0 −1.84 3.6

.
Since the symmetric part of J(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1 , ps2 , qs2), (J + J
T )/2, has only positive
eigenvalues, which are: 9.44, 5.78, 3.5, 2.57, 1.4, and 1.87, I know that the F (X)
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in Example 3.2 is strongly monotone. Hence, I can conclude that the equilibrium
solution is unique.
The equilibrium solution was achieved after 2931 iterations of the Euler method
and 18.58 seconds of CPU time:
p∗c1 = 29.19, p
∗
s1
= 27.66, p∗s2 = 37.38,
q∗c1 = 18.43, q
∗
s1
= 12.14, q∗s2 = 18.18,
with incurred demands of:
d111 = 46.72, d121 = 53.37.
The utilities of NP1 and NP2 are 962.58, and 1303.77, respectively, and the utility of
CP1 is 2112.75. Note that NP2 offers his services at a higher quality, but at a higher
price than NP1.
Example 3.3
The network topology of this example is depicted in Figure 3.7. I have two content
providers, two network providers, and three markets of users.
The demand functions are:
d111 = 112− 2.1ps1 + .6ps2 − 1.85pc1 + .5pc2 + .64qs1 − .04qs2 + .76qc1 − .4qc2 ,
d112 = 100− 2.2ps1 + .6ps2 − 2.3pc1 + .5pc2 + .7qs1 − .4qs2 + .61qc1 − .4qc2 ,
d113 = 95− .2ps1 + .6ps2 − 2.2pc1 + .5pc2 + .1qs1 − .4qs2 + .66qc1 − .4qc2 ,
d121 = 112 + .6ps1 − .2ps2 − 1.85pc1 + .5pc2 − .4qs1 + .1qs2 + .76qc1 − .4qc2 ,
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Figure 3.7. Network Topology of Content Flows for Example 3.3
d122 = 100 + .6ps1 − 2ps2 − 2.3pc1 + .5pc2 − .4qs1 + .9qs2 + .61qc1 − .4qc2 ,
d123 = 95 + .06ps1 − 2.3ps2 − 2.2pc1 + .5pc2 − .04qs1 + .68qs2 + .66qc1 − .4qc2 ,
d211 = 99− 2.1ps1 + .06ps2 + .5pc1 − 1.85pc2 + .64qs1 − .04qs2 − .4qc1 + .76qc2 ,
d212 = 110− 2.2ps1 + .6ps2 + .5pc1 − 2.3pc2 + .7qs1 − .4qs2 − .4qc1 + .61qc2 ,
d213 = 115− .2ps1 + .6ps2 + .5pc1 − 2.2pc2 + .1qs1 − .4qs2 − .4qc1 + .66qc2 ,
d221 = 99 + .6ps1 − .2ps2 + .5pc1 − 1.85pc2 − .4qs1 + .1qs2 − .4qc1 + .76qc2 ,
d222 = 110 + .6ps1 − 2ps2 + .5pc1 − 2.3pc2 − .4qs1 + .9qs2 − .4qc1 + .61qc2 ,
d223 = 115 + .06ps1 − 2.3ps2 + .5pc1 − 2.2pc2 − .04qs1 + .68qs2 − .4qc1 + .66qc2 .
The network providers’ cost functions are:
CS1 = 1.2(d111 + d112 + d113 + d211 + d212 + d213 + q
2
s1
),
CS2 = 3.2(d121 + d122 + d123 + d221 + d222 + d223 + q
2
s2
).
The cost functions of the content providers are:
CC1 = 2.7q
2
c1
, CC2 = 3.1q
2
c2
.
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The utility functions of the content providers are:
UCP1 = (pc1 − pt1)(d111 + d112 + d113) + (pc1 − pt2)(d121 + d122 + d123)− CC1,
UCP2 = (pc2 − pt1)(d211 + d212 + d213) + (pc2 − pt2)(d221 + d222 + d223)− CC2.
The utility functions of the network providers are:
UNP1 = (ps1 + pt1)(d111 + d112 + d113 + d211 + d212 + d213)− CS1,
UNP2 = (ps2 + pt2)(d121 + d122 + d123 + d221 + d222 + d223)− CS2.
I set pt1 = 23 and pt2 = 21.
The Jacobian of -∇U(pc1 , qc1 , pc2 , qc2 , ps1 , qs1 , ps2 , qs2), denoted by
J(pc1 , qc1 , pc2 , qc2 , ps1 , qs1 , ps2 , qs2), is
J =

25.4 −4.06 −3 2.4 3.24 −.6 3.24 −.84
−4.06 5.4 0 0 0 0 0 0
−3 2.4 25.4 −4.06 3.24 −.6 3.24 −.84
0 0 −4.06 6.2 0 0 0 0
4.85 −.83 4.85 −.83 18 −2.88 −2.52 1.68
0 0 0 0 −2.88 2.4 0 0
4.85 −.83 4.85 −.83 −2.52 1.68 18 −3.36
0 0 0 0 0 0 −3.36 6.4

.
The symmetric part of J(pc1 , qc1 , pc2 , qc2 , ps1 , qs1 , ps2 , qs2), (J +J
T )/2, has only positive
eigenvalues, which are: 1.85, 4.46, 5.42, 5.48, 10.71, 21.47, 28.25, and 29.56. Hence,
the F (X) in Example 3.3 is also strongly monotone and I know that the equilibrium
solution is unique.
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The equilibrium solution below is achieved after 1758 iterations and 19.95 CPU
seconds:
p∗c1 = 40.57, p
∗
c2
= 41.49, p∗s1 = 8.76, p
∗
s2
= 5.35,
q∗c1 = 13.96, q
∗
c2
= 12.76 q∗s1 = 36.67, q
∗
s2
= 12.15,
with incurred demands of:
d111 = 68.11, d112 = 35.60, d113 = 30.87,
d211 = 51.55, d212 = 41.80, d213 = 47.10,
d121 = 53.93, d122 = 21.68, d123 = 25.62,
d221 = 37.37, d222 = 27.89, d223 = 41.86.
In this example, NP1 has a lower cost of bandwidth in comparison with that of NP2.
This can be related to the technology. NP1 may be using advanced technology and,
therefore, incurs a lower cost. Hence, NP1 can set up his services at a higher quality
(qs1 > qs2) and absorbs a higher percentage of the total demand (TNP1 > TNP2).
Please refer to Figures 3.8 and 3.9 to view the trajectories of the prices and the
quality levels generated by the Euler method at iterations 0, 40, 80, . . ., 1720, and
1758.
As mentioned in Section 3.1.1, the transfer prices are not variables in this model.
However, the value of these prices: ptj ; j = 1, . . . , n, may impact the equilibrium
values of the price and quality variables and the incurred utilities of the entities in
the model. In order to make the impact of their values clearer, I provide sensitivity
analysis results. For Example 3.1, with a single network provider, NP1, I varied the
value of pt1 from 0 to 40 to determine the effect on NP1’s utility, price, and quality
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Figure 3.8. Prices and Quality Levels of Content Providers for Example 3.3
level, and on the two content providers’, CP1 and CP2, utilities, prices, and quality
levels. The results are reported in Figure 3.10.
For Example 3.1, by increasing the value of pt1 , I found that the utility of both
CPs and that of NP1 increases. Also, the prices charged by the CPs increase while
the price charged by NP1 decreases as the value of pt1 increases. On the other hand,
the quality of all providers does not change considerably (cf. Figure 3.10).
It is interesting that, when pt1 ≥ 33, the price charged by the network provider,
NP1, p
∗
s1
= 0, and the utilities of both content providers remain essentially unchanged.
Therefore, in this case, the best value of pt1 for all entities would be 33. Hence, in this
example, all providers benefit with a positive pt1 .
For Examples 3.2 and 3.3, in which I have two network providers, two kinds of
sensitivity analyzes were performed. The results for the first sensitivity analysis are
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Figure 3.9. Prices and Quality Levels of Network Providers for Example 3.3
reported in Figure 3.11. For the first sensitivity analysis, the value of both pt1 and pt2
increase simultaneously from 0 to 40. As can be seen from the results in Figure 3.11,
the utilities of all providers decrease with increasing values of the ptjs.
For the second sensitivity analysis in this set, I let pt1 + pt2 = 40, so that pt1
starts at 40 and decreases to 0 while pt2 starts at 0 and increases to 40. This transfer
pricing scheme illustrates the case where the two network providers charge the content
providers differently. The results are reported in Figure 3.12. I determine that the
total utility of providers computed as the sum of the NPs’ and the CPs’ utilities,
which correspond to their profits, is maximized when both network providers charge
equally (cf. Figure 3.12).
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Figure 3.10. Effect of pt1 Value on Utilities, Prices, and Quality in Example 3.1
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Figure 3.11. Effect of pt1 and pt2 Values on Utilities, Prices, and Quality in Example
3.2 with pt1 = pt2
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By examining other values for the sum of pt1 and pt2 , with n = 30, n = 50,
and n = 60, I reach the conclusion, computationally, that for a pricing scheme of
pt1 + pt2 = n the optimal total utility of all providers is obtained when pt1 = pt2 = n/2
for n as above.
Figure 3.12. Effect of pt1 and pt2 Values on Total Utility in Example 3.3
Interesting results have been observed by performing sensitivity analysis. First, in
a market with a monopolistic network provider all providers can increase their utility
with a positive value of pt1 . When I have multiple network providers, all providers
achieve a higher utility by not charging content providers. On the other hand, if
the network providers are allowed to charge content providers (lack of neutrality
regulations), the social welfare or summation of all providers’ utilities would be
maximized if the network providers charge equally. I obtained such conclusions based
on the results for Examples 3.2 and 3.3.
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Nevertheless, as mentioned in Musacchio and Kim (2009), Njoroge et al. (2010),
Altman, Caron, and Kesidis (2010), Musacchio, Schwartx, and Walrand (2009), and
Economides and Tag (2012), the overall effect of implementing network neutrality
regulations (e.g., having the ptjs be zero) may still be both positive and negative
depending on the parameter values and the model structure. This further emphasizes
the importance of a computational framework to investigate the impacts of different
values of transfer prices and their impacts, along with any other sensitivity analysis
that may be desired.
Example 3.4
In this example, there are 4 content providers, 3 network providers, and 5 markets
of user (Figure 13). Here, there are 4 × 3 × 5 = 60 demand functions and 7 profit
functions for the providers.
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Figure 3.13. Network Topology of Content Flows for Example 3.4
The demand functions for demand market k for content from content provider i
that is transferred by network provider j has the following form:
78
dijk =d
0
ik − βikpci +
m∑
f=1,f 6=i
(
β´fkpcf
)
= − αjkpsj +
n∑
l=1,l 6=j
(
α´lkpsl
)
= + δikqci −
m∑
f=1,f 6=i
(
´δfkqcf
)
= + γjkqsj −
n∑
l=1,l 6=j
(
γ´lkqsl
)
, ∀i, j, k.
The parameters for the demand functions are given in Table 3.1.
The cost function for network provider j has the following form:
CSj = σj(
m∑
i=1
o∑
k=1
dijk + qsj
2), ∀j,
where σ1 = 1.2, σ2 = 3.2, and σ3 = 2.5.
Also, the cost function for content provider i is given by:
CCi = κi(qci
2), ∀i,
where κ1 = 2.7, κ2 = 3.1, κ3 = 2.9, and κ4 = 3.2.
The utility of each provider is the difference of its revenue and cost. The transfer
price for network providers are:
pt1 = 10, pt2 = 14, pt3 = 13.
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The utility functions are:
UNP1 = 6.12pc1 + 6.984pc2 + 7.356pc3 + 6.492pc4 + 46.8ps1 − 9.6ps2
− 9.6ps3 + 1.62qc1 + 1.884qc2 + 1.776qc3 + 1.356qc4 − 11.616qs1 + 9.6qs2
+ 9.6qs3 − 1.2qs12 − (ps1 + 10)×
(
5.1pc1 + 5.82pc2 + 6.13pc3 + 5.41pc4
+ 39ps1 − 8ps2 − 8ps3 + 1.35qc1 + 1.57qc2 + 1.48qc3 + 1.13qc4 − 9.68qs1
+ 8qs2 + 8qs3 − 2020
)− 2424,
UNP2 = 16.32pc1 + 18.624pc2 + 19.616pc3 + 17.312pc4 − 25.6ps1 + 134.656ps2
− 25.6ps3 + 4.32qc1 + 5.0244qc2 + 4.736qc3 + 3.616qc4 + 25.6qs1 − 21.76qs2
+ 25.6qs3 − 3.2qs22 − (ps2 + 14)×
(
5.1pc1 + 5.82pc2 + 6.13pc3 + 5.41pc4
− 8ps1 + 42.08ps2 − 8ps3 + 1.35qc1 + 1.57qc2 + 1.48qc3 + 1.13qc4 + 8qs1
− 6.8qs2 + 8qs3 − 2020
)− 6464,
UNP3 = 12.75pc1 + 14.55pc2 + 15.325pc3 + 13.525pc4 − 20ps1 − 20ps2
+ 98.8ps3 + 3.375qc1 + 3.925qc2 + 3.7qc3 + 2.825qc4 + 20qs1 + 20qs2
− 32.1qs3 − 2.5qs32 − (ps3 + 13)×
(
5.1pc1 + 5.82pc2 + 6.13pc3 + 5.41pc4
− 8ps1 − 8ps2 + 39.52ps3 + 1.35qc1 + 1.57qc2 + 1.48qc3 + 1.13qc4 + 8qs1
+ 8qs2 − 12.84qs3 − 2020
)− 5050,
83
UCP1 = (pc1 − 10) ∗ (1.5pc2 − 9.6pc1 + 1.5pc3 + 1.5pc4 − 9.75ps1 + 2ps2 + 2ps3
+ 3.15qc1 − 1.5qc2 − 1.5qc3 − 1.5qc4 + 2.42qs1 − 2qs2 − 2qs3 + 510)− 2.7qc12
+ (pc1 − 14)×
(
1.5pc2 − 9.6pc1 + 1.5pc3 + 1.5pc4 + 2ps1 − 10.52ps2 + 2ps3
+ 3.15qc1 − 1.5qc2 − 1.5qc3 − 1.5qc4 − 2qs1 + 1.7qs2 − 2qs3 + 510
)
+ (pc1 − 13)×
(
1.5pc2 − 9.6pc1 + 1.5pc3 + 1.5pc4 + 2ps1 + 2ps2 − 9.88ps3 + 3.15qc1
− 1.5qc2 − 1.5qc3 − 1.5qc4 − 2qs1 − 2qs2 + 3.21qs3 + 510
)
,
UCP2 = (pc2 − 10)×
(
1.5pc1 − 10.32pc2 + 1.5pc3 + 1.5pc4 − 9.75ps1 + 2ps2 + 2ps3
− 1.5qc1 + 2.93qc2 − 1.5qc3 − 1.5qc4 + 2.42qs1 − 2qs2 − 2qs3 + 491
)− 3.1qc22
+ (pc2 − 14)×
(
1.5pc1 − 10.32pc2 + 1.5pc3 + 1.5pc4 + 2ps1 − 10.52ps2 + 2ps3
− 1.5qc1 + 2.93qc2 − 1.5qc3 − 1.5qc4 − 2qs1 + 1.7qs2 − 2qs3 + 491
)
+ (pc2 − 13)×
(
1.5pc1 − 10.32pc2 + 1.5pc3 + 1.5pc4 + 2ps1 + 2ps2 − 9.88ps3
− 1.5qc1 + 2.93qc2 − 1.5qc3 − 1.5qc4 − 2qs1 − 2qs2 + 3.21qs3 + 491
)
,
UCP3 = (pc3 − 10)×
(
1.5pc1 + 1.5pc2 − 10.63pc3 + 1.5pc4 − 9.75ps1 + 2ps2 + 2ps3
− 1.5qc1 − 1.5qc2 + 3.02qc3 − 1.5qc4 + 2.42qs1 − 2qs2 − 2qs3 + 508
)− 2.9qc32
+ (pc3 − 14)×
(
1.5pc1 + 1.5pc2 − 10.63pc3 + 1.5pc4 + 2ps1 − 10.52ps2 + 2ps3 − 1.5qc1
− 1.5qc2 + 3.02qc3 − 1.5qc4 − 2qs1 + 1.7qs2 − 2qs3 + 508
)
+ (pc3 − 13)×
(
1.5pc1 + 1.5pc2 − 10.63pc3 + 1.5pc4 + 2ps1 + 2ps2 − 9.88ps3
− 1.5qc1 − 1.5qc2 + 3.02qc3 − 1.5qc4 − 2qs1 − 2qs2 + 3.21qs3 + 508
)
,
84
UCP4 = (pc4 − 10)×
(
1.5pc1 + 1.5pc2 + 1.5pc3 − 9.91pc4 − 9.75ps1 + 2ps2 + 2ps3
− 1.5qc1 − 1.5qc2 − 1.5qc3 + 3.37 ∗ qc4 + 2.42qs1 − 2qs2 − 2qs3 + 511
)− 3.2qc42
+ (pc4 − 14)×
(
1.5pc1 + 1.5pc2 + 1.5pc3 − 9.91pc4 + 2ps1 − 10.52ps2 + 2ps3 − 1.5qc1
− 1.5qc2 − 1.5qc3 + 3.37qc4 − 2qs1 + 1.7qs2 − 2qs3 + 511
)
+ (pc4 − 13)×
(
1.5pc1 + 1.5pc2 + 1.5pc3 − 9.91pc4 + 2ps1 + 2ps2 − 9.88ps3 − 1.5qc1
− 1.5qc2 − 1.5qc3 + 3.37qc4 − 2qs1 − 2qs2 + 3.21 ∗ qs3 + 511
)
.
The Euler method required 9046 iterations and 212.56 CPU seconds for convergence.
The equilibrium result is:
p∗c1 = 32.27, p
∗
c2
= 26.37, p∗c3 = 27.35, p
∗
c4
= 30.51,
p∗s1 = 21.77, p
∗
s2
= 0, p∗s3 = 5.45,
q∗c1 = 34.89, q
∗
c2
= 19.90, q∗c3 = 23.46, q
∗
c4
= 28.71,
q∗s1 = 123.32, q
∗
s2
= 11.48, q∗s3 = 40.95.
The utilities of network providers are:
UNP1 = 18209.15, UNP2 = 1796.99, UNP2 = 5856.37.
The content providers’ utilities are:
UCP1 = 8666.85, UCP2 = 5376.46, UCP3 = 6101.34, UCP4 = 7686.85.
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According to the result1, NP1 transfers almost 60 percent of total demand for all
demand markets and CP1 has the largest supply (around 30%)
2 among the content
providers.
3.5. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, I developed a modeling and computational framework for a service-
oriented Internet using game theory and variational inequality theory. First, I modeled
a simple, illustrative Internet with a single content provider and a single network
provider and analyzed the effect of the price that the network provider charges the
content provider for data transmission. User’s demand is a function of price and
quality of both providers and goes up (down) as the price (quality) of the providers
decreases. The analysis showed that the network provider benefits from charging the
content provider if the user is more sensitive towards the network provider’s fee.
I then modeled a market of multiple providers. The providers (content and network
providers) are assumed to compete in an oligopolistic manner using quality and price
of offered services to users as strategic variables. All providers are noncooperative and
are assumed to be utility maximizers with their utilities consisting of profits. The
users, in turn, reflect their preferences for the services produced by a content provider
and transported by a network provider through the demand functions, which are
functions of price and quality of not only that network and content provider, but also
of the other providers. I also provided the equilibrium model’s equivalent variational
1TNP1 = 1192.41, TNP2 = 205.40, and TNP3 = 630.16
2SCP1 = 574.22, SCP2 = 434.53, SCP3 = 478.91, and SCP4 = 540.30
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inequality formulation with nice features for computational purposes. I used the Euler
method to solve numerical examples in order to illustrate the proposed model.
Next chapter, I focus on the dynamics of this model.
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CHAPTER 4
A DYNAMIC SERVICE-ORIENTED INTERNET
NETWORK ECONOMIC MODEL WITH PRICE AND
QUALITY COMPETITION
This chapter completes the general model in Chapter 3. The dynamic adjustment
process for the evolution of the price and quality of content service providers and
network service providers is captured in this chapter by developing a projected
dynamical systems model for a service-oriented Internet. In an oligopoly market, the
providers are competing to maximize their profits while satisfying the demands of
heterogeneous users for the Internet services at different quality levels and prices.
This chapter is based on Nagurney et al. (2014a) and is organized as follows. In
Section 4.1, I develop the model and describe the content providers’ and the network
providers’ decision-making behaviors, and formulate the dynamics of the prices and
the quality levels of the content and the network providers as a projected dynamical
system (cf. Dupuis and Nagurney (1993), Zhang and Nagurney (1995), Nagurney and
Zhang (1996), and Nagurney (2006a)). I establish that the set of stationary points
of the projected dynamical system coincides with the set of solutions to the derived
variational inequality problem in Section 3.2. The associated stability results are also
provided. In Section 4.2, I present the algorithm to track the trajectories of the prices
and quality levels over time until the equilibrium values are attained. I then apply
the discrete-time algorithm to several numerical examples to further illustrate the
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model. I summarize the results and present my conclusions in Section 4.3, along with
suggestions for future research.
4.1. The Dynamic Network Economic Model of a Service-
Oriented Internet with Price and Quality Competition
In this section, I develop the dynamic network economic model of a service-oriented
Internet with price and quality competition. Unlike earlier models that focused on
dynamics (cf. Nagurney et al. (2013a) and Nagurney and Wolf (2013)), the new model
allows for distinct quality levels associated with content provision and with transport
network service provision. Moreover, I utilize direct demand functions, rather than
inverse demand (price) functions, to capture the demand for content and network
provision. Users (consumers) at the demand markets provide feedback to the content
providers and the network providers in terms of the prices that they charge and their
quality levels through the demands. Here, the demands are for the combination of
content and network provision.
The network structure of the problem, which depicts the direction of the content
flows, is given in Figure 4.1. Specifically, I assume m content providers, with a typical
content provider denoted by CPi; n network providers, which provide the transport of
the content to the consumers at the demand markets, with a typical network provider
denoted by NPj, and o demand markets of users, with a typical demand market
denoted by uk.
The notation for the model is given in Table 4.1. I first discuss what is meant by
quality in the context of our model and describe specific functional forms, which are
then utilized in the numerical examples. I then describe the behavior of the content
providers and, subsequently, that of the network providers. I construct the projected
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Figure 4.1. The Network Structure of the Model’s Content Flows
dynamical system which formulates, in a unified manner, the dynamics of the content
provider prices and quality levels and those of the network providers.
4.1.1 Modeling of Quality in a Service-Oriented Internet
The quality of content provided can be specified for a specific domain of content,
e.g., video streaming. In this case, quality is defined as the quality of videos produced
by the content provider CPi and the production cost CCi is a convex and continuous
function of quality of service as well as demand. Here I assume that the demand is
equal to the supply, so that CCi = CCi(SCPi, qci).
A possible functional form for CCi is given by K(SCP
2
i + q
2
ci
). Of course, a special
case of this functional form would be Kq2ci , which would mean that the production
cost of CPi depends only on the quality of his product content.
The quality of the network transport service associated with NPj, qsj , in turn,
can be defined by various metrics such as the latency, jitter, or bandwidth. In this
framework, as in Chapter 3, Section 3.1, I define the quality as the “expected delay,”
which is computed by the Kleinrock function (see Altman, Legout, and Xu (2011))
as the reciprocal of the square root of delay: qsj =
1√
Delay
=
√
b(d, qsj)−D, where
b(d, qsj) is the total bandwidth of the network and is a function of demand d and
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Table 4.1. Notation for the Dynamic Network Economic Model of a Service-Oriented
Internet with Price and Quality Competition
Notation Definition
pci the price CPi; i = 1, . . . ,m, charges the users for a unit
of his content. The pci ; i = 1, . . . ,m, are grouped into the
vector pc ∈ Rm+ .
psj the price NPj; j = 1, . . . , n, charges the users for a unit
of content transmitted by NPj, with the psj ; j = 1, . . . , n,
grouped into the vector ps ∈ Rn+.
ptj the fixed transmission fee that NPj; j = 1, . . . , n, charges
the content providers for transmitting a unit of content.
qci the quality of CPi’s content. The qci ; i = 1, . . . ,m, are
grouped into the vector qc ∈ Rm+ .
qsj the quality of NPj’s transmission service. The qsj ; j =
1, . . . , n, are grouped into the vector qs ∈ Rn+.
dijk(pc, qc, ps, qs) the demand for CPi’s content; i = 1, . . . ,m, transmitted by
NPj; j = 1, . . . , n, at demand market uk; k = 1, . . . , o.
The demand function dijk is monotonically decreasing
(increasing) in pci and psj (qci and qsj), and monotonically
increasing (decreasing) in the other prices (quality levels).
SCPi the total supply of content of CPi; i = 1, . . . ,m.
TNPj the total amount of content transmitted by NPj;
j = 1, . . . , n.
CCi(SCPi, qci) the total cost of CPi; i = 1, . . . ,m, to produce the content.
CSj(TNPj, qsj) the total cost of NPj ; j = 1, . . . , n, to maintain its network
based on the total traffic passed through and its quality
level.
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quality, that is: b(d, qsj) = d+ q
2
sj
. Hence, the greater the demand at higher quality,
the larger the amount of bandwidth used. The network provider incurs a cost of
transferring the demand while supporting qsj for data transport, denoted by CSj.
I assume a convex, continuous, and differentiable transfer function for NPj of the
following general form: CSj(TNPj, qsj) = R
(
TNPj + q
2
sj
)
, where R is the unit cost
of bandwidth.
4.1.2 The Behavior of the Content Providers and Their Price and Quality
Dynamics
Each CPi produces distinct (but substitutable) content of specific quality qci , and
sells at a unit price pci . The total supply of CPi, SCPi, is given by:
SCPi =
n∑
j=1
o∑
k=1
dijk, i = 1, . . . ,m. (4.1)
I assume that the content providers are profit-maximizers, where the profit or
utility of CPi, UCPi ; i = 1, . . . ,m, which is the difference between his total revenue
and his total cost, is given by the expression:
UCPi(pc, qc, ps, qs) =
n∑
j=1
(pci − ptj)
o∑
k=1
dijk − CCi(SCPi, qci). (4.2)
Let K1i denote the feasible set corresponding to CPi, where K1i ≡ {(pci , qci) | pci ≥
0, and qci ≥ 0}. Hence, the price charged by each CPi and his quality level must
be nonnegative. I assume that the utility functions in (4.2) for all i are continuous,
continuously differentiable, and concave.
I now propose a dynamic adjustment process for the evolution of the content
providers’ prices and quality levels. In this framework, the rate of change of the price
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charged by CPi; i = 1, . . . ,m, is in proportion to
∂UCPi (pc,qc,ps,qs)
∂pci
, as long as the price
pci is positive. Namely, when pci > 0,
p˙ci =
∂UCPi(pc, qc, ps, qs)
∂pci
, (4.3)
where p˙ci denotes the rate of change of pci . However, when pci = 0, the nonnegativity
condition on the price forces the price pci to remain zero when
∂UCPi (pc,qc,ps,qs)
∂pci
≤ 0.
Hence, in this case, I am only guaranteed of having possible increases in the price.
Namely, when pci = 0,
p˙ci = max{0,
∂UCPi(pc, qc, ps, qs)
∂pci
}. (4.4)
Note that (4.4) is economically meaningful since when the marginal utility (profit)
with respect to the price charged by CPi is positive then we can expect the price that
he charges for the content to increase; similarly, if the marginal utility (profit) with
respect to the price that he charges is negative, then we can expect the price that
he charges for the content to decrease. The max operator in (4.4) guarantees that
the price will not take on a negative value, since it must satisfy the nonnegativity
constraint.
I may write (4.3) and (4.4) concisely for each CPi; i = 1, . . . ,m, as:
p˙ci =

∂UCPi (pc,qc,ps,qs)
∂pci
, if pci > 0
max{0, ∂UCPi (pc,qc,ps,qs)
∂pci
}, if pci = 0.
(4.5)
As for CPi’s quality level, when qci > 0, then
q˙ci =
∂UCPi(pc, qc, ps, qs)
∂qci
, (4.6)
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where q˙ci denotes the rate of change of qci ; otherwise:
q˙ci = max{0,
∂UCPi(pc, qc, ps, qs)
∂qci
}, (4.7)
since qci must be nonnegative.
Combining (4.6) and (4.7), I may write, for each CPi; i = 1, . . . ,m:
q˙ci =

∂UCPi (pc,qc,ps,qs)
∂qci
, if qci > 0
max{0, ∂UCPi (pc,qc,ps,qs)
∂qci
}, if qci = 0.
(4.8)
The system (4.8) is also economically meaningful, since we can expect the quality
level associated with CPi’s content to increase (decrease) if the associated marginal
utility (profit) is positive (negative). In addition, I am guaranteed that the quality of
CPi’s content is never negative.
4.1.3 The Behavior of the Network Providers and Their Price and Quality
Dynamics
Each NPj; j = 1, . . . , n, selects his quality qsj and the price ptj that he charges
each content provider to transfer one unit of content to the users, and the price psj
that he charges users to transfer them one unit of content. Theoretically, every content
provider is connected to every network provider and, subsequently, to all users, as
depicted in Figure 4.1. However, solution of the model will determine which links have
positive flows on them in terms of content. The total amount of content of services
transported by NPj, TNPj, is given by:
TNPj =
m∑
i=1
o∑
k=1
dijk, j = 1, . . . , n. (4.9)
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The utility of NPj; j = 1, . . . , n, UNPj , corresponds to his profit and is the difference
between his income and his cost, that is:
UNPj(pc, qc, ps, qs) = (psj + ptj)TNPj − CSj(TNPj, qsj). (4.10)
Let K2j denote the feasible set corresponding to network provider j, where K2j ≡
{(psj , qsj) | psj ≥ 0, and qsj ≥ 0}. Hence, NPj’s price and quality must both be
nonnegative. The utility functions in (4.10) for all j are assumed to be continuous,
continuously differentiable, and concave.
Although the network provider needs to determine the price to charge the content
provider, ptj , he cannot maximize his utility with respect to ptj simultaneously with
psj . Note that the providers’ utilities are linear functions of ptj , so that if ptj is under
the control of one of the providers, it would simply be set at an extreme value and,
subsequently, lead to zero demand and zero income. Therefore, ptj is assumed to be
an exogenous parameter in this model.
I now describe the dynamics. Using similar arguments to those in Section 4.1.2, we
have that the rate of change of the price for NPj, p˙sj ; j = 1, . . . , n, can be expressed
as:
p˙sj =

∂UNPj (pc,qc,ps,qs)
∂psj
, if psj > 0
max{0, ∂UNPj (pc,qc,ps,qs)
∂psj
}, if psj = 0.
(4.11)
Analogously, for the quality level of NPj; j = 1, . . . , n, I may write:
q˙sj =

∂UNPj (pc,qc,ps,qs)
∂qsj
, if qsj > 0
max{0, ∂UNPj (pc,qc,ps,qs)
∂qsj
}, if qsj = 0.
(4.12)
Before proceeding to the construction of the projected dynamical systems model, I
depict the financial payment flows associated with this dynamic network economic
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model in Figure 4.2. The directions of the arrows reflect the direction of the financial
payments. The prices charged, in turn, would have the opposite direction to the
associated financial payment.
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Figure 4.2. The Network Structure of the Model’s Financial Payment Flows
4.1.4 The Projected Dynamical System
Consider now the dynamic network economic model in which the content provider
prices evolve according to (4.5) and their quality levels evolve according to (4.8).
Similarly, the quality levels of the network providers evolve according to (4.12) and the
prices that they charge according to (4.11). Let X denote the (2m+ 2n)-dimensional
vector consisting of the vectors: (pc, qc, ps, qs). I also define the feasible set K ≡∏m
i=1K
1
i ×
∏n
j=1K
2
j . Finally, I define the (2m+ 2n)-dimensional vector F (X) with
components:
−∂UCPi(pc, qc, ps, qs)
∂pci
,−∂UCPi(pc, qc, ps, qs)
∂qci
; i = 1, . . . ,m;
−∂UNPj(pc, qc, ps, qs)
∂psj
,−∂UNPj(pc, qc, ps, qs)
∂qsj
; j = 1, . . . , n. (4.13)
All vectors are assumed to be column vectors.
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Then, the dynamic model described above can be rewritten as the projected
dynamical system (cf. (2.17)) defined by the following initial value problem:
X˙ = ΠK(X,−F (X)), X(0) = X0, (4.14)
where ΠK is the projection operator of −F (X) onto K and X0 is the initial point
(p0c , q
0
c , p
0
s, q
0
s) corresponding to the initial price and quality levels of the content and
the network providers. Specifically, according to Definition 2.7, ΠK is the projection,
with respect to K, with K being a convex polyhedron, of the vector −F (X) at X,
defined as:
ΠK(X,−F (X)) = lim
δ→0
PK(X − δF (X))−X
δ
, (4.15)
with PK being the projection map:
PK(X) = argminz∈K‖X − z‖, (4.16)
and where ‖ · ‖ = 〈x, x〉. In this model, the projection operator takes on a nice explicit
form because the feasible set K is the nonnegative orthant.
The trajectory associated with (4.14) provides the dynamic evolution of the prices
charged and the quality levels of both the content providers and the network providers
and the dynamic interactions among the content and the network providers and the
users at the demand markets through the demand functions.
As emphasized in Definition 2.7, the dynamical system (4.14) is non-classical in
that the right-hand side is discontinuous in order to guarantee that the constraints,
that is, the nonnegativity assumption on all the prices and quality levels, are satisfied.
Dupuis and Nagurney (1993) introduced such dynamical systems and they have been
used, to-date, in numerous competitive applications. Here, for the first time, I model
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the dynamics of both price and quality competition of both content and network
providers.
4.1.5 Stationary/Equilibrium Point
I now present the relationship between the stationary points of the projected dynamical
system (4.14) and the solutions, commonly referred to as equilibria (Theorem 2.6), of
the associated variational inequality problem: determine X∗ ∈ K such that
〈F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (4.17)
where 〈·, ·〉 denotes the inner product in n-dimensional Euclidean space, F is a
continuous function from K to Rn, and K is closed and convex set. According
to Theorem 2.6, (cf. Dupuis and Nagurney (1993)), the stationary points of the
projected dynamical system (4.14) coincide with the solution of variational inequality
(4.17). Hence, I can immediately write down the variational inequality governing
the equilibrium state (stationary point) associated with the above dynamic network
economic model, in which no content provider nor any network provider has any
incentive to alter his pricing and quality level strategies, as given below.
Corollary 4.1
(p∗c , q
∗
c , p
∗
c , q
∗
c ) ∈ K is a stationary point of the projected dynamical system (4.14) if
and only if it satisfies the variational inequality:
−
m∑
i=1
∂UCPi(p
∗
c , q
∗
c , p
∗
s, q
∗
s)
∂pci
× (pci − p∗ci)−
m∑
i=1
∂UCPi(p
∗
c , q
∗
c , p
∗
s, q
∗
s)
∂qci
× (qci − q∗ci)
−
n∑
j=1
∂UNPj(p
∗
c , q
∗
c , p
∗
s, q
∗
s)
∂psj
× (psj − p∗sj)−
n∑
j=1
∂UNPj(p
∗
c , q
∗
c , p
∗
s, q
∗
s)
∂qsj
× (qsj − q∗sj) ≥ 0,
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∀(pc, qc, ps, qs) ∈ K, (4.18)
or, equivalently,
m∑
i=1
[
−
n∑
j=1
o∑
k=1
dijk −
n∑
j=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂pci
× (p∗ci − ptj)
+
∂CCi(SCPi, q
∗
ci
)
∂SCPi
· ∂SCPi
∂pci
]
× (pci − p∗ci)
+
M∑
i=1
[
−
n∑
j=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂qci
× (p∗ci − ptj) +
∂CCi(SCPi, q
∗
ci
)
∂qci
]
× (qci − q∗ci)
+
n∑
j=1
[
−
m∑
i=1
o∑
k=1
dijk −
m∑
i=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂psj
× (p∗sj + ptj)
+
∂CSj(TNPj, q
∗
sj
)
∂TNPj
· ∂TNPj
∂psj
]
× (psj − p∗sj)
+
n∑
j=1
[
−
m∑
i=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂qsj
× (p∗sj + ptj) +
∂CSj(TNPj, q
∗
sj
)
∂qsj
]
× (qsj − q∗sj) ≥ 0,
∀(pc, qc, ps, qs) ∈ K. (4.19)
Variational inequalities (4.18) and (4.19) are precisely the ones obtained in (3.43)
and (3.44) for the static counterpart of this dynamic network economic model in
which the content providers compete in price and quality until the Nash equilibrium
is achieved whereby no content provider can improve upon his profits by altering his
price and/or quality level. Similarly, the network providers also compete in price
and quality until no network provider can improve upon his profits by altering his
strategies and, hence, a Nash equilibrium is also achieved.
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Recall that a content price pattern and quality level pattern (p∗c , q
∗
c ) is said to
constitute a Nash equilibrium if for each content provider CPi; i = 1, . . . ,m:
UCPi(p
∗
ci
, pˆ∗ci , q
∗
ci
, qˆ∗ci , p
∗
s, q
∗
s , ) ≥ UCPi(pci , pˆ∗ci , qci , qˆ∗ci , p∗s, q∗s , ), ∀(pci , qci) ∈ K1i , (4.20)
where pˆ∗ci ≡ (p∗c1 , . . . , p∗ci−1 , p∗ci+1 , . . . , p∗cm) and qˆ∗ci ≡ (q∗c1 , . . . , q∗ci−1 , q∗ci+1 , . . . , q∗cm).
Similarly, a network price pattern and quality level pattern (p∗s, q
∗
s) is said to
constitute a Nash equilibrium if for each network provider NPj; j = 1, . . . , n:
UNPj(p
∗
c , q
∗
c , p
∗
sj
, pˆ∗sj , q
∗
sj
, qˆ∗sj) ≥ UNPj(p∗c , q∗c , psj , pˆ∗sj , qsj , qˆ∗sj), ∀(psj , qsj) ∈ K2j , (4.21)
where pˆ∗sj ≡ (p∗s1 , . . . , p∗sj−1 , p∗sj+1 , . . . , p∗sn) and qˆ∗sj ≡ (q∗s1 , . . . , q∗sj−1 , q∗sj+1 , . . . , q∗sn).
4.1.6 Stability Under Monotonicity
I now investigate whether, and under what conditions, the dynamic, continuous-
time adjustment process defined by (4.14) approaches a stationary point/equilibrium.
Recall that Lipschitz continuity of F (X) (Definition 2.6) guarantees the existence of a
unique solution to (4.14). In other words, X0(t) solves the initial value problem (IVP)
X˙ = ΠK(X,−F (X)), X(0) = X0, (4.22)
with X0(0) = X0.
I propose the following definitions of stability for the adjustment process, which are
adaptations of those introduced in Zhang and Nagurney (1995) (see also Definition
2.10). I use B(X, r) to denote the open ball with radius r and center X.
I now present some fundamental definitions, for completeness, and some basic
qualitative results.
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Definition 4.1
An equilibrium price and quality pattern X∗ is stable, if for any  > 0, there exists a
δ > 0, such that for all initial X ∈ B(X∗, δ) and all t ≥ 0
X(t) ∈ B(X∗, ). (4.23)
The equilibrium point X∗ is unstable, if it is not stable.
Definition 4.2
An equilibrium price and quality pattern X∗ is asymptotically stable, if it is stable and
there exists a δ > 0 such that for all initial prices and qualities X ∈ B(X∗, δ)
lim
t→∞
X(t) −→ X∗. (4.24)
Definition 4.3
An equilibrium price and quality pattern X∗ is globally exponentially stable, if there
exist constants b > 0 and µ > 0 such that
‖X0(t)−X∗‖ ≤ b‖X0 −X∗‖e−µt, ∀t ≥ 0, ∀X0 ∈ K. (4.25)
Definition 4.4
An equilibrium price and quality pattern X∗ is a global monotone attractor, if the
Euclidean distance ‖X(t)−X∗‖ is nonincreasing in t for all X ∈ K.
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Definition 4.5
An equilibrium X∗ is a strictly global monotone attractor, if ‖X(t)−X∗‖ is monoton-
ically decreasing to zero in t for all X ∈ K.
I now investigate the stability of the dynamic adjustment process under various
monotonicity conditions.
Recall (Definition 2.3, Definition 2.4, and Definition 2.5) that F (X) is monotone if
〈F (X)− F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X,X∗ ∈ K. (4.26)
F (X) is strictly monotone if
〈F (X)− F (X∗), X −X∗〉 > 0, ∀X,X∗ ∈ K, X 6= X∗. (4.27)
F (X) is strongly monotone, if there is an η > 0, such that
〈F (X)− F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ η‖X −X∗‖2, ∀X,X∗ ∈ K. (4.28)
The monotonicity of a function F is closely related to the positive-definiteness of its
Jacobian ∇F (cf. Nagurney (1999)). Specifically, if ∇F is positive-semidefinite, then
F is monotone; if ∇F is positive-definite, then F is strictly monotone; and, if ∇F is
strongly positive-definite, in the sense that the symmetric part of ∇F, (∇F T +∇F )/2,
has only positive eigenvalues, then F is strongly monotone.
In the context of this network economic model, where F (X) is the vector of negative
marginal utilities, I note that if the utility functions are twice differentiable and the
Jacobian of the negative marginal utility functions (or, equivalently, the negative of
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the Hessian matrix of the utility functions) for the model is positive-definite, then the
corresponding F (X) is strictly monotone.
I now present an existence and uniqueness result, the proof of which follows from
the basic theory of variational inequalities (cf. Nagurney (1999)).
Theorem 4.1
Suppose that F is strongly monotone. Then there exists a unique solution to variational
inequality (4.18), equivalently, to variational inequality (4.19).
I summarize in the following theorem the stability properties of the utility gradient
process, under various monotonicity conditions on the marginal utilities.
Theorem 4.2
(i). If F (X) is monotone, then every stationary point of (4.14), provided its existence,
is a global monotone attractor for the utility gradient process.
(ii). If F (X) is strictly monotone, then there exists at most one stationary point
/equilibrium of (4.14). Furthermore, given existence, the unique equilibrium is a
strictly global monotone attractor for the utility gradient process.
(iii). If F (X) is strongly monotone, then the stationary point/equilibrium of (4.14),
which is guaranteed to exist, is also globally exponentially stable for the utility gradient
process.
Proof: The stability assertions follow from Theorems 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 in Nagurney and
Zhang (1996), respectively. The uniqueness in (ii) is a classical variational inequality
result, whereas existence and uniqueness as in (iii) follows from Theorem 4.1. 2
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Example 4.1
I present Example 4.1 in order to illustrate some of the above concepts and results.
The network consists of a single content provider, CP1, a single network provider,
NP1, and users at a single demand market, u1, as depicted in Figure 4.3.
mCP1Content Provider
?mNP1Network Provider
?mu1Demand Market
Figure 4.3. Network Topology for Example 4.1
The data are as follows. The price pt1 is 10. The demand function is:
d111 = 100− .5ps1 − .8pc1 + .6qs1 + .5qc1 .
The cost functions of CP1 and NP1 are, respectively:
CC1 = 2(d
2
111 + q
2
c1
), CS1 = 2.2
(
d111 + q
2
s1
)
,
and their utility/profit functions are, respectively:
UCP1 = (pc1 − pt1)d111 − 2(d2111 + q2c1),
UNP1 = (ps1 + pt1)d111 − 2.2(d111 + q2s1).
Hence, I have that:
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Fpc1 =−
∂UCP1
∂pc1
=− ∂
[
(pc1 − 10)d111 − 2(d2111 + q2c1)
]
∂pc1
=− [d111 + (pc1 − 10)×
∂d111
∂pc1
− 4d111 × ∂d111
∂pc1
]
=− [d111 + (pc1 − 10)× (−.8)− 4d111 × (−.8)]
=− 428 + 2.1ps1 + 4.16pc1 − 2.52qs1 − 2.1qc1 ;
Fqc1 =
− ∂UCP1
∂qc1
=− ∂
[
(pc1 − 10)d111 − 2(d2111 + q2c1)
]
∂qc1
=− [(pc1 − 10)×
∂d111
∂qc1
− (4d111 × ∂d111
∂qc1
+ 4qc1)]
=− [(pc1 − 10).5− 4d111 × .5− 4qc1 ]
=205− ps1 − 2.1pc1 + 1.2qs1 + 5qc1 ;
Fps1 =−
∂UNP1
∂ps1
=− ∂
[
(ps1 + 10)d111 − 2.2(d111 + q2s1)
]
∂ps1
=− [d111 + (ps1 + 10)×
∂d111
∂ps1
− 2.2× ∂d111
∂ps1
]
=− [d111 + (ps1 + 10)× (−.5)− 2.2× (−.5)]
=− 96.1 + ps1 + .8pc1 − .6qs1 − .5qc1 ;
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Fqs1 =−
∂UNP1
∂qs1
=− ∂
[
(ps1 + 10)d111 − 2.2(d111 + q2s1)
]
∂qs1
=− [(ps1 + 10)×
∂d111
∂qs1
− (2.2× ∂d111
∂qs1
+ 4.4qs1)]
=− [(ps1 + 10)× .6− 2.2× .6− 4.4qs1 ]
=− 4.68− .6ps1 + 4.4qs1 .
The Jacobian matrix of -∇U(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1), denoted by J(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1), is
J(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1) =

4.16 −2.1 2.1 −2.52
−2.1 5 −1 1.2
.8 −.5 1 −.6
0 −.6 0 4.4

.
Since the symmetric part of J(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1), (J
T + J)/2, has only positive
eigenvalues, which are: .43, 2.40, 4.03, and 7.70, the F (X) in Example 4.1 (cf.
(4.13)) is strongly monotone. Thus, according to Theorem 4.2, there exists a unique
equilibrium, which is also globally exponentially stable for the utility gradient process.
In the next section, I compute the equilibrium solution to this and other numerical
examples.
4.2. The Algorithm and Numerical Examples
Note that, for computation purposes, I need to identify a discrete-time adjustment
process or algorithm which will track the continuous-time process (4.14) until a
stationary point is achieved (equivalently, an equilibrium point). In this section, I
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use the Euler method (cf. Section 2.4), for computational procedure. Specifically,
iteration τ of the Euler method is given by:
Xτ+1 = PK(Xτ − aτF (Xτ )). (4.29)
4.2.1 Explicit Formulae for the Euler Method Applied to the Service-
oriented Internet with Price and Quality Competition
The elegance of the Euler method for the computation of solutions to this network
economic model of a service-oriented Internet can be seen in the following explicit
formulae. Indeed, variational inequality problem (4.19) yields the following closed
form expressions for the price and the quality of each content and network provider
i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 1, . . . , n:
pτ+1ci = max
{
0, pτci + aτ (
n∑
j=1
o∑
k=1
dijk +
n∑
j=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂pci
× (pτci − ptj)
−∂CCi(SCPi, q
τ
ci
)
∂SCPi
· ∂SCPi
∂pci
)
}
, (4.30)
qτ+1ci = max
{
0, qτci + aτ (
n∑
j=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂qci
× (pτci − ptj)−
∂CCi(SCPi, q
τ
ci
)
∂qci
)
}
, (4.31)
pτ+1sj = max
{
0, pτsj + aτ (
m∑
i=1
o∑
k=1
dijk +
m∑
i=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂psj
× (pτsj + ptj)
−∂CSj(TNPj, q
τ
sj
)
∂TNPj
· ∂TNPj
∂psj
)
}
, (4.32)
qτ+1sj = max
{
0, qτsj + aτ (
m∑
i=1
o∑
k=1
∂dijk
∂qsj
× (pτsj + ptj)−
∂CSj(TNPj, q
τ
sj
)
∂qsj
)
}
. (4.33)
Note that, all the functions to the right of the equal signs in (4.30)-(4.33) are
evaluated at their respective variables computed at the τ -th iteration.
107
I now provide the convergence result. The proof is direct from Theorem 5.8 in
Nagurney and Zhang (1996).
Theorem 4.3: Convergence
In the service-oriented Internet network economic problem, assume that F (X) =
−∇U(pc, qc, ps, qs) is strongly monotone. Also, assume that F is uniformly Lips-
chitz continuous. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium price and quality pattern
(p∗c , q
∗
c , p
∗
s, q
∗
s) ∈ K and any sequence generated by the Euler method as given by (4.30)-
(4.33), where {aτ} satisfies
∑∞
τ=0 aτ = ∞, aτ > 0, aτ → 0, as τ → ∞ converges to
(p∗c , q
∗
c , p
∗
s, q
∗
s) satisfying (4.19).
I implemented the Euler method (cf. (4.30) - (4.33)) to compute solutions to
service-oriented Internet network economic problems in Matlab. The Euler method
was deemed to have converged if, at a given iteration, the absolute value of the difference
of each price and each quality level differed from its respective value at the preceding
iteration by no more than  = 10−6. The sequence {aτ} used was: .1(1, 12 , 12 , 13 , 13 , 13 . . .).
I initialized the algorithm by setting p0ci = q
0
ci
= p0sj = q
0
sj
= 0, ∀i, j.
Example 4.1 Revisited
I first applied the Euler method to compute the equilibrium prices and quality levels
for Example 4.1. The Euler method required 136 iterations for convergence to the
computed equilibrium:
p∗c1 = 94.50, q
∗
c1
= 2.51 p∗s1 = 24.40, q
∗
s1
= 4.38,
with an incurred demand of d111 = 16.10. The utility/profit of CP1 is 829.32 and that
of NP1 is 475.70.
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If I change pt1 to 0, then the new equilibrium is:
p∗c1 = 35.39, q
∗
c1
= 2.59, p∗s1 = 87.14, q
∗
s1
= 4.52,
with an incurred demand of d111 = 16.08. The utility/profit of CP1 is now 882.01 and
that of NP1 is 505.92.
Hence, in this example, NP1 would be better off in terms of his profit, if he does
not charge CP1, that is, pt1 = 0 since the users are more sensitive to the content
provider’s price.
Example 4.2
In Example 4.2, there are 2 content providers, CP1 and CP2, a single network provider,
NP1, and users at a single demand market, u1, as depicted in Figure 4.4.mCP1Content Providers
@
@R
mCP2
 
 	mNP1Network Provider
?mu1Demand Market
Figure 4.4. Network Topology for Example 4.2
The data are as follows. The demand functions are:
d111 = 100− 1.6pc1 + .65pc2 − 1.35ps1 + 1.2qc1 − .42qc2 + 1.54qs1 ,
d211 = 112 + .65pc1 − 1.5pc2 − 1.35ps1 − .42qc1 + 1.3qc2 + 1.54qs1 .
The cost functions of the content providers are:
CC1 = 1.7q
2
c1
, CC2 = 2.4q
2
c2
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and their utilities/profit functions are:
UCP1 = (pc1 − pt1)d111 − CC1, UCP2 = (pc2 − pt1)d211 − CC2.
The cost function of the network provider is:
CS1 = 2.1(d111 + d211 + q
2
s1
),
and its utility/profit function is:
UNP1 = (ps1 + pt1)(d111 + d211)− CS1.
pt1 is assumed to be 10.
The Jacobian matrix of -∇U(pc1 , qc1 , pc2 , qc2 , ps1 , qs1), denoted by
J(pc1 , qc1 , pc2 , qc2 , ps1 , qs1), is
J(pc1 , qc1 , pc2 , qc2 , ps1 , qs1) =

3.2 −1.2 −.65 .42 1.35 −1.54
−1.2 3.4 0 0 0 0
−.65 .42 3 −1.3 1.35 −1.54
0 0 −1.3 4.8 0 0
.95 −.78 .85 −.88 5.4 −3.08
0 0 0 0 −3.08 4.2

.
Since the symmetric part of J(pc1 , qc1 , pc2 , qc2 , ps1 , qs1), (J
T +J)/2, has only positive
eigenvalues, which are 1.52, 1.61, 2.37, 4.22, 5.61, and 8.67, the F (X) in Example
4.2 is strongly monotone. Thus, according to Theorem 4.2, there exists a unique
equilibrium, which is also globally exponentially stable for the utility gradient process.
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The Euler method converged in 2341 iterations to the following solution:
p∗c1 = 51.45, p
∗
c2
= 56.75, p∗s1 = 42.64,
q∗c1 = 14.63, q
∗
c2
= 12.66, q∗s1 = 37.06,
with incurred demands of:
d111 = 66.32, d211 = 70.13.
The utility/profit of CP1 is 2385.21 and of CP2: 2894.58. The utility/profit of NP1
is 4011.92.
Example 4.3
In Example 4.3, there is a single content provider, CP1, two network providers, NP1
and NP2, and a single demand market, u1, as depicted in Figure 4.5.
m
m m
m
u1
NP1 NP2
CP1



A
A
AU
A
A
AU



Content Provider
Network Providers
Demand Market
Figure 4.5. Network Topology for Example 4.3
The demand functions are:
d111 = 100− 1.7pc1 − 1.5ps1 + .8ps2 + 1.76qc1 + 1.84qs1 − .6qs2 ,
111
d121 = 100− 1.7pc1 + .8ps1 − 1.8ps2 + 1.76qc1 − .6qs1 + 1.59qs2 .
The cost function of CP1 is:
CC1 = 1.5(d111 + d121 + q
2
c1
),
and its utility/profit function is:
UCP1 = (pc1 − pt1)d111 + (pc1 − pt2)d121 − CC1.
The network providers’ cost functions are:
CS1 = 1.8(d111 + q
2
s1
), CS2 = 1.7(d121 + q
2
s2
),
with their utility/profit functions given by:
UNP1 = (ps1 + pt1)d111 − CS1, UNP2 = (ps2 + pt2)d121 − CS2.
I set pt1 = 10 and pt2 = 7.
The Jacobian matrix of -∇U(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1 , ps2 , qs2), denoted by J(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 ,
qs1 , ps2 , qs2), is
J(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1 , ps2 , qs2) =

6.8 −3.52 .7 −1.24 1 −.99
−3.52 3 0 0 0 0
1.7 −1.76 3 −1.84 −0.8 .6
0 0 −1.84 3.6 0 0
1.7 −1.76 −.8 .6 3.6 −1.59
0 0 0 0 −1.59 3.4

.
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The symmetric part of J(pc1 , qc1 , ps1 , qs1 , ps2 , qs2), (J
T + J)/2, has only positive
eigenvalues, which are .66, 1.32, 1.84, 3.96, 5.85, and 9.77. Hence, the F (X) in
Example 4.3 is also strongly monotone and I know from Theorem 4.2, that there
exists a unique equilibrium, which is also globally exponentially stable for the utility
gradient process.
The Euler method required 120 iterations for convergence. The computed equilib-
rium solution is:
p∗c1 = 64.90, p
∗
s1
= 57.98, p∗s2 = 43.24,
q∗c1 = 64.41, q
∗
s1
= 33.82, q∗s2 = 22.70,
with incurred demands of:
d111 = 99.28, d121 = 87.38.
The utility/profit of CP1 is 4006.15. The utilities/profits of NP1 and NP2 are
4511.38, and 3366.23, respectively.
Example 4.4
In Example 4.4, there are two content providers, CP1 and CP2, two network providers,
NP1 and NP2, and two markets of users, u1 and u2, as depicted in Figure 4.6.mCP1
?
Q
Q
Q
Qs
mCP2
?



+
Content Providers
mNP1
?
Q
Q
Q
Qs
mNP2
?



+
Network Providers
mu1 mu2Demand Markets
Figure 4.6. Network Topology for Example 4.4
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The demand functions are:
d111 = 100− 2.1pc1 + .5pc2 − 2.3ps1 + .6ps2 + .63qc1 − .4qc2 + .62qs1 − .4qs2 ,
d112 = 112− 2.2pc1 + .5pc2 − 2.4ps1 + .6ps2 + .75qc1 − .4qc2 + .56qs1 − .4qs2 ,
d121 = 100− 2.1pc1 + .5pc2 + .6ps1 − 2.2ps2 + .63qc1 − .4qc2 − .4qs1 + .59qs2 ,
d122 = 112− 2.2pc1 + .5pc2 + .6ps1 − 2.1ps2 + .75qc1 − .4qc2 − .4qs1 + .68qs2 ,
d211 = 110 + .5pc1 − 2.3pc2 − 2.3ps1 + .6ps2 − .4qc1 + .76qc2 + .62qs1 − .4qs2 ,
d212 = 104 + .5pc1 − 2.05pc2 − 2.4ps1 + .6ps2 − .4qc1 + .61qc2 + .56qs1 − .4qs2 ,
d221 = 110 + .5pc1 − 2.3pc2 + .6ps1 − 2.2ps2 − .4qc1 + .76qc2 − .4qs1 + .59qs2 ,
d222 = 104 + .5pc1 − 2.05pc2 + .6ps1 − 2.1ps2 − .4qc1 + .61qc2 − .4qs1 + .68qs2 .
The cost functions of the content providers are:
CC1 = 3.7(q
2
c1
), CC2 = 5.1(q
2
c2
),
and their profit functions are, respectively:
UCP1 = (pc1 − pt1)(d111 + d112) + (pc1 − pt2)(d121 + d122)− CC1,
UCP2 = (pc2 − pt1)(d211 + d212) + (pc2 − pt2)(d221 + d222)− CC2.
The network providers’ cost functions are:
CS1 = 4.1(d111 + d112 + d211 + d212 + q
2
s1
), CS2 = 3.9(d121 + d122 + d221 + d222 + q
2
s2
),
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and their profit functions are:
UNP1 = (ps1 + pt1)(d111 + d112 + d211 + d212)− CS1,
UNP2 = (ps2 + pt2)(d121 + d122 + d221 + d222)− CS2.
I set pt1 = 23, and pt2 = 22.
The Jacobian matrix of -∇U(pc1 , qc1 , pc2 , qc2 , ps1 , qs1 , ps2 , qs2), denoted by
J(pc1 , qc1 , pc2 , qc2 , ps1 , qs1 , ps2 , qs2), is
J =

17.2 −2.76 −2 1.6 3.5 −.38 3.1 −.47
−2.76 7.4 0 0 0 0 0 0
−2 1.6 17.4 −2.74 3.5 −.38 3.1 −.47
0 0 −2.74 10.2 0 0 0 0
3.3 −.58 3.35 −.57 18.8 −2.36 −2.4 1.6
0 0 0 0 −2.36 8.2 0 0
3.3 −.58 3.35 −.57 −2.4 1.6 17.2 −2.54
0 0 0 0 0 0 −2.54 7.8

.
The symmetric part of J(pc1 , qc1 , pc2 , qc2 , ps1 , qs1 , ps2 , qs2), (J
T +J)/2, has only posi-
tive eigenvalues, which are 6.54, 7.01, 7.57, 8.76, 10.24, 20.39, 20.94, and 22.75. Hence,
the F (X) in Example 4.4 is also strongly monotone and I know that the equilibrium
solution is unique. The Euler method required 189 iterations for convergence, yielding:
p∗c1 = 41.52, p
∗
c2
= 40.93, p∗s1 = 0.0, p
∗
s2
= 0.58,
q∗c1 = 7.09, q
∗
c2
= 4.95, q∗s1 = 5.44, q
∗
s2
= 6.08,
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with incurred demands of:
d111 = 37.04, d112 = 45.42, d121 = 35.91, d122 = 45.21,
d211 = 38.83, d212 = 42.00, d221 = 37.70, d222 = 41.79.
The profits of the content providers are, respectively, 2924.52 and 2828.79, and
that of the network providers: 2964.97 and 2855.11.
Please refer to Figures 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9 to view the trajectories of the prices and
the quality levels generated by the Euler method at iterations 0, 10, 20,. . ., 180, 189.
Figure 4.7. Prices of Content Provider 1 and Network Provider 1 for Example 4.4
4.3. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, I developed a new dynamic network economic model of a service-
oriented Internet. The model handles price and quality competition among the content
providers, who provide Internet services, and among the network providers, who
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Figure 4.8. Prices of Content Provider 2 and Network Provider 2 for Example 4.4
transport the Internet services. Consumers’ direct demand functions that depend on
the prices and the quality levels of both content and network providers, are utilized
rather than their inverses, which allows for prices as strategic variables. The framework
yields insights into the evolutionary processes of quality selection and the pricing of
Internet services.
Specifically, the projected dynamical systems model that I constructed provides
a continuous-time adjustment process of the content providers’ and the network
providers’ prices and quality levels, and guarantees that prices and quality levels
remain nonnegative, as required by the constraints. The set of equilibrium/stationary
points coincides with the set of solutions to the associated variational inequality
problem. Qualitative properties, including stability analysis results, are also provided.
I proposed the Euler method, which provides a discretization of the continuous-time
adjustment process and yields closed form expressions for the prices and the quality
levels at each iteration step. This algorithm also tracks the values of the prices and
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Figure 4.9. Quality Levels of Content Providers and Network Providers for Example
4.4
quality levels over time until the equilibrium point is achieved. Convergence results
were also given. The generality and practicality of this model and the computational
procedure are illustrated through several numerical examples.
The NGI, as an exciting new area of research, is full of additional questions for
investigation, some of which are identified below.
• The price mechanisms used in my model are usage-based with bandwidth-based
pricing for the content and network providers. What would be the equilibrium
outcomes if a flat-rate or a two-part tariff pricing mechanism would be applied
instead? Would such pricing mechanisms increase the users’ demand?
• Since long-term contracts lock in consumers, and have low flexibility, it would be
interesting to consider short-term contracts, which might enable users to select
among the service offerings from different providers, in a more dynamic manner.
How would the pricing dynamics change in an NGI with short-term contracts?
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• In this model, content providers and network providers have no restrictions on
their services, with the exception that the prices that they charge and their
service quality levels must be nonnegative. However, providers in the future
Internet might be faced with some additional restrictions, that is, constraints.
For example, what would be the dynamics and the equilibrium prices and quality
levels for a content provider with a production capacity limitation? To what
extent would the equilibrium price and quality level of a network provider with
capacity restrictions for data transmission change in comparison with the case
with no such limitations? Presently, I handled capacity limitations through the
nonlinearity of the underlying cost functions, which can capture “congestion”.
• I might wish to consider an upper bound or a non-zero lower bound for the
quality level of a content or network provider’s services. A non-zero, but positive,
lower bound on the quality level, for example, might occur due to an imposed
governmental regulation.
• Empirical studies could be used to validate this model and to yield a parameter-
ization of the model that matches a practical NGI scenario.
I believe that the framework constructed in this chapter can serve as the foundation
to address the above issues in future research.
According to the suggestion for future work, I focus in the next chapter on the
pricing model in a service-oriented Internet which offers flexible contracts to users, so
that they can select the services according to their preferred level of quality of service,
price, and contract duration.
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CHAPTER 5
A DIFFERENTIATED SERVICE-ORIENTED INTERNET
NETWORK ECONOMIC MODEL WITH
DURATION-BASED CONTRACTS
In contemplating the current Internet limitations, the ChoiceNet project as a new
architecture for the Internet of the future aims to provide more options and flexibility
for all entities in the market by offering more choices to support and encourage
innovation. It is not unreasonable to expect having different levels of quality of service
and flexible contract duration for connectivity in the future Internet.
In this dissertation, I considered quality of service for content and network providers
in their pricing competition and analyzed this game theory model in both static (in
Chapter 3) and dynamic versions (in Chapter 4) to describe the dynamic adjustment
process for setting equilibrium prices and quality levels.
In this chapter, I develop and analyze a pricing model for a service-oriented Internet
in which contract duration is not fixed anymore and can change according to customer
preferences. In this model, network providers compete in usage service rates, quality
levels, and duration-based contracts. Also, the governing equilibrium conditions of
the model which yield the service usage, quality levels and durations are formulated
as a variational inequality problem.
This chapter is based on Nagurney et al. (2015b) and is organized as follows. In
Section 5.1, I develop the competitive duration-based contract pricing model for a
service-oriented Internet network with differentiated services and derive the variational
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inequality formulation. I also provide some qualitative properties of the equilibrium
pattern. In Section 5.2, I present the computational scheme, which has nice features
for ease of implementation, and compute solutions to a series of numerical examples in
Section 5.3. Then, I summarize the results and present my conclusions in Section 5.4.
5.1. The Competitive Duration-Based Differentiated Service-
Oriented Internet Game Theory Model
The focus of this game theory model is on duration-based contracts associated with
network provision. I assume m network providers, with a typical provider denoted
by i; i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and n users/demand markets, with a typical one denoted by
j; j = 1, 2, . . . , n, as shown in Figure 5.1. A demand market may correspond to an
individual, a household, and/or a business. The users reveal their preferences for the
network providers’ services through the demand price functions, which depend on the
service usage rates, the quality of services, and the contract durations. I further detail
the model’s underlying functions and their generality below.
k
k
Network Providers
Demand Markets
1
1
· · ·
· · ·
k
k
i
j
k
k
m
n
· · ·
· · ·?
J
J
J
J
J
JJ^
HHHHHHHHHHHHHj?












fl
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
ZZ~?







=
 
· · ·
· · · · · ·
Figure 5.1. The Bipartite Structure of the Competition Among the Network Providers
Let pij denote the price for transmission of bit units of data (can be individual
ones, Megabits, etc.) from network provider i to demand market j, for the selected
number of bit units per unit time (the reserved usage rate), at the quality level and the
contract duration. Let dij represent the number of bit units per unit time contracted
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for between i and j, corresponding to the reserved usage rate, and let qij denote the
contracted quality of service, which ranges between 0 and 100, with 100 denoting
perfect quality. Tij represents the duration of the contract between network provider i
and demand market j in units of time. Henceforth, I simply refer to usage rate with
the understanding that I mean a reserved usage rate. Indeed, although the consumer
may not use up all of his usage rate over the contract duration, the network provider
still needs to plan as if the user will in order to provide the desired quality of service
and to manage the network resources accordingly. In Section 5.2, I provide specific
units in the context of the numerical examples for the prices and decision variables.
Here, I consider a general framework that can be adapted to any currency, time unit,
etc., as needed.
Each network provider i; i = 1, . . . ,m, is faced, due to technological limitations,
with a maximum usage rate to a particular demand market j, d¯ij, in terms of the
number of megabits per time unit, and may also impose a nonnegative minimum, dij,
so that
dij ≤ dij ≤ d¯ij, ∀i, j. (5.1)
Also, due to technological limitations, network provider i may have a maximum
level of quality q¯ij that he can offer, where q¯ij ≤ 100. Hence,
0 ≤ qij ≤ q¯ij, ∀i, j. (5.2)
A single parameter with quality, subject to a bound, as above, was also used in
El Azouzi, Altman, and Wynter (2003). Finally, the contract durations for a given
network provider and demand market pair may also be bounded, with T¯ij denoting
the upper bound and T ij the nonnegative lower bound, so that
T ij ≤ Tij ≤ T¯ij, ∀i, j. (5.3)
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For example, some service providers may decide to have a positive lower bound
for the contract duration for ease of management. I group the usage rates for service
into the vector d ∈ Rmn+ , the quality levels into the vector q ∈ Rmn+ , and the contract
durations into the vector T ∈ Rmn+ .
The price of i’s service provision to j, pij, is a function of the reserved usage rates,
the quality levels, and the durations of the contracts, as follows
pij = pij(d, q, T ), ∀i, j. (5.4)
Note that, according to (5.4), the price of transmission between (i, j) depends not
only on the usage per unit time in terms of the number of bit units, the quality of
transmission between (i, j), and the contract duration, but also on the values of these
variables associated with other network providers and with other demand markets.
This functional form also captures that users should be aware of the services offered
by the network providers at other demand markets. Indeed, I argue for transparency
in ChoiceNet, so that users can make informed decisions.
I assume that the demand price function for each pair (i, j) is monotonically
decreasing in its reserved service usage rate and in the duration of the contract
between (i, j) but increasing in terms of service quality between the pair.
Each network provider incurs a cost for delivering the service at a specific quality
and usage rate and maintaining the quality within the contract duration. I assume
that the cost is a convex function (MacKie-Mason and Varian (1995) and Roughgarden
(2005)) of the usage rates, the quality levels, and the durations of the contracts. The
cost cij incurred by network provider i for serving j is of the form:
cij = cij(d, q, T ), ∀i, j. (5.5)
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The demand price functions (5.4) and the cost functions (5.5) are assumed to be
continuous and continuously differentiable. The generality of the expressions in (5.4)
and (5.5) allows for modeling and application flexibility. Moreover, the cost functions
in (5.5) reveal that the cost on a “link” as depicted in Figure 5.1 can depend not only
on the usage on that link but also on those on the other links. Since there may be
competition for network resources, such cost functions can capture competition, albeit
at a high level, among the network providers during transmission.
The strategic variables of network provider i are its service usage rates, the
quality levels, and the contract durations {di, qi, and Ti}, where di = (di1, . . . , din),
qi = (qi1, . . . , qin), and Ti = (Ti1, . . . , Tin).
The utility or profit of network provider i is the difference between his revenue and
his total cost and is given by the expression:
Ui =
n∑
j=1
pijTijdij −
n∑
j=1
cij, ∀i. (5.6)
In (5.6), the first term after the equal sign is the total revenue and the second term
is the total cost of network provider i.
Let Ki denote the feasible set corresponding to network provider i, where Ki ≡
{(di, qi, Ti)| (5.1), (5.2), and (5.3) hold} and define K ≡
∏m
i=1K
i. The network
providers compete in a noncooperative manner in the sense of Nash (1950, 1951), each
one seeking to maximize his profit. I wish to determine the vectors of the equilibrium
service usage rates, quality levels, and contract durations (d∗, q∗, T ∗), according to the
definition below.
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Definition 5.1: The Differentiated Service-Oriented Internet Network
Equilibrium with Contract Durations
A service usage rate, quality, and contract duration pattern (d∗, q∗, T ∗) ∈ K is an
equilibrium if, for each network provider i; i = 1, . . . ,m:
Ui(d
∗
i , q
∗
i , T
∗
i , dˆ
∗
i , qˆ
∗
i , Tˆ
∗
i ) ≥ Ui(di, qi, Ti, dˆ∗i , qˆ∗i , Tˆ ∗i ), ∀(di, qi, Ti) ∈ Ki, (5.7)
where
dˆ∗i = (d
∗
1, . . . , d
∗
i−1, d
∗
i+1, . . . , d
∗
m),
qˆ∗i = (q
∗
1, . . . , q
∗
i−1, q
∗
i+1, . . . , q
∗
m),
and
Tˆ ∗i = (T
∗
1 , . . . , T
∗
i−1, T
∗
i+1, . . . , T
∗
m). (5.8)
According to (5.7), an equilibrium is established if no network provider can
unilaterally improve his profit by selecting an alternative vector of reserved service
usage rates, quality levels, and durations of contracts, given the decisions of the other
network providers.
5.1.1 Variational Inequality Formulation
Variational inequalities have been used to formulate a spectrum of problems arising
in engineering, operations research, management sciences, transportation science,
economics, and finance (cf. Nagurney (1999), Nagurney (2006a), Nagurney and Qiang
(2009), and references therein). I now present a variational inequality formulation of
the service-oriented Internet network equilibrium.
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Theorem 5.1: Variational Inequality Formulation
Assume that the profit function Ui(d, q, T ) is concave with respect to the variables
{di1, . . . , din}, {qi1, . . . , qin}, and {Ti1, . . . , Tin} and is continuous and continuously
differentiable for each network provider i; = 1, . . . ,m. Then, (d∗, q∗, T ∗) ∈ K is an
Internet network equilibrium service usage rate, quality, and contract duration pattern
according to Definition 5.1 if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality:
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∂Ui(d
∗, q∗, T ∗)
∂dij
× (dij − d∗ij)−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∂Ui(d
∗, q∗, T ∗)
∂qij
× (qij − q∗ij)
−
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
∂Ui(d
∗, q∗, T ∗)
∂Tij
× (Tij − T ∗ij) ≥ 0, ∀(d, q, T ) ∈ K, (5.9)
or, equivalently, (d∗, q∗, T ∗) ∈ K is an equilibrium service usage rate, quality, and
contract duration pattern if and only if it satisfies the variational inequality:
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
[ n∑
l=1
∂cil(d
∗, q∗, T ∗)
∂dij
−pij(d∗, q∗, T ∗)×T ∗ij−
n∑
l=1
∂pil(d
∗, q∗, T ∗)
∂dij
×d∗il×T ∗il
]
×(dij−d∗ij)
+
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
[ n∑
l=1
∂cil(d
∗, q∗, T ∗)
∂qij
−
n∑
l=1
∂pil(d
∗, q∗, T ∗)
∂qij
×d∗il×T ∗il
]
×(qij−q∗ij)
+
m∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
[ n∑
l=1
∂cil(d
∗, q∗, T ∗)
∂Tij
−pij(d∗, q∗, T ∗)×d∗ij−
n∑
l=1
∂pil(d
∗, q∗, T ∗)
∂Tij
×d∗il×T ∗il
]
×(Tij − T ∗ij) ≥ 0, ∀(d, q, T ) ∈ K. (5.10)
Proof: (5.9) follows directly from Gabay and Moulin (1980) and Dafermos and
Nagurney (1987). In order to obtain variational inequality (5.10) from variational
inequality (5.9), I note that:
− ∂Ui
∂dij
= [
n∑
l=1
∂cil
∂dij
−pij×Tij−
n∑
l=1
∂pil
∂dij
×dil×Til]; i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 1, . . . , n, (5.11)
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−∂Ui
∂qij
= [
n∑
l=1
∂cil
∂qij
−
n∑
l=1
∂pil
∂qij
× dil × Til]; i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 1, . . . , n,
(5.12)
and
− ∂Ui
∂Tij
= [
n∑
l=1
∂cil
∂Tij
−pij×dij−
n∑
l=1
∂pil
∂Tij
×dil×Til]; i = 1, . . . ,m; j = 1, . . . , n. (5.13)
Multiplying the right-most expression in (5.11) by (dij − d∗ij) and summing the
resultant over all i and all j; multiplying the right-most expression in (5.12) by
(qij − q∗ij) and summing the resultant over all i and j, and, similarly, multiplying the
right-most expression in (5.13) by (Tij − T ∗ij) and summing the resultant over all i and
j yields (5.10). The conclusion follows. 2
I now put variational inequality (5.10) into standard form (cf. (2.1)), that is:
Determine X∗ ∈ K ⊂ RN , such that
〈F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (5.14)
where F is a given continuous function from K to RN , and K is a closed and convex
set.
I define themn-dimensional vectorsX ≡ (d, q, T ) and F (X) ≡ (F 1(X), F 2(X), F 3(X))
with the (i, j)-th component, F 1ij, of F
1(X) given by
F 1ij(X) ≡ −
∂Ui
∂dij
, (5.15)
the (i, j)-th component, F 2ij, of F
2(X) given by
F 2ij(X) ≡ −
∂Ui
∂qij
, (5.16)
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and the (i, j)-th component, F 3ij, of F
3(X) given by
F 3ij(X) ≡ −
∂Ui
∂Tij
, (5.17)
and with the feasible set K ≡ K. Then, clearly, variational inequality (5.10) can be
put into standard form (5.14).
The next theorem is immediate from the standard theory of variational inequalities
(Theorem 2.2) since the feasible set K in this model is compact and the function F
that enters variational inequality (5.14) for this model under the imposed assumptions
is continuous.
Theorem 5.2: Existence
A solution X∗ to variational inequality (5.14) is guaranteed to exist.
Theorem 5.3: Uniqueness
If F (X) is strictly monotone, that is:
〈F (X1)− F (X2), X1 −X2〉 > 0, ∀X1, X2 ∈ K, X1 6= X2, (5.18)
then the solution to variational inequality (5.14) is unique.
Proof: Follows from the standard theory of variational inequalities.
F (X) is strictly monotone if ∇F (X) is positive-definite over the feasible set K.
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5.2. Explicit Formulae for the Euler Method Applied to the
Internet Network Model with Contract Durations
The feasible set underlying variational inequality (5.10) consists of box-type
constraints, a feature that I exploit for computational purposes. Specifically, for
the computation of the equilibrium pattern, I apply the Euler method (cf Section 2.4),
which has been used to compute solutions to numerous network equilibrium problems
(see, e.g., Nagurney and Zhang (1996), Cruz (2008), Nagurney et al. (2014a), and
Toyasaki, Daniele, and Wakolbinger (2014)).
In particular, the Euler method yields, at each iteration, explicit formulae for the
solution of the variational inequality problem (5.10) for the service usage rates, quality
levels, and contract durations, respectively:
dτ+1ij = max
{
dij ,min{d¯ij, dτij − aτF 1ij(Xτ )}
}
, (5.19)
qτ+1ij = max
{
0 ,min
{
q¯ij , q
τ
ij − aτF 2ij(Xτ )
}}
, (5.20)
T τ+1ij = max
{
T ij ,min
{
T¯ij, T
τ
ij − aτF 3ij(Xτ )
}}
. (5.21)
Note that all the functions to the right of the equal signs in (5.19) - (5.21) are
evaluated at their respective variables computed at the τ -th iteration. This algorithm
can also be interpreted as a discrete-time adjustment process. I now provide the
convergence result. The proof is direct from Theorem 5.8 in Nagurney and Zhang
(1996).
Theorem 5.4: Convergence
In the differentiated service-oriented Internet network game theory model with contract
durations, if F (X) = −∇U(d, q, T ) is strictly monotone at an equilibrium pattern and
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F is uniformly Lipschitz continuous, then there exists a unique equilibrium service usage
rate, quality, and contract duration pattern (d∗, q∗, T ∗) ∈ K and any sequence generated
by the Euler method as given by (5.19) - (5.21), where {aτ} satisfies
∑∞
τ=0 aτ =∞,
aτ > 0, aτ → 0, as τ →∞ converges to (d∗, q∗, T ∗).
5.3. Numerical Examples
In this section, I present numerical examples which were solved via the Euler
method (cf. (5.19) - (5.21)). I implemented the Euler method in Matlab on a VAIO
S Series laptop with an Intel Core i7 processor and 12 GB RAM. The algorithm
was considered to have converged if, at a given iteration, the absolute value of the
difference of each variable differed from its respective value at the preceding iteration
by no more than  = 10−4. The sequence {aτ} was: (1, 12 , 12 , 13 , 13 , 13 . . .). I initialized
the algorithm for all the examples by setting d0ij = dij; q
0
ij = qij;T
0
ij = T ij, ∀i, j.
The examples begin with a simple network of two network providers and a single
demand market (user), which I then extend to two network providers and two demand
markets, and, finally, to two network providers and three demand markets. In the
numerical examples, the contract durations, Tijs, are in hours, the reserved service
usage rates, dijs, are in Megabits/second, and, to simplify the presentation, the prices
pij are in cents/Megabit multiplied by 10
−5. I use linear demand functions (see Altman,
Legout, and Xu (2011), El Azouzi, Altman, and Wynter (2003), and Zhang et al.
(2010)). The data were selected to be consistent with current advertized pricing of
ISPs such as COMCAST1.
1http://www.comcast.com.
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Example 5.1
The topology of the first example is given in Figure 5.2.
1
Demand Market 1
@
@
@
 
 
 R	
Network Provider 1
1 
Network Provider 2
2
Figure 5.2. Network Topology for Example 5.1
The price functions at Demand Market 1 are:
p11 = 12− .167 d11 − .0334 d21 + .032 q11 − .0064 q21 − .182T11 − .0546T21,
p21 = 12− .0334 d11 − .167 d21 − .0064 q11 + .032 q21 − .0546T11 − .182T21.
These functions reflect that Demand Market 1 is more sensitive to the contract
duration than to the service usage rate. The network providers likely use different
technologies for their services; therefore, their cost functions are distinct. The cost
functions for Network Providers 1 and 2 are, respectively:
c11 = (.0049 q
2
11 + .001715 q11 + .029 d11)T11, c21 = (.0037 q
2
21 + .053 d
2
21)T21.
The utility functions of the network providers are:
U1 = p11d11T11 − c11, U2 = p21d21T21 − c21.
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Network Provider 1 can offer services at a higher minimum service usage rate but
at a lower minimum contract duration in comparison to Network Provider 2, where:
23 ≤ d11 ≤ 250, 0 ≤ q11 ≤ 100, 8 ≤ T11 ≤ 40,
15 ≤ d21 ≤ 200, 0 ≤ q21 ≤ 100, 11 ≤ T21 ≤ 40.
Applying the Euler algorithm, the equilibrium solution and the incurred prices at
equilibrium are, after 2,957 iterations:
d∗11 = 28.28, d
∗
21 = 20.97,
T ∗11 = 17.83, T
∗
21 = 17.39,
q∗11 = 92.17, q
∗
21 = 90.63,
p11 = 4.75, p21 = 5.73.
The Jacobian matrix of F (X) = −∇U(d, q, T ), denoted by J(d11, d21, T11, T21, q11, q21),
for this problem evaluated at X∗ = (d∗11, d
∗
21, T
∗
11, T
∗
21, q
∗
11, q
∗
21) is:
J =

5.96 0.59 3.25 0.97 −0.575 0.115
0.58 7.655 0.95 3.16 0.11 −0.56
3.25 0.94 10.29 1.54 0 0.18
0.70 3.16 1.15 7.63 0.13 0
−0.57 0 0 0 0.17 0
0 −0.56 0 0 0 0.13

.
The eigenvalues of 1
2
(J + JT ) are: 0.08, 0.11, 4.28, 4.49, 9.45, and 13.43, which
are all positive. Therefore, both the uniqueness of the equilibrium solution and the
conditions for convergence of the algorithm are guaranteed.
132
Hence, the contract period for Network Provider 1 at Demand Market 1 is 17.83
hours and that for Network Provider 2 is 17.39 hours. The revenue in cents for Network
Provider 1 for the contract is p11d11T11 × 10−5 × 3600 seconds/hour = 86.26 cents.
Network Provider 1 faces a cost of c11× 10−5× 3600 seconds/hour=27.37 cents for this
contract and earns a profit of 58.91 cents. Note that this is the profit for a single user
for the specific contract. The quality provided by Network Provider 1 of its service is
higher than that provided by Network Provider 2. Network Provider 2, on the other
hand, earns 75.15 cents in revenue, has 33.61 cents in cost, which results in a profit of
41.54 cents.
In this example, if the contract duration was 1 month, the revenue of a network
provider per user would be approximately $35, which is consistent with today’s Internet
pricing from service providers such as COMCAST.
Example 5.2 and Sensitivity Analysis in Price
This example has the identical data to that of Example 5.1 except that Demand
Market 2 is added as in Figure 5.3.
Demand Market 1
1 
Demand Market 2
2
? ?
Network Provider 1
1 
Network Provider 2
2
Q
Q
Q
Q
QQs




+
Figure 5.3. Network Topology for Example 5.2
The price functions for Demand Market 1 are as in Example 5.1. Demand Market
2 is less sensitive to the contract duration, the quality, and the service usage rate than
Demand Market 1. The price functions for Demand Market 2 are:
p12 = 6− .063 d12 − .0126 d22 + .026 q12 − .0052 q22 − .117T12 − .0351T22,
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p22 = 6− .0126 d12 − .063 d22 − .0052 q12 + .026 q22 − .0351T12 − .117T22.
The cost functions for the network providers are:
c1j = (.0049 q
2
1j + .001715 q1j + .029 d1j)T1j, j = 1, 2
c2j = (.0037 q
2
2j + .053 d
2
2j)T2j, j = 1, 2.
The bounds on the variables are:
23 ≤ d1j ≤ 250, 0 ≤ q1j ≤ 100, 8 ≤ T1j ≤ 40, j = 1, 2,
15 ≤ d2j ≤ 200, 0 ≤ q2j ≤ 100, 11 ≤ T2j ≤ 40, j = 1, 2.
The utilities of Network Providers 1 and 2 are, respectively:
U1 = p11d11T11 + p12d12T12 − (c11 + c12), U2 = p21d21T21 + p22d22T22 − (c21 + c22).
The Jacobian of F (X) is also positive-definite for this example.
The computed equilibrium, after 6,244 iterations, is:
d∗11 = 28.28, d
∗
12 = 45.39, d
∗
21 = 20.98, d
∗
22 = 20.71,
T ∗11 = 17.83, T
∗
12 = 15.18, T
∗
21 = 17.39, T
∗
22 = 12.47,
q∗11 = 92.16, q
∗
12 = 100.00, q
∗
21 = 90.72, q
∗
22 = 72.64.
At equilibrium, the prices of network services are:
p11 = 4.75, p12 = 2.89, p21 = 5.73, p22 = 3.50.
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Following the methodology used for Example 5.1, it follows that the revenue of
Network Provider 1 is now 157.87 cents and his cost is 54.93 cents. Therefore, Network
Provider 1 earns 102.94 cents for providing the services to the two demand markets.
Network Provider 2’s profit is now 55.12 cents at a revenue of 107.75 cents and a cost
of 52.63 cents.
In order to understand the impact of changes in price functions, I denoted the
constant term in the price functions of Demand Market 2 as p0 and allowed p0 to vary
from 6 (its initial value) in both p12 and p22 to 16 in increments of 2. The results are
reported in Figure 5.4. We see that not only the prices that Demand Market 2 is
charged, but also the service usage rates and the durations of the contracts for this
demand market increase. These changes lead to higher profits for not only Network
Provider 2 but also interestingly for Network Provider 1 (cf. Figure 5.5).
Figure 5.4. Effect of Increasing p0 on Demand Market 2’s Contracts
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Figure 5.5. Effect of Increasing p0 on Network Providers’ Profits
Example 5.3 and Sensitivity Analysis in Quality Upper Bounds
Example 5.3 extends Example 5.2 to include a third demand market as shown in
Figure 5.6.
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1 
Demand Market 2
2 
Demand Market 3
3
 
 
 	
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 
 	
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Network Provider 1
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
Network Provider 2
1 2
Figure 5.6. Network Topology for Example 5.3
The price and demand functions for Demand Markets 1 and 2 are as in Example
5.2. The price functions for Demand Market 3 are:
p13 = 9− .115 d13 − .023 d23 + .028 q13 − .0056 q23 − .211T13 − .0633T23,
p23 = 9− .023 d13 − .115 d23 − .0056 q13 + .028 q23 − .0633T13 − .211T23.
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The cost functions for Demand Market 3 are:
c1j = (.0049 q
2
1j + .001715 q1j + .029 d1j)T1j, j = 3,
c2j = (.0037 q
2
2j + .053 d
2
2j)T2j, j = 3,
with those for Demand Markets 1 and 2 as in Example 5.2.
The bounds on the variables are:
23 ≤ d1j ≤ 250, 0 ≤ q1j ≤ 100, 8 ≤ T1j ≤ 40, j = 1, 2, 3,
15 ≤ d2j ≤ 200, 0 ≤ q2j ≤ 100, 11 ≤ T2j ≤ 40, j = 1, 2, 3.
The utility functions of Network Providers 1 and 2 are:
U1 = p11d11T11 + p12d12T12 + p13d13T13 − (c11 + c12 + c13),
U2 = p21d21T21 + p22d22T22 + p23d23T23 − (c21 + c22 + c23).
The Jacobian of F (X) for this example is also positive-definite. The new equilibrium
solution, computer after 8,681 iterations, is:
d∗11 = 31.48, d
∗
12 = 45.39, d
∗
13 = 30.16, d
∗
21 = 23.55, d
∗
22 = 20.71, d
∗
23 = 19.87,
T ∗11 = 20.31, T
∗
12 = 15.18, T
∗
13 = 13.49, T
∗
21 = 19.84, T
∗
22 = 12.47, T
∗
23 = 13.00,
q∗11 = 100.00, q
∗
12 = 100.00, q
∗
13 = 76.77, q
∗
21 = 100.00, q
∗
22 = 72.64, q
∗
23 = 67.11.
The equilibrium prices are:
p11 = 5.29, p12 = 2.89, p13 = 3.77, p21 = 6.43, p22 = 3.50, p23 = 4.57.
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Following the methodology used for Examples 5.1 and 5.2, I determine that Network
Provider 1 earns a profit of 169.81 cents and Network Provider 2 a profit of 99.21
cents. The total cost of Network Provider 1 is now 78.71 cents and that of Network
Provider 2 is 83.71 cents.
In order to investigate the effects of the maximum quality level of the network
providers on their profits, I conducted a numerical sensitivity analysis. Quality dis-
ruptions may occur for various reasons, including natural, man-made, or technological
issues. I used Example 5.3 as a baseline but varied the quality upper bounds from 10
through 100 in increments of 10 with both providers having the same quality upper
bound. The profits/utilities of the providers are displayed in Figure 5.7.
Figure 5.7. Effect of Increasing Maximum Quality Level on Network Providers’
Profits - Same for Both Providers
The results show that the profit of Network Provider 1 increases as the maximum
quality level increases, while the profit of Network Provider 2 is less sensitive to changes
in the maximum quality level. Also, Figure 5.7 reveals that, when both providers have
similar maximum levels of quality, Network Provider 1’s utility/profit is highest when
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the maximum quality level for both providers is at 100, while the highest utility/profit
for Network Provider 2 is obtained when the maximum quality level for both is at 60.
Figure 5.8. Effect of Increasing Maximum Quality Level on Network Providers’
Profits - Different for Each Provider
Additional sensitivity analysis results are given in Figure 5.8 to investigate the
impact on profits of distinct quality level upper bounds for the providers. The results
in Figure 5.8 reveal that each network provider is better off at a higher maximum
quality level while the maximum quality level of the other provider is fixed. Also, each
provider benefits by increasing his maximum quality level bound while the maximum
quality level of the other provider is lower. For each provider, the lowest utility/profit
occurs when that provider has the lowest level of maximum quality (10) whereas the
other provider has the highest maximum quality level (100).
These examples illustrate the importance of computations in gaining insights that
may not be obvious otherwise because of the number of decision-makers, demand
markets, and the complexity of interactions among them.
Note that if F (X) is monotone, a property that would be satisfied for utility
functions as in Theorem 5.1, in which case ∇F (X) is positive-semidefinite, then an
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algorithm such as the extragradient method of Korpelevich (1977) could be utilized,
with F (X) also being Lipschitz continuous.
5.4. Summary
In this chapter, I developed a game theory model for a differentiated service-oriented
Internet with duration-based contracts and quality competition. The Internet service
providers are competing in an oligopoly market in terms of quality, duration, and
price to the users in the demand markets.
The theoretical formalism was established using variational inequalities, which
provides us with tools for both qualitative analysis and computational schemes. In
order to show the applicability of the model, three examples are given. The first one
shows the simplest market and the last one extends two previous ones with more
decision-makers.
Numerical examples, supplemented with sensitivity analysis, demonstrated the
efficacy of both the model and algorithmic framework. The results show that the
model can capture the current pricing that we have in the Internet service market.
The outcomes reveal that the idea of more flexibility in the next generation Internet,
(e.g. ChoiceNet) is possible for future providers considering technological constraints
in terms of contract duration, quality of service and even quantity of services.
This model can be used as the base for future studies focusing on shorter con-
tracts for a service-oriented Internet with a more complicated architecture, resource
limitations, and bandwith sharing.
As I explained in Chapter 1, the Internet as a communication network, which
transfers data between entities, is quite similar to a supply chain with freight service
providers, which carry goods from one point to another point. Therefore, it would
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be interesting to analyze the price and quality competition between freight service
providers with different modes of shipment. This is done in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 6
A SUPPLY CHAIN NETWORK MODEL WITH
COMPETITION IN PRICE AND QUALITY BETWEEN
MULTIPLE MANUFACTURERS AND FREIGHT
SERVICE PROVIDERS WITH MULTIPLE MODES OF
SHIPMENT
In this chapter, a supply chain with freight service providers is considered. Supply
chain networks and the Internet have many features in common. They both are
involved in delivering products (in terms of goods or communication data) and quality
of service should also be taken into account since quality is perceived as the most
important element which leads to company success.
I develop a game theory model in both equilibrium and dynamic settings in an
oligopoly market of manufacturers and freight service providers. The new static
and dynamic models in this chapter also build on the work of Nagurney, Dong, and
Zhang (2002), which introduced supply chain network equilibrium models but here
the competition is in price and quality and not in quantities. See, also, the dynamic
multilevel financial/informational/logistical framework of Nagurney, Dong, and Zhang
(2002), the supernetwork model with freight carriers in Yamada et al. (2011), and
the maritime chain model with carriers, ports, and shippers of Talley and Ng (2013).
For a plethora of supply chain network equilibrium models, along with the underlying
dynamics, see the book by Nagurney (2006a). For an overview of projected dynamical
systems, which is the methodology that I utilize to describe the underlying competitive
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dynamics and the evolution of prices and quality, see Chapter 2, Section 2.2. My
contributions to existing knowledge and literature are:
• I model explicit competition among manufacturing firms and freight service
providers (carriers) in terms of prices and quality of the products that the
firms offer and the prices and quality of the freight services provided. This
multi-faceted inclusion of competition from price and quality dimensions leads
to results that not just quantify quality at the product and service ends, but
also helps to assess the trade-offs between quality and costs at each echelon of
the supply chain that ultimately influences the demand. A model that considers
oligopolistic competition among manufacturers and freight service providers
under price and quality with multiple modes of transportation and non-separable
demand and cost functions is attempted for the first time in this chapter.
• The analysis for freight service providers contains price and quality evaluations
for multiple modes of transportation. The transportation costs, resultantly, differ
by mode, leading to a pertinent evaluation of quality vs. costs for the freight
service providers and the modes of transportation they offer to the customers. In
my frame of reference, modes could also imply intermodal transport of products.
• I handle heterogeneity in the providers’ cost functions and in the consumers’
demands and do not limit myself to specific functional forms. Utility of each
manufacturing firm considers price and quality for not just his own products,
but that of other manufacturing firms as well. Similarly, the utility of each
freight service provider includes the implications of other providers’ prices and
quality for various modes in addition to his own. Also, I impose bounds on the
prices and quality levels with positive minimum quality levels corresponding to
minimum quality standards, relevant for policy-making.
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• I provide qualitative properties of the equilibrium price and quality pattern and
also present the underlying dynamics associated with the evolution of the prices
and quality levels over time until the equilibrium is achieved.
• The theoretical framework is supported by a rigorous algorithm that is well-suited
for implementation.
• The computational scheme is applied to a spectrum of numerical examples in
order to illustrate the generality of the framework.
This chapter is based on Nagurney et al. (2015a). The structure of Chapter 6 is
as follows. Section 6.1 presents the multitiered supply chain network game theory
model with manufacturers and freight service providers. I capture the firms’ behavior
that accounts for the prices and quality levels of the products at the demand markets.
In parallel, I model freight service providers’ behavior that deals with the prices
and quality levels of their services for various modes. The freight service providers
compete in terms of price and quality that differ by mode. A variational inequality
formulation is derived, which unifies the firms’ and freight service providers’ behaviors.
An existence result for a solution to the unified variational inequality formulation (cf.
Nagurney (1999)) is also given. A projected dynamical systems model is, subsequently,
constructed in Section 6.2 to capture the underlying dynamics of the competitive
behavior. In Section 6.3, I present an algorithm for solving the proposed variational
inequality formulation, accompanied by convergence results. At each iteration, the
algorithm yields closed form expressions for the prices and qualities of the firms and
freight service providers. It also serves as a time-discretization of the continuous time
adjustment processes in prices and quality levels. Section 6.4 illustrates the model
and the computational algorithm through several numerical examples in order to
gain managerial insights. In Section 6.5, I summarize the results and present the
conclusions.
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6.1. The Supply Chain Network Model with Price and
Quality Competition
In the supply chain network, there are N manufacturing firms involved in the
production of substitutable products that are transported by O freight service providers
or carriers to Q demand markets. I denote a typical manufacturing firm by Fi;
i = 1, . . . , N , a typical freight service provider by Cj; j = 1, . . . , O, and a typical
demand market by k; k = 1, . . . , Q. Each freight service provider Cj ; j = 1, . . . , O has
Mj possible modes of transport/shipment, associated with which is also a distinct
quality. The modes of shipment may include rail, air, truck, sea, or even bicycles for
last mile deliveries, etc.
Moreover, for the sake of modeling flexibility and generality, a mode in this
framework may represent a composition of modes as in the case of intermodal
transportation. The freight service providers are responsible for picking up the
products at the manufacturers and delivering them to consumers at the demand
markets. Note that each freight service provider may have a different number of modes
available to him based on vehicle ownership and access, contracts, prior relationships,
geographical issues, etc. The supply chain network representation of this game theory
model is depicted in Figure 6.1. The manufacturing firms compete with one another
as do the freight service providers.
Firm Fi manufactures a product of quality qi at the price pi. As in Nagurney and
Li (2014b), I define and quantify quality as the quality conformance level, that is,
the degree to which a specific product conforms to a design or specification (Gilmore
(1974) and Juran and Gryna (1988)). I group the prices of all firms’ products into the
vector pF ∈ RN+ , and their quality levels into the vector qF ∈ RN+ .
145
The quality and price associated with freight service provider Cj retrieving the
product from firm Fi and delivering it to demand market k via mode m are denoted,
respectively, by qmijk and p
m
ijk; i = 1, . . . , N ; j = 1, . . . , O; k = 1, . . . , Q; m = 1, . . . ,Mj .
Quality with respect to freight in this model corresponds to level of service as
emphasized by Mancera, Bruckmann, and Weidmann (2013). I group these quality
levels and prices into the vectors qC ∈ RNOQ
∑O
j=1Mj
+ and pC ∈ R
NOQ
∑O
j=1Mj
+ .
The consumers at demand market k; k = 1, . . . , Q, reveal their preferences for firm
Fi’s product transported by freight service provider Cj via mode m through a demand
function dmijk. The demand d
m
ijk depends not only on the price and quality of firm Fi’s
product, but also, in general, on the prices and quality levels of all other substitutable
products as well as on the prices and quality levels associated with transportation:
dmijk = d
m
ijk(pF , qF , pC , qC), i = 1, . . . , N ; j = 1, . . . , O; k = 1, . . . , Q;m = 1, . . . ,Mj.
(6.1)
The generality of the demand functions allows for the modeling of competition
on the demand side for the products and freight service provision. I expect that the
demand dmijk will increase (decrease) as the price (quality) of firm Fi’s product or the
shipment price (quality) of freight service provider Cj decreases. I group the demands
into the NOQ
∑O
j=1Mj-dimensional vector d(pF , qF , pC , qC).
6.1.1 The Firms’ Behavior
The supply of firm Fi’s product, si, is equal to the demand, that is,
si(pF , qF , pC , qC) =
Q∑
k=1
O∑
j=1
Mj∑
m=1
dmijk(pF , qF , pC , qC), i = 1, . . . , N, (6.2)
since I expect the markets to clear.
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Figure 6.1. The Supply Chain Network Structure of the Game Theory Model
The production cost of firm Fi, PCi, depends, in general, upon the entire production
(supply) pattern, as well as on the product quality levels, that is:
PCi = PCi
(
sF (pF , qF , pC , qC), qF
)
, i = 1, . . . , N, (6.3)
where sF (pF , qF , pC , qC) ∈ RN+ is the vector of all the supplies of the products. The
generality of the production cost functions allows us to capture competition for
resources in manufacturing, whether natural, human, and/or capital.
The utility of firm Fi, UFi ; i = 1, . . . , N , represents his profit, and is the difference
between the firm’s revenue and the production cost:
UFi(pF , qF , pC , qC) = pi
[ Q∑
k=1
O∑
j=1
Mj∑
m=1
dmijk(pF , qF , pC , qC)
]−PCi(sF (pF , qF , pC , qC), qF ).
(6.4)
Each firm Fi is faced with a nonnegative lower bound qi on the quality of his
product as well as an upper bound q¯i, so that
q
i
≤ qi ≤ q¯i, i = 1, . . . , N. (6.5)
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Typically, q¯i = 100 corresponds to perfect quality conformance as discussed in
Nagurney and Li (2015). If that is not achievable by a firm, then the upper bound
would be set to a lower value. Also, a positive lower bound q
i
corresponds to a
minimum quality standard as discussed in Nagurney and Li (2014b).
In addition, each firm Fi is faced with an upper bound on the price that he charges
for his product, that is,
0 ≤ pi ≤ p¯i, i = 1, . . . , N. (6.6)
The price that firm Fi charges and his quality level correspond to his strategic
variables in the competitive game. Let K1i denote the feasible set corresponding
to Fi, where K
1
i ≡ {(pFi , qFi) | (6.5) and (6.6) hold}. I define: K1 ≡
∏N
i=1K
1
i and
assume that all the above functions are continuous and continuously differentiable.
The manufacturers compete in a noncooperative manner which I formalize in Section
6.1.3.
6.1.2 The Freight Service Providers’ Behavior
Recall that freight service provider Cj transports a product from firm Fi to demand
market k via mode m at a quality level qmijk at a unit price of p
m
ijk. I group the quality
levels of freight service provider Cj into the vector qCj ∈ RNQMj+ and his prices into
the vector pCj ∈ RNQMj+ . These are his strategic variables.
I denote the transportation cost between firm Fi and demand market k via mode
m of freight service provider Cj by TC
m
ijk and assume that:
TCmijk = TC
m
ijk
(
d(pF , qF , pC , qC), qC
)
, i = 1, . . . , N ; j = 1, . . . , O; k = 1, . . . , Q;m = 1, . . . ,Mj,
(6.7)
that is, the transportation cost may depend, in general, on the vector of demands and
the vector of quality levels of all freight service providers. In the transportation costs,
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I also include handling costs associated with, for example, loading and unloading and,
perhaps, also, storage of the products over a period of time.
The utility or profit function of freight service provider Cj, UCj , is the difference
between his revenue and his transportation costs:
UCj(pF , qF , pC , qC) =
N∑
i=1
O∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
[
pmijkd
m
ijk(pF , qF , pC , qC)
]
−
N∑
i=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
TCmijk
(
d(pF , qF , pC , qC), qC
)
. (6.8)
Each Cj; j = 1, . . . , O, is faced with a lower and upper bound on the quality of
transport shipment qm
ijk
, q¯mijk, respectively, and an upper bound for price, p¯
m
ijk, between
i and k so that
qm
ijk
≤ qmijk ≤ q¯mijk, i = 1, . . . , N ; k = 1, . . . , Q;m = 1, . . . ,Mj, (6.9)
0 ≤ pmijk ≤ p¯mijk, i = 1, . . . , N ; k = 1, . . . , Q;m = 1, . . . ,Mj. (6.10)
The freight service provider lower bounds are assumed to be nonnegative as in the
case of product quality with a positive value corresponding to a minimum quality
standard.
Let K2j denote the feasible set corresponding to Cj, where K
2
j ≡ {(pCj , qCj) |
(6.9) and (6.10) hold}. I then define K2 ≡ ∏Oj=1K2j . I assume that all the above
functions associated with the freight service providers are continuous and continuously
differentiable. The freight service providers also compete in a noncooperative manner,
as per below.
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6.1.3 The Nash Equilibrium Conditions and Variational Inequality
Formulation
I now present the Nash equilibrium definition that captures the decision-makers’
competitive behavior in this model.
Definition 6.1: Nash Equilibrium in Prices and Quality Levels
A price and quality level pattern (p∗F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C) ∈ K3 ≡
∏N
i=1K
1
i ×
∏O
j=1K
2
j , is said
to constitute a Nash equilibrium if for each firm Fi; i = 1, . . . , N :
UFi(p
∗
i , pˆ
∗
i , q
∗
i , qˆ
∗
i , p
∗
C , q
∗
C) ≥ UFi(pi, pˆ∗i , qi, qˆ∗i , p∗C , q∗C), ∀(pi, qi) ∈ K1i , (6.11)
where
pˆ∗i ≡ (p∗1, . . . , p∗i−1, p∗i+1, . . . , p∗N) and qˆ∗i ≡ (q∗1, . . . , q∗i−1, q∗i+1, . . . , q∗N), (6.12)
and if for each freight service provider Cj; j = 1, . . . , O:
UCj(p
∗
F , q
∗
F , p
∗
Cj
, ˆp∗Cj , q
∗
Cj
, ˆq∗Cj) ≥ UCj(p∗F , q∗F , pCj , ˆp∗Cj , qCj , ˆq∗Cj), ∀(pCj , qCj) ∈ K2j ,
(6.13)
where
ˆp∗Cj ≡ (p∗C1 , . . . , p∗Cj−1 , p∗Cj+1 , . . . , p∗CO) and ˆq∗Cj ≡ (q∗C1 , . . . , q∗Cj−1 , q∗Cj+1 , . . . , q∗CO).
(6.14)
According to (6.11) and (6.13), a Nash equilibrium is established if no decision-
maker, whether a manufacturing firm or freight service provider, can unilaterally
improve upon his profits by selecting an alternative vector of prices and quality levels.
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I assume that the above utility functions are concave. Under previously imposed
assumptions on the production cost, transportation cost, and demand functions, I
know that the utility functions are continuous and continuously differentiable. I now
derive the variational inequality formulation of the governing equilibrium conditions.
Theorem 6.1: Variational Inequality Formulations of Nash Equilibrium in
Prices and Quality
Assume that the manufacturing firms’ and freight service providers’ utility functions
are concave, continuous, and continuously differentiable. Then (p∗F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C) ∈ K3 is
a Nash equilibrium according to Definition 6.1 if and only if it satisfies the variational
inequality:
−
N∑
i=1
∂UFi(p
∗
F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C)
∂pi
× (pi − p∗i )−
N∑
i=1
∂UFi(p
∗
F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C)
∂qi
× (qi − q∗i )
−
O∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
∂UCj(p
∗
F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C)
∂pmijk
× (pmijk − pm∗ijk)
−
O∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
∂UCj(p
∗
F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C)
∂qmijk
× (qmijk − qm∗ijk ) ≥ 0, ∀(pF , qF , pC , qC) ∈ K3,
(6.15)
or, equivalently,
N∑
i=1
[
N∑
l=1
∂PCi
(
sF (p
∗
F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C), q
∗
F
)
∂sl
×∂sl(p
∗
F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C)
∂pi
−
O∑
j=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
dmijk(p
∗
F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C)− p∗i
O∑
j=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
∂dmijk(p
∗
F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C)
∂pi
]
× (pi − p∗i )
+
N∑
i=1
[
N∑
l=1
∂PCi
(
sF (p
∗
F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C), q
∗
F
)
∂sl
×∂sl(p
∗
F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C)
∂qi
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+
∂PCi
(
s∗F , q
∗
F
)
∂qi
− p∗i
O∑
j=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
∂dmijk(p
∗
F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C)
∂qi
]
× (qi − q∗i )
+
O∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
[
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
[ N∑
r=1
O∑
v=1
Q∑
w=1
Mv∑
z=1
∂TCtljs(d(p
∗
F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C), q
∗
C)
∂dzrvw
× ∂d
z
rvw(p
∗
F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C)
∂pmijk
]
−dmijk(p∗F , q∗F , p∗C , q∗C)−
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
∂dtljs(p
∗
F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C)
∂pmijk
× pt∗ljs
]
× (pmijk − pm∗ijk)
+
O∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
[
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
[ N∑
r=1
O∑
v=1
Q∑
w=1
Mv∑
z=1
∂TCtljs(d(p
∗
F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C), q
∗
C)
∂dzrvw
× ∂d
z
rvw(p
∗
F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C)
∂qmijk
]
+
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
∂TCtljs(d
∗, q∗C)
∂qmijk
−
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
∂dtljs(p
∗
F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C)
∂qmijk
×pt∗ljs
]
×(qmijk−qm∗ijk ) ≥ 0,
∀(pF , qF , pC , qC) ∈ K3, (6.16)
where s∗F ≡ sF (p∗F , q∗F , p∗C , q∗C) and d∗ ≡ d(p∗F , q∗F , p∗C , q∗C).
Proof: (6.15) follows from Gabay and Moulin (1980) and Dafermos and Nagurney
(1987). In order to obtain (6.16) from (6.15), for each i I have:
−∂UFi
∂pi
=
N∑
l=1
∂PCi
∂sl
× ∂sl
∂pi
−
O∑
j=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
dmijk − pi
O∑
j=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
∂dmijk
∂pi
, (6.17)
−∂UFi
∂qi
=
N∑
l=1
∂PCi
∂sl
× ∂sl
∂qi
+
∂PCi
∂qi
− pi
O∑
j=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
∂dmijk
∂qi
, (6.18)
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and, for each i, j, k and m, I have:
−∂UCj
∂pmijk
=
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
[ N∑
r=1
O∑
v=1
Q∑
w=1
Mv∑
z=1
∂TCtljs
∂dzrvw
× ∂d
z
rvw
∂pmijk
]
−dmijk −
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
∂dtljs
∂pmijk
× ptljs, (6.19)
−∂UCj
∂qmijk
=
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
[ N∑
r=1
O∑
v=1
Q∑
w=1
Mv∑
z=1
∂TCtljs
∂dzrvw
× ∂d
z
rvw
∂qmijk
]
+
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
∂TCtljs
∂qmijk
−
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
∂dtljs
∂qmijk
× ptljs. (6.20)
Multiplying the right-most expression in (6.17) by (pi − p∗i ) and summing the result
over all i and similarly, multiplying the right-most expression in (6.18) by (qi − q∗i ),
and summing the result over all i, yields, respectively,
N∑
i=1
[ N∑
l=1
∂PCi
∂sl
× ∂sl
∂pi
−
O∑
j=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
dmijk − pi
O∑
j=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
∂dmijk
∂pi
]
× (pi − p∗i ), (6.21)
N∑
i=1
[ N∑
l=1
∂PCi
∂sl
× ∂sl
∂qi
+
∂PCi
∂qi
− pi
O∑
j=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
∂dmijk
∂qi
]
× (qi − q∗i ), (6.22)
Also, multiplying the right-most expression in (6.19) by (pmijk − pm∗ijk) and summing
over all i, j, k, and m and similarly, multiplying the right-most expression in (6.20) by
(qmijk − qm∗ijk ) and summing over all i, j, k, and m yields, respectively:
O∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
[
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
[ N∑
r=1
O∑
v=1
Q∑
w=1
Mv∑
z=1
∂TCtljs
∂dzrvw
× ∂d
z
rvw
∂pmijk
]
−dmijk −
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
∂dtljs
∂pmijk
× ptljs
]
× (pmijk − pm∗ijk), (6.23)
O∑
j=1
N∑
i=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
[
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
[ N∑
r=1
O∑
v=1
Q∑
w=1
Mv∑
z=1
∂TCtljs
∂dzrvw
× ∂d
z
rvw
∂qmijk
]
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+
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
∂TCtljs
∂qmijk
−
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
∂dtljs
∂qmijk
× ptljs
]
× (qmijk − qm∗ijk ), (6.24)
Finally, summing (6.21), (6.22), (6.23), and (6.24), yields variational inequality (6.16).2
I now put the above Nash equilibrium problem into standard variational inequality
form (cf. (2.1)).
〈F (X∗), X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ K, (6.25)
I set K ≡ K3, which is a closed and convex set, and n = 2N + 2(NOQ∑Oj=1Mj). I
define the vector X ≡ (pF , qF , pC , qC) and F (X) ≡ (FpF , FqF , FpC , FqC ) with the i-th
component of FpF and FqF given, respectively, by:
Fpi = −
∂UFi
∂pi
, (6.26)
Fqi = −
∂UFi
∂qi
, (6.27)
and the (i, j, k,m)-th component of FpC and FqC , respectively, given by:
Fpmijk = −
∂UCj
∂pmijk
, (6.28)
Fqmijk = −
∂UCj
∂qmijk
. (6.29)
Then, clearly, variational inequality (6.16) can be put into standard form (6.25).
Existence of a solution to variational inequality (6.15), equivalently, variational
inequality (6.16), is guaranteed since the feasible set K is compact and the function
F (X) (cf. (6.25)) in this model is continuous, under the assumptions made on the
underlying functions (see Theorem 2.7).
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6.2. The Dynamics
I now propose dynamic adjustment processes for the evolution of the firms’ product
prices and quality levels and those of the freight service providers (carriers). Each
manufacturing firm adjusts the prices and quality of his products in a direction that
maximizes his utility while maintaining the price and quality bounds. Also, each
freight service provider adjusts his prices and quality levels in order to maximize
his utility while keeping the prices and quality levels within their minimum and
maximum levels. This kind of behavior, as I show below, yields a projected dynamical
system. I also demonstrate that the stationary point of the projected dynamical
system coincides with the solution of the variational inequality governing the Nash
equilibrium of the supply chain network model introduced in Section 6.1. Hence, the
adjustment processes provide a reasonable economic and behavioral description of the
underlying competitive interactions.
For a current price and quality level pattern at time t, X(t) =
(
pF (t), qF (t), pC(t),
qC(t)
)
, −Fpi(X(t)) =
∂UFi
(
pF (t),qF (t),pC(t),qC(t)
)
∂pi
, given by (6.26), is the marginal utility
(profit) of firm Fi with respect to the price that he charges for his product, −Fqi(X(t)) =
∂UFi
(
pF (t),qF (t),pC(t),qC(t)
)
∂qi
, defined in (6.27), is the marginal utility of firm Fi with respect
to the quality of his product, and −Fpmijk(X(t)) =
∂UCj
(
pF (t),qF (t),pC(t),qC(t)
)
∂pmijk
, given by
(6.28), and −Fqmijk(X(t)) =
∂UCj
(
pF (t),qF (t),pC(t),qC(t)
)
∂qmijk
, defined in (6.29), are, respectively,
the marginal utility of freight service provider Cj with respect to price and with
respect to quality of shipment, from manufacturing firm Fi to demand market k by
mode m. In this framework, the rate of change of the price that firm Fi charges is in
proportion to −Fpi(X), as long as the price pi is positive and less than p¯i. Namely,
when 0 < pi < p¯i, then
p˙i =
∂UFi(pF , qF , pC , qC)
∂pi
, (6.30)
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where p˙i denotes the rate of change of pi. However, when
∂UFi (pF ,qF ,pC ,qC)
∂pi
≤ 0 or
∂UFi (pF ,qF ,pC ,qC)
∂pi
≥ p¯i, constraint (6.6) forces the price to remain zero or equal to p¯i,
hence
p˙i = max
{
0,min{∂UFi(pF , qF , pC , qC)
∂pi
, p¯i}
}
. (6.31)
I may write (6.30) and (6.31) concisely as:
p˙i =

∂UFi (pF ,qF ,pC ,qC)
∂pi
, if 0 < pi < p¯i
max
{
0,min{∂UFi (pF ,qF ,pC ,qC)
∂pi
, p¯i}
}
, if pi = 0 or pi = p¯i.
(6.32)
The rate of change of the product quality of firm Fi, in turn, is in proportion to
−Fqi(X), if qi < qi < q¯i, so that
q˙i =
∂UFi(pF , qF , pC , qC)
∂qi
, (6.33)
where q˙i denotes the rate of change of qi. However, when
∂UFi (pF ,qF ,pC ,qC)
∂qi
≤q
i
or
∂UFi (pF ,qF ,pC ,qC)
∂qi
≥ q¯i, constraint (6.5) forces the quality level to remain at least qi or
at most q¯i, respectively. Therefore,
q˙i = max
{
q
i
,min{∂UFi(pF , qF , pC , qC)
∂qi
, q¯i}
}
. (6.34)
Combining (6.33) and (6.34), I may write:
q˙i =

∂UFi (pF ,qF ,pC ,qC)
∂qi
, if q
i
< qi < q¯i
max
{
q
i
,min{∂UFi (pF ,qF ,pC ,qC)
∂qi
, q¯i}
}
, if qi = qi or qi = q¯i.
(6.35)
The rate of change of price pmijk, in turn, that freight service provider Cj charges
demand market k to ship the product from firm Fi via mode m, is in proportion to
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−Fpmijk , as long as 0 < pmijk < p¯mijk, so that
p˙mijk =
∂UCj(pF , qF , pC , qC)
∂pmijk
, (6.36)
where p˙mijk is the rate of change of p
m
ijk. Otherwise, constraint (6.10) forces the price
to be zero or at most equal to p¯mijk. Thus,
p˙mijk = max
{
0,min{∂UCj(pF , qF , pC , qC)
∂pmijk
, p¯mijk}
}
. (6.37)
I can write (6.36) and (6.37) compactly as:
p˙mijk =

∂UCj (pF ,qF ,pC ,qC)
∂pmijk
, if 0 < pmijk < p¯
m
ijk
max
{
0,min{∂UCj (pF ,qF ,pC ,qC)
∂pmijk
, p¯mijk}
}
, if pmijk = 0 or p
m
ijk = p¯
m
ijk.
(6.38)
Finally, the rate of change of qmijk, which is given by q˙
m
ijk, is in proportion to −Fqmijk ,
while the quality of mode m of freight service provider Cj for shipping the product
from firm Fi to demand market k, q
m
ijk, is more than his lower bound and less than
his upper bound. In other words, when qm
ijk
< qmijk < q¯
m
ijk, I have
q˙mijk =
∂UCj(pF , qF , pC , qC)
∂qmijk
, (6.39)
otherwise:
q˙mijk = max
{
qm
ijk
,min{∂UCj(pF , qF , pC , qC)
∂qmijk
, q¯mijk}
}
. (6.40)
Combining (6.39) and (6.40), the quality level qmijk evolves according to
q˙mijk =

∂UCj (pF ,qF ,pC ,qC)
∂qmijk
, if qm
ijk
< qmijk < q¯
m
ijk
max
{
qm
ijk
,min{∂UCj (pF ,qF ,pC ,qC)
∂qmijk
, q¯mijk}
}
, if qmijk = q
m
ijk
or qmijk = q¯
m
ijk.
(6.41)
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Applying (6.32) and (6.35) to all manufacturing firms Fi; i = 1, . . . , N , and
applying (6.38) and (6.41) to all modes m = 1, . . . ,Mj of freight service providers Cj;
j = 1, . . . , O used in shipping the product from firm Fi; i = 1, . . . , N to all demand
markets k; k = 1, . . . , Q, and combining the resultants, yields the pertinent ordinary
differential equation (see (2.17)) for the adjustment processes of the prices and quality
levels of firms and freight service providers, in vector form:
X˙ = ΠK(X,−F (X)), X(0) = X0. (6.42)
Note that X0 is the initial point (p0F , q
0
F , p
0
C , q
0
C) corresponding to the initial price and
quality levels of the manufacturing firms and freight service providers and F (X) is
the vector of minus the marginal utilities of the manufacturing firms and the freight
service providers with respect to their strategic variables of prices and quality levels,
with the individual components of F (X) given by (6.26) through (6.29).
The trajectory provides the dynamic evolution of the prices charged and the quality
levels of the manufacturing firms’ products and carriers’ freight services and the
dynamic interactions among them. I note that ODE (6.42) ensures that the prices and
quality levels of all firms and carriers are always within their lower and upper bounds.
The following theorem from Dupuis and Nagurney (1993) and Theorem 2.6 holds
true in this framework since the feasible set K is convex.
Theorem 6.2
X∗ solves the variational inequality problem (6.25) (equivalently, (6.15) and (6.16)),
if and only if it is a stationary point of the ODE (6.42), that is,
X˙ = 0 = ΠK(X∗,−F (X∗)). (6.43)
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This theorem demonstrates that the necessary and sufficient condition for a product
and freight service price and quality level pattern X∗ = (p∗F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C) to be a Nash
equilibrium, according to Definition 6.1, is that X∗ = (p∗F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C) is a stationary
point of the adjustment processes defined by ODE (6.42), that is, X∗ is the point at
which X˙ = 0.
6.3. Explicit Formulae for the Euler Method Applied to the
Multitiered Supply Chain Network Problem
The explicit formulae yielded by the Euler method (see Section 2.4) are the following
closed form expressions for all firms’ product price pi; i = 1, . . . , N and product quality
qi; i = 1, . . . , N , respectively:
pτ+1i = max
{
0 ,min
{
p¯i , p
τ
i +aτ
[ O∑
j=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
dmijk(p
τ
F , q
τ
F , p
τ
C , q
τ
C)
+pτi
O∑
j=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
∂dmijk(p
τ
F , q
τ
F , p
τ
C , q
τ
C)
∂pi
−
N∑
l=1
∂PCi(sF (p
τ
F , q
τ
F , p
τ
C , q
τ
C), q
τ
F )
∂sl
× ∂sl(p
τ
F , q
τ
F , p
τ
C , q
τ
C)
∂pi
]}}
, (6.44)
qτ+1i = max
{
q
i
,min
{
q¯i , q
τ
i +aτ
[
pτi
O∑
j=1
Q∑
k=1
Mj∑
m=1
∂dmijk(p
τ
F , q
τ
F , p
τ
C , q
τ
C)
∂qi
−
N∑
l=1
∂PCi(sF (p
τ
F , q
τ
F , p
τ
C , q
τ
C), q
τ
F )
∂sl
× ∂sl(p
τ
F , q
τ
F , p
τ
C , q
τ
C)
∂qi
− ∂PCi(s
τ
F , q
τ
F )
∂qi
]}}
. (6.45)
Also, one can obtain the values for the prices, pmijk, and the quality levels, q
m
ijk, of the
freight service providers: (i = 1, . . . , N ; j = 1, . . . , O; k = 1, . . . , Q; m = 1, . . . ,Mj),
according to the following closed form expressions, respectively:
p
m(τ+1)
ijk = max
{
0 ,min
{
p¯mijk , p
mτ
ijk + aτ
[
dmijk(p
τ
F , q
τ
F , p
τ
C , q
τ
C)
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+
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
∂dtljs(p
τ
F , q
τ
F , p
τ
C , q
τ
C)
∂pmijk
× ptτljs
−
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
( N∑
r=1
O∑
v=1
Q∑
w=1
Mv∑
z=1
∂TCtljs(d(p
τ
F , q
τ
F , p
τ
C , q
τ
C), q
τ
C)
∂dzrvw
×∂d
z
rvw(p
τ
F , q
τ
F , p
τ
C , q
τ
C)
∂pmijk
)]}}
,
(6.46)
q
m(τ+1)
ijk = max
{
qm
ijk
,min
{
q¯mijk , q
mτ
ijk + aτ
[ N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
∂dtljs(p
τ
F , q
τ
F , p
τ
C , q
τ
C)
∂qmijk
× ptτljs
−
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
( N∑
r=1
O∑
v=1
Q∑
w=1
Mv∑
z=1
∂TCtljs(d(p
τ
F , q
τ
F , p
τ
C , q
τ
C), q
τ
C)
∂dzrvw
× ∂d
z
rvw(p
τ
F , q
τ
F , p
τ
C , q
τ
C)
∂qmijk
)
−
N∑
l=1
Q∑
s=1
Mj∑
t=1
∂TCtljs(d
τ , qτC)
∂qmijk
]}}
. (6.47)
Note that all the functions to the left of the equal signs in (6.44) - (6.47) are
evaluated at their respective variables computed at the τ -th iteration.
Also, the below convergence result is immediate following Nagurney and Zhang
(1996) since the feasible set K is compact.
Theorem 6.3: Convergence
In this multitiered supply chain network game theory model, assume that
F (X)=−∇U(pF , qF , pC , qC) is strictly monotone. Also, assume that F is uniformly
Lipschitz continuous. Then, there exists a unique equilibrium price and quality pattern
(p∗F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C) ∈ K and any sequence generated by the Euler method as given by (6.44)
– (6.47), where {aτ} satisfies
∑∞
τ=0 aτ =∞, aτ > 0, aτ → 0, as τ →∞ converges to
(p∗F , q
∗
F , p
∗
C , q
∗
C).
6.4. Numerical Examples
In this section, I present numerical examples illustrating the multitiered supply chain
network game theory framework developed in Sections 6.1 and 6.2. The equilibrium
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solutions of the model are computed by applying the Euler method as outlined in
Section 6.3. Specifically, I present a spectrum of examples with various combinations of
manufacturing firms, freight service providers, and modes. The supply chain network
topology for each numerical example is described before the data and solution are
presented.
The computations via the Euler method (cf. (6.44) -(6.47)) are carried out using
Matlab. The algorithm was implemented on a VAIO S Series laptop with an Intel
Core i7 processor and 12 GB RAM. The convergence tolerance is 10−6, so that the
algorithm is deemed to have converged when the absolute value of the difference
between each successive price and quality level is less than or equal to 10−6. The
sequence {ατ} is set to: .1{1, 12 , 12 , 13 , 13 , 13 , ...}. I initialize the algorithm by setting the
prices and quality levels at their lower bounds. The ranges in which the prices and
quality levels vary are noted for each example.
The first two examples are simple examples, for exposition purposes and clarity.
The subsequent examples, along with their variants, reveal various aspects of the
underlying competition. For the first two examples, I also provide the trajectories of
the evolution of the prices and quality. Due to complexity of the model, the number
of variables in each example is quite considerable. The examples, number of variables
and CPU time for each one are provided in Table 6.1. It demonstrates the breadth of
each network considered in the examples.
This framework can be applied to both high value and low value products with
appropriate modifications in the underlying functions. For example, valuable goods
would require greater quality in freight service provision, but at a higher associated
cost. Also, I would expect that their production/manufacturing costs, given the
components, to be higher.
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Table 6.1. Example Features
Example No. of
Variables
CPU
Time
1 4 4.70
2 6 73.34
3 8 186.03
Variant of 3 8 1157.82
4 16 462.31
Variant of 4 16 2675.05
5 28 703.08
Variant of 5 28 7967.54
Example 6.1
In the first example, I have a single manufacturing firm, F1, a single freight service
provider, C1, with one mode of transport, and a single demand market, as depicted in
the supply chain network in Figure 6.2.
F1Manufacturing Firm
?C1Freight Service Provider
?1Demand Market
Figure 6.2. The Supply Chain Network Topology for Example 6.1
The demand function for demand market 1 is:
d1111 = 43− 1.62p1111 + 1.6q1111 − 1.45p1 + 1.78q1.
The supply of F1 is:
s1 = d
1
111.
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The production cost of manufacturing firm F1 is:
PC1 = 1.55(s1 + 1.15q
2
1).
The utility of manufacturing firm F1 is:
UF1 = p1s1 − PC1.
The quality and price of the firm are bounded as per the following constraints:
0 ≤ p1 ≤ 80, 10 ≤ q1 ≤ 100.
The transportation cost of freight service provider C1 is:
TC1111 = .5d
1
111 + (q
1
111)
2.
The utility of freight service provider C1 is:
UC1 = p
1
111d
1
111 − TC1111,
with the following limitations on his price and quality:
0 ≤ p1111 ≤ 70, 9 ≤ q1111 ≤ 100.
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The Jacobian of -∇U(p1111, p1, q1111, q1), denoted by J(p1111, p1, q1111, q1), is
J =

3.24 1.45 −1.60 −1.78
1.62 2.90 −1.60 −1.78
−1.60 0 2.00 0
0 −1.78 0 3.57

.
The eigenvalues of the symmetric part of J , (J + JT )/2, are all positive and they
are: 0.79, 1.14, 3.28, and 6.47. The equilibrium result, after 60 iterations, is:
p1∗111 = 16.63, p
∗
1 = 19.57, q
1∗
111 = 12.90, q
∗
1 = 10.00.
Figure 6.3. Prices and Quality Levels for the Product and Freight of Example 6.1
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The iterates displayed in Figure 6.3 provide a discrete-time evolution of the prices
and quality levels of the manufacturer and freight service provider as they respond
through the time periods to the demands for the product and service. I observe that
the prices move much above the quality levels and reach significantly higher values
than their points of initiation, while the quality levels do not gain as much. This
can be attributed to a lack of competition and enough scope at the demand market
for gaining revenues. The manufacturer and freight service provider would try to
extract the maximum price out of the market while offering a low quality product and
services.
Indeed, in the absence of competition, the manufacturing firm and the freight
service provider produce and transport at low quality levels. This explains the low
equilibrium values of q∗1 and q
1∗
111. The utility of firm F1 is 292.60 and that of freight
service provider C1 is 254.95. Also, the demand d
1
111 at equilibrium is 26.13. The
demand function is assumed so that more weight is given to the quality of the product
than of the freight service provision and the price of the freight service provider than
the product price. Since there is no competition, the manufacturing firm ends up with
a higher utility by selling a low quality product, while the freight service provider
gains but not as much as the manufacturer.
Example 6.2
In Example 6.2, I extend Example 6.1 by adding another mode of shipment for freight
service provider C1. The supply chain network topology is now depicted in Figure 6.4.
The demand functions are:
d1111 = 43− 1.62p1111 + 1.6q1111 − 1.45p1 + 1.78q1 + .03p2111 − .2q2111,
d2111 = 52− 1.75p2111 + 1.21q2111 − 1.45p1 + 1.78q1 + .03p1111 − .2q1111.
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F1Manufacturing Firm
?C1Freight Service Provider
1 2
1Demand Market
Figure 6.4. The Supply Chain Network Topology for Example 6.2
The contribution of quality of the product is higher in the demand functions than
its price. Also, the contribution of price of the freight service provider is higher in
the demand functions than the quality he offers. Here, the freight service provider is
striving to position himself as a value added service.
The supply of manufacturing firm F1 is changed to:
s1 = d
1
111 + d
2
111
since there are two modes of shipment available now.
The production cost function of F1 is the same as Example 6.1. The transportation
costs of the freight service provider C1 for modes 1 and 2 are:
TC1111 = .5d
1
111 + (q
1
111)
2,
TC2111 = .45d
2
111 + .54(q
2
111)
2 + .0035d2111q
2
111.
Note that mode 1’s cost remains as in Example 6.1.
The utility of freight service provider C1 is:
UC1 = p
1
111d
1
111 + p
2
111d
2
111 − TC1111 − TC2111,
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with the constraints on the price and quality of shipment kept for the first mode as in
Example 6.1 and for the added second mode as below:
0 ≤ p2111 ≤ 70, 9 ≤ q2111 ≤ 100.
The symmetric part of J , (J + JT )/2, has positive eigenvalues, which guarantees
the strict monotonicity of F (X). The equilibrium solution, after 166 iterations, is:
p1∗111 = 21.68, p
2∗
111 = 24.16, p
∗
1 = 27.18,
q1∗111 = 14.58, q
2∗
111 = 22.43, q
∗
1 = 25.59.
The trajectories in Figure 6.5 provide a discrete-time evolution of the prices and
quality levels of the manufacturer and freight service provider. As compared to Figure
6.3, the quality levels, and, therefore, the prices, of both manufacturer and freight
service provider increase. This would be a result of the competing modes. I observe
that the quality of mode 2 is much better than that of mode 1. Hence, the freight
service provider quotes a higher price for mode 2. At the manufacturer’s level, I
observe a higher price in comparison to the quality level. However, I see the difference
between the prices and quality levels to be much less than Figure 6.3 (the trajectories
move along more closely in Figure 6.5 than in Figure 6.3 for the manufacturer).
At equilibrium, the utility of manufacturing firm F1 is 737.29 and that of freight
service provider C1 is 1190.05. The amount shipped via mode 1, d
1
111, is 33.59 and
that shipped via mode 2, d2111, is 40.73. Interestingly, even though the price offered
by service provider C1 for mode 2 is slightly higher, the quality level of mode 2 is
much better than that of mode 1, which increases the demand satisfied by mode 2
as compared to mode 1. Also, the fixed component of the demand function, d2111 is
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Figure 6.5. Prices and Quality Levels for Products and Modes 1 and 2 of Example
6.2
higher than that of d1111. This also contributes to the higher demand shipped by mode
2 to demand market 1.
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The differences in the utilities of the manufacturer (737.29) and the freight service
provider (1190.05) are explained mainly by the production costs and transportation
costs, respectively. It is judicious to assume that the production costs of a manufac-
turing firm would be higher than the transportation costs incurred by a freight service
provider. This difference gets aptly captured in the (comparatively) higher coefficients
of the production cost function.
Example 6.3 and Variant
In Example 6.3 and its variant, I extend Example 6.2 by including another freight
service provider with one mode of shipment as illustrated in Figure 6.6.



1
C1 C2
F1
1 2




A
A
A
AAU
A
A
A
AAU




Manufacturing Firm
Freight Service Providers
Demand Market
Figure 6.6. The Supply Chain Network Topology for Example 6.3 and Variant
The demand functions are:
d1111 = 43− 1.62p1111 + 1.6q1111 − 1.45p1 + 1.78q1 + .03p2111 − .2q2111 + .04p1121 − .1q1121,
d2111 = 52− 1.75p2111 + 1.21q2111 − 1.45p1 + 1.78q1 + .03p1111 − .2q1111 + .04p1121 − .1q1121,
d1121 = 47− 1.79p1121 + 1.41q1121 − 1.45p1 + 1.78q1 + .03p1111 − .2q1111 + .04p2111 − .1q2111.
The supply of F1 is:
s1 = d
1
111 + d
2
111 + d
1
121.
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The production cost of F1 is the same as in Example 6.2. Therefore, the utility
function of F1 has not changed. The transportation costs of freight service provider
C1 are:
TC1111 = .5d
1
111 + (q
1
111)
2 + .045d1121,
TC2111 = .45d
2
111 + .54(q
2
111)
2 + .005d2111q
2
111,
and that of freight service provider C2 is:
TC1121 = .64d
1
121 + .76(q
1
121)
2.
The utility function of C1 and his price and quality constraints have not changed.
The utility of C2 is:
UC2 = p
1
121d
1
121 − TC1121.
The maximum and minimum levels of price and quality of C2 are:
0 ≤ p1121 ≤ 65, 12 ≤ q1121 ≤ 100.
The Jacobian of F (X) for this example is also positive-definite. The new equilibrium
solution, computed after 218 iterations, is:
p1∗111 = 45.69, p
2∗
111 = 45.32, p
1∗
121 = 44.82, p
∗
1 = 53.91,
q1∗111 = 31.69, q
2∗
111 = 41.32, q
1∗
121 = 41.24, q
∗
1 = 78.43.
In addition to the competition between modes captured in Example 6.2, in Example
6.3, I capture the competition among freight service providers. This adds pragmatism
and generality. The assumption regarding the demand functions being more inclined
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towards the quality of the product manufactured and the prices of the freight service
providers remains valid in this instance as well. This supposition induced by the
assumed coefficients of the demand and cost functions gets clearly reflected in the
equilibrium solution (p∗1 = 53.91; q
∗
1 = 78.43).
At equilibrium, the utility of manufacturing firm F1 is 961.39 and that of freight
service providers C1 and C2 are 4753.06 and 2208.92, respectively. Demand market
1 receives amounts of 71.88 and 76.81 via modes 1 and 2 from C1, and 79.07 from
C2. The inclusion of an additional freight service provider helps to increase the total
demand as compared to Example 6.2. The increasing demand provides an incentive
for manufacturing firm F1 to increase his quality level and, consequently, his price.
This surge in demand also has a positive effect on the utilities of the manufacturing
firm and both freight service providers. Higher demand gets satisfied by C2 since his
price is lower and the quality level is at par with the quality provided by C1 for both
modes. Clearly, mode 1 of C1 carries the lowest amount of the total demand due to
the higher price and lower quality combination he offers.
Variant of Example 6.3
I consider a variant of Example 6.3 wherein the demand function is more sensitive
to the price of the product manufactured and the quality offered by the freight
service providers. Keeping the other data consistent, the demand functions are, hence,
modified to the following:
d1111 = 43− 1.44p1111 + 1.53q1111 − 1.82p1 + 1.21q1 + .03p2111 − .2q2111 + .04p1121 − .1q1121,
d2111 = 52− 1.49p2111 + 1.65q2111 − 1.82p1 + 1.21q1 + .03p1111 − .2q1111 + .04p1121 − .1q1121,
d1121 = 47− 1.57p1121 + 1.64q1121 − 1.82p1 + 1.21q1 + .03p1111 − .2q1111 + .04p2111 − .1q2111.
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The equilibrium solution, computed after 553 iterations, is:
p1∗111 = 8.71, p
2∗
111 = 63.17, p
1∗
121 = 16.22, p
∗
1 = 24.80,
q1∗111 = 9.00, q
2∗
111 = 93.15, q
1∗
121 = 16.92, q
∗
1 = 23.67.
It should be noted that the quality levels offered by the freight service providers
take on higher values than their prices as opposed to a vice versa situation in the
case of Example 6.3. At equilibrium, the utility of manufacturing firm F1 is 1952.19
and that of service providers C1 and C2 are 1073.86 and 164.99, respectively. The
transportation costs increase to ensure high quality transportation. Thus, the utility
of the manufacturing firm is higher than the utilities of both freight service providers.
This can be explained by the fact that, apart from the price and quality level of the
second mode of service provider C1, the prices and quality levels of the other mode
and the other service provider take on much smaller values than in the equilibrium
solution of the previous assumption. Since the emphasis is given to the quality of the
freight service provider in the demand functions, the low quality levels result in lower
demand. Demand market 1 receives amounts of 9.96 and 92.51 via modes 1 and 2 of
freight service provider C1, and 24.46 via freight service provider C2. The low demand
further reduces the utilities.
Example 6.4 and Variant
Example 6.4 and its variant extend the previous numerical examples through the
addition of another manufacturing firm, as shown in Figure 6.7. These manufacturers
offer substitutable products to the demand markets.
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Figure 6.7. The Supply Chain Network Topology for Example 6.4 and Variant
The demand functions for manufacturing firm F1 are:
d1111 = 43−1.62p1111+1.6q1111−1.45p1+1.78q1+.08p2−.04q2+.03p2111−.2q2111+.04p1121−.1q1121,
d2111 = 52−1.75p2111+1.21q2111−1.45p1+1.78q1+.08p2−.04q2+.03p1111−.2q1111+.04p1121−.1q1121,
d1121 = 47−1.79p1121+1.41q1121−1.45p1+1.78q1+.08p2−.04q2+.03p1111−.2q1111+.04p2111−.1q2111,
and that of manufacturing firm F2 are:
d1211 = 51−1.57p1211+1.26q1211−1.65p2+1.98q2+.08p1−.04q1+.04p2211−.1q2211+.02p1221−.12q1221,
d2211 = 44−1.63p2211+1.21q2211−1.65p2+1.98q2+.08p1−.04q1+.04p1211−.1q1211+.02p1221−.12q1221,
d1221 = 56−1.46p1221+1.41q1221−1.65p2+1.98q2+.08p1−.04q1+.04p1211−.1q1211+.02p2211−.12q2211.
The supply of F1 is similar to that in Example 6.3 and that of manufacturing firm
F2 is:
s2 = d
1
211 + d
2
211 + d
1
221.
The production cost functions of F1 and F2 are:
PC1 = 1.55s1 + 1.88q
2
1 + .02s2 + .06q2,
PC2 = 1.47s2 + 1.94q
2
2 + .041s1 + .032q1.
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Manufacturing firm F1 has the same utility function and price and quality bounds
as in Example 6.3. The utility of manufacturing firm F2 is:
UF2 = p2s2 − PC2,
and the price and quality of his product are constrained in the following manner:
0 ≤ p2 ≤ 95, 8 ≤ q2 ≤ 100.
The transportation cost functions of freight service provider C1 are changed to:
TC1111 = .5d
1
111 + (q
1
111)
2 + .0045d1121 + .0045d
1
221 + .0045d
1
211,
TC2111 = .45d
2
111 + .54(q
2
111)
2 + .0011d2211,
TC1211 = .68d
1
211 + .79(q
1
211)
2 + .002d1211 + .002d
1
221,
TC2211 = .57d
2
211 + .74(q
2
211)
2 + .005d2111,
and the cost functions of freight service provider C2 are changed to:
TC1121 = .64d
1
121 + .76(q
1
121)
2 + .0015d1221,
TC1221 = .59d
1
221 + .80(q
1
221)
2 + .01d1121 + .01d
1
111 + .01d
1
211.
The utility of C1 is:
UC1 = p
1
111d
1
111 + p
2
111d
2
111 + p
1
211d
1
211 + p
2
211d
2
211 − TC1111 − TC2111 − TC1211 − TC2211,
and that of C2 is:
UC2 = p
1
121d
1
121 + p
1
221d
1
221 − TC1121 − TC1221.
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The lower and upper bounds of the prices for freight service providers are now:
0 ≤ pM1i1k ≤ 90, ∀i, k,M1, forM1 = 2,
0 ≤ pM2i2k ≤ 85, ∀i, k,M2, forM2 = 1.
The equilibrium solution, computed after 231 iterations, is:
p1∗111 = 40.20, p
2∗
111 = 40.72, p
1∗
121 = 39.79, p
∗
1 = 48.08,
p1∗211 = 51.17, p
2∗
211 = 42.88, p
1∗
221 = 69.18, p
∗
2 = 50.89,
q1∗111 = 27.73, q
2∗
111 = 37.76, q
1∗
121 = 36.53, q
∗
1 = 66.25,
q1∗211 = 37.64, q
2∗
211 = 29.42, q
1∗
221 = 63.97. q
∗
2 = 75.65.
In this example, I consider competition at the manufacturers’ level, the freight
service providers’ level, and between modes of a particular freight service provider.
This, further, increases the generality, as well as the complexity, of the problem when
compared with Example 6.3. The assumption regarding the demand functions being
more inclined towards the quality of the product manufactured and the prices of
the freight service providers remains valid in this instance as well. The equilibrium
solution (p∗1 = 48.08; q
∗
1 = 66.25; p
∗
2 = 50.89; q
∗
2 = 75.65) supports this assumption.
The utilities of manufacturing firms F1 and F2 are 1179.39 and 976.85, respectively.
Moreover, the utilities of service providers C1 and C2 are 8743.66 and 5340.84,
respectively. The demand market receives an amount of 132.37 of the product
manufactured by F1 from service provider C1 and an amount of 70.05 from C2. Firm
F2 sends 144.51 units via C1 and 100.14 units by C2.
Due to the added competition at the manufacturers’ level, the quality and price
of the product manufactured at firm F1 have declined as compared to Example 6.3.
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This was expected since to attain more market share, the prices would be lowered,
which would result in a lowering of quality levels. The utility of F1 is higher than
that of F2. A product with reduced prices and quality levels would require cheaper
prices (and, hence, quality) of the transporters. Resultantly, prices and quality levels
of freight service provider C1 carrying products from F1 have also been reduced. It is
interesting to note that even though the price and quality level of C2 transporting the
product manufactured by F2 are the highest of all (p
1∗
221; q
1∗
221), more demand for F2
is satisfied by service provider C2 (100.14) than that of F1 (70.05). The prices and
quality levels of provider C2 transporting goods of manufacturer F1 are at par with
that of provider C1. Clearly, both manufacturers prefer freight service provider C1 to
freight service provider C2.
Variant of Example 6.4
I now construct a variant of Example 6.4 wherein the demand function is more
sensitive to the price of the product manufactured and the quality offered by the
service providers. Keeping the other data consistent, the demand functions are, hence,
modified to the following:
d1111 = 43− 1.44p1111 + 1.53q1111 − 1.82p1 + 1.21q1 + 0.08p2 − 0.04q2 + 0.03p2111
−0.2q2111 + 0.04p1121 − 0.1q1121,
d2111 = 52− 1.49p2111 + 1.65q2111 − 1.82p1 + 1.21q1 + 0.08p2 − 0.04q2 + .03p1111
−0.2q1111 + 0.04p1121 − 0.1q1121,
d1121 = 47− 1.57p1121 + 1.64q1121 − 1.82p1 + 1.21q1 + 0.08p2 − 0.04q2 + .03p1111
−0.2q1111 + 0.04p2111 − 0.1q2111,
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d1211 = 51− 1.39p1211 + 1.66q1211 − 1.88p2 + 1.25q2 + 0.08p1 − 0.04q1 + .04p2211
−0.1q2211 + 0.02p1221 − 0.12q1221,
d2211 = 44− 1.42p2211 + 1.58q2211 − 1.88p2 + 1.25q2 + 0.08p1 − 0.04q1 + .04p1211
−0.1q1211 + 0.02p1221 − 0.12q1221,
d1221 = 56− 1.40p1221 + 1.63q1221 − 1.88p2 + 1.25q2 + 0.08p1 − 0.04q1 + .04p1211
−0.1q1211 + 0.02p2211 − 0.12q2211.
The equilibrium solution, computed after 568 iterations, is:
p1∗111 = 8.30, p
2∗
111 = 64.70, p
1∗
121 = 15.54, p
∗
1 = 25.02,
p1∗211 = 28.70, p
2∗
211 = 18.47, p
1∗
221 = 36.15, p
∗
2 = 21.38,
q1∗111 = 9.00, q
2∗
111 = 96.71, q
1∗
121 = 16.16, q
∗
1 = 22.71,
q1∗211 = 28.34, q
2∗
211 = 17.19, q
1∗
221 = 38.55. q
∗
2 = 19.24.
At equilibrium, the utilities of manufacturing firms F1 and F2 are 2037.45 and
1511.87, and that of freight service providers C1 and C2 are 1729.44 and 737.02. It is
important to note that, based on the previous equilibrium solutions, the utilities of
the freight service providers were higher than those of the manufacturers. However,
based on the variant’s solution, the utilities of the freight service providers (focus on
quality) are lower than the utilities of the manufacturers (focus on price). This is
directly connected to the transportation costs which increase in order to ensure high
quality transportation. Demand market 1 receives 104.81 units of F1’s product from
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service provider C1 and 23.37 units from C2. Also, the demand market receives 62.52
units of F2’s product via C1 and 49.79 via C2.
Example 6.5 and Variant
In this example and its variant, I extend the previous ones by adding another demand
market to the supply chain network; see Figure 6.8. The manufacturers and freight
service providers compete to serve two demand markets now.
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Figure 6.8. The Supply Chain Network Topology for Example 6.5 and Variant
The demand functions at demand market 2 for manufacturing firm F1 are:
d1112 = 50− 1.63p1112 + 1.55q1112 − 1.48p1 + 1.74q1 + 0.06p2 − 0.05q2 + .05p2112
−0.23q2112 + 0.02p1122 − 0.13q1122,
d2112 = 39− 1.78p2112 + 1.21q2112 − 1.48p1 + 1.74q1 + 0.06p2 − 0.05q2 + .05p1112
−0.23q1112 + 0.02p1122 − 0.13q1122,
d1122 = 42− 1.66p1122 + 1.41q1122 − 1.48p1 + 1.74q1 + 0.06p2 − 0.05q2 + .05p1112
−0.23q1112 + 0.02p2112 − 0.13q2112,
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and for manufacturing firm F2 are:
d1212 = 38− 1.49p1212 + 1.34q1212 − 1.61p2 + 1.86q2 + 0.06p1 − 0.05q1 + .05p2212
−0.09q2212 + 0.03p1222 − 0.08q1222,
d2212 = 43− 1.57p2212 + 1.26q2212 − 1.61p2 + 1.86q2 + 0.06p1 − 0.05q1 + .05p1212
−0.09q1212 + 0.03p1222 − 0.08q1222,
d1222 = 58− 1.53p1222 + 1.31q1222 − 1.61p2 + 1.86q2 + 0.06p1 − 0.05q1 + .05p1212
−0.09q1212 + 0.03p2212 − 0.08q2212.
The supply functions for both manufacturers are changed in the following manner:
s1 = d
1
111 + d
2
111 + d
1
121 + d
1
112 + d
2
112 + d
1
122,
s2 = d
1
211 + d
2
211 + d
1
221 + d
1
212 + d
2
212 + d
1
222.
There is no change to the utility functions of the manufacturing firms. However,
the transportation functions of freight service provider C1 have been changed to:
TC1111 = .5d
1
111 + (q
1
111)
2 + .0045d1121 + .0045d
1
221 + .0045d
1
211 + .0045d
1
112,
TC2111 = .45d
2
111 + .54(q
2
111)
2 + .0011d2211 + .0011d
2
212,
TC1211 = .68d
1
211 + .79(q
1
211)
2 + .002d1111 + .002d
1
121 + 0.002d
1
212,
TC2211 = .57d
2
211 + .74(q
2
211)
2 + .005d2111 + .005d
2
212,
TC1112 = .61d
1
112 + .7(q
1
112)
2 + .0037d1111 + .0037d
1
122 + 0.0037d
1
212,
TC2112 = .52d
2
112 + .58(q
2
112)
2 + .0024d2212,
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TC1212 = .49d
1
212 + .59(q
1
212)
2 + .0017d1112 + .0017d
1
122,
TC2212 = .43d
2
212 + .55(q
2
212)
2 + .0023d2112,
and that of freight service provider C2 to:
TC1121 = .64d
1
121 + .76(q
1
121)
2 + .0015d1221,
TC1221 = .59d
1
221 + .80(q
1
221)
2 + .014d1121 + .014d
1
111 + .014d
1
211,
TC1122 = .67d
1
122 + .73(q
1
122)
2 + .0031d1222 + .0031d
1
212,
TC1222 = .45d
1
222 + .58(q
1
222)
2 + .012d1122 + .012d
1
112 + .012d
1
212.
With the same constraints on the prices and quality levels, the utilities of freight
service providers become:
UC1 = p
1
111d
1
111 + p
2
111d
2
111 + p
1
211d
1
211 + p
2
211d
2
211 + p
1
112d
1
112 + p
2
112d
2
112 + p
1
212d
1
212 + p
2
212d
2
212
−TC1111 − TC2111 − TC1211 − TC2211 − TC1112 − TC2112 − TC1212 − TC2212,
UC2 = p
1
121d
1
121 + p
1
221d
1
221 + p
1
122d
1
122 + p
1
222d
1
222 − TC1121 − TC1221 − TC1122 − TC1222.
The equilibrium solution, after 254 iterations, is:
p1∗111 = 56.79, p
2∗
111 = 55.45, p
1∗
112 = 72.96, p
2∗
112 = 36.93,
p1∗121 = 55.19, p
1∗
122 = 53.55, p
1∗
211 = 62.77, p
2∗
211 = 53.28,
p1∗212 = 72.94, p
2∗
212 = 65.91, p
1∗
221 = 76.15, p
1∗
222 = 83.73,
p∗1 = 63.76, p
∗
2 = 64.90, q
∗
1 = 100.00, q
∗
2 = 100.00,
q1∗111 = 39.53, q
2∗
111 = 51.20, q
1∗
112 = 74.61, q
2∗
112 = 23.54,
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q1∗121 = 50.93, q
1∗
122 = 51.05, q
1∗
211 = 46.25, q
2∗
211 = 36.72,
q1∗212 = 76.89, q
2∗
212 = 69.56, q
1∗
221 = 61.18, q
1∗
222 = 94.70.
In this example, I consider competition at the manufacturers’ level, the freight
service providers’ level, and between modes of a particular service provider, wherein all
these players are competing to satisfy the demands at two different demand markets.
This makes the problem quite complex. The assumption regarding the demand
functions being more sensitive to the quality of the product manufactured and the
prices of the service providers remains valid in this example as well. The equilibrium
solution (p∗1 = 63.76; q
∗
1 = 100.00; p
∗
2 = 64.90; q
∗
2 = 100.00) supports this assumption.
The price and quality levels have gone up as compared to Example 6.4 since there are
two demand markets to be satisfied now as opposed to one.
The utilities of manufacturers F1 and F2 have increased to 15244.22 and 19922.55,
respectively. Also, the freight service providers C1 and C2 are now witnessing higher
utilities of 29256.82 and 16905.45, respectively. Since more demand from multiple
demand markets has increased the prices and quality levels of products, the utilities
have increased. The results indicate that service provider C1 transports an amount
of 279.46 to demand market 1 and an amount of 381.13 to demand market 2. Also,
service provider C2 carries an amount of 207.96 to demand market 1 and 215.20 to
demand market 2.
As there is enough demand for products of both manufacturers F1 and F2, the
prices of the products are high and the quality levels are at their upper bounds of 100.
This happens since the emphasis is on quality rather than price for manufacturers.
Resultantly, the overall prices and quality levels of the two freight service providers
also go up as compared to Example 6.4.
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Variant of Example 6.5
Once again, I consider a variant wherein the demand functions are more sensitive
to the price of the product manufactured and the quality offered by the freight
service providers. Keeping the other data consistent, the demand functions are, hence,
modified to the following:
d1112 = 50−1.37p1112+1.67q1112−1.91p1+1.33q1+.06p2−.05q2+.05p2112−.23q2112+.02p1122−.13q1122,
d2112 = 39−1.41p2112+1.65q2112−1.91p1+1.33q1+.06p2−.05q2+.05p1112−.23q1112+.02p1122−.13q1122,
d1122 = 42−1.35p1122+1.70q1122−1.91p1+1.33q1+.06p2−.05q2+.05p1112−.23q1112+.02p2112−.13q2112,
d1212 = 38−1.33p1212+1.59q1212−1.87p2+1.29q2+.06p1−.05q1+.05p2212−.09q2212+.03p1222−.08q1222,
d2212 = 43−1.36p2212+1.67q2212−1.87p2+1.29q2+.06p1−.05q1+.05p1212−.09q1212+.03p1222−.08q1222,
d1222 = 58−1.42p1222+1.68q1222−1.87p2+1.29q2+.06p1−.05q1+.05p1212−.09q1212+.03p2212−.08q2212.
The equilibrium solution, after 769 iterations, is:
p1∗111 = 22.05, p
2∗
111 = 80.01, p
1∗
112 = 44.02, p
2∗
112 = 77.79,
p1∗121 = 46.56, p
1∗
122 = 71.98, p
1∗
211 = 62.01, p
2∗
211 = 47.77,
p1∗212 = 82.80, p
2∗
212 = 85.62, p
1∗
221 = 64.72, p
1∗
222 = 85.00,
p∗1 = 43.78, p
∗
2 = 52.86, q
∗
1 = 85.79, q
∗
2 = 100.00,
q1∗111 = 9.00, q
2∗
111 = 100.00, q
1∗
112 = 39.34, q
2∗
112 = 100.00,
q1∗121 = 49.85, q
1∗
122 = 82.99, q
1∗
211 = 61.55, q
2∗
211 = 46.18,
q1∗212 = 100.00, q
2∗
212 = 100.00, q
1∗
221 = 65.62, q
1∗
222 = 100.00.
The utilities of firms F1 and F2 are 6333.31 and 10285.25, respectively. The
utilities of freight service providers C1 and C2 are 18654.58 and 10277.76, respectively.
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As expected, the utilities are increasing from those in Example 6.3 onwards. This
particular variant registers the highest. Since the focus of the freight service providers
is on quality, there are multiple cases wherein the quality levels of the providers are at
their upper bounds. The demand markets have grown which lets the manufacturers
and freight service providers increase their prices and quality levels. Higher quality
levels, however, ensure that the transportation costs go up which, in turn, reduces the
utilities of the freight service providers.
6.5. Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, I developed a game theory supply chain network model in both
static and dynamic versions with multiple manufacturers and freight service providers
competing on price and quality. This multi-faceted inclusion of competition in
the model assesses the quality conformance level of the product and the level of
service of freight service providers along with the prices at which the products and
the transportation services were offered. The model handles multiple modes of
transportation for delivery of products. The utility of each manufacturer (or service
provider) depends on the prices and on the quality levels of the products (or shipment
services) he offers as well as those of other competitors.
Variational inequality theory was employed in the formulation of the equilibrium
governing the manufacturers’ and freight service providers’ behaviors with respect
to price and quality followed by the rigorous description of the underlying dynamic
interactions until a stationary point, equivalently, an equilibrium is achieved. The
dynamics were shown to satisfy a projected dynamical system. The computational
procedure utilized was the Euler method. The discrete-time algorithm, also serving as
an approximation to the continuous-time trajectories, yields an equilibrium price and
quality patterns for the manufacturers and the freight service providers.
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In order to demonstrate the generality of the framework and the computational
scheme, I then provided solutions to a series of numerical examples, beginning with
smaller scale examples. In the larger examples, a scenario and its variant were explored
while computing and analyzing the solutions for various combinations of manufacturing
firms, freight service providers, and modes of transportation. The competition within
echelons of the different examples altered the price and quality levels, and, thereby,
the utilities, of the entities. I considered a scenario wherein the demand functions were
more sensitive to the quality of the product manufactured and the price charged by the
freight service providers. The variant took a contrasting position, whereby the demand
markets were giving more importance to the price of the product manufactured and the
quality levels offered by the freight service providers. These contradictory situations
brought about interesting comparisons between the utilities of the manufacturers and
the freight service providers and how they changed when the emphasis on price and
quality levels changed.
There are many aspects to this proposed framework that are worthy of further
discussion and investigation. For instance, additional tiers of supply chain decision-
makers could be included. The quality levels might be explicitly modeled for the
freight service providers in terms of time-conformance of delivery, reliability of the
service, emission standards (to compare the environmental viability of various modes),
the quality of in-house transportation infrastructure, and so on. It is interesting to
note from the results of this model that in order to capture a higher market share,
manufacturers or freight service providers might try to quote a lower price and offer a
lower quality level (leading to a lower cost). However, a lower quality product/service
might not be able to sustain the market share.
This work fills the gap in the existing literature by capturing quality in transporta-
tion as well as production in a multitiered competitive supply chain network, along
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with prices as strategic variables. It provides a critical foundation for future research
in this area.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
7.1. Conclusions
The Internet is a network of service providers which provides connections between
entities and offers numerous distributed applications and services (Wolf et al. (2012)).
Customers’ demands are driving the Internet and telecommunication networks to-
wards providing quality-based services. However, providers face many challenges in
determining technical and economic solutions to price and bill their services and to
establish economic relationships with other providers that are necessary to deliver
end-to-end services. Although the underlying technology associated with the existing
Internet is rather well-understood, the economics of the associated services have been
less studied.
Quality-based demands are not limited to the Internet and communication networks,
and supply chain networks are under many pressures to offer differentiated products
and services (Li and Nagurney (2015)). Nowadays, customers demand quality products,
quality distribution and shipment, quality services, and increasing value. Success in
a supply chain network is determined by how well the entire supply chain performs,
rather than by the performance of its individual entities (Floden, Barthel, and Sorkina
(2010) and Saxin, Lammgard, and Floden (2005)). Logistic and freight companies as
the main components of any supply chain need to be strategic in delivering the goods
to meet the customers’ satisfaction and improve their competitive advantages.
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The purpose of this dissertation was to model, analyse, and compute solutions
to game theory problems based on communication and supply chain networks with
a focus on quality of service and price competition between decision-makers in the
Internet and freight shipment networks.
In this dissertation, the methodologies utilized were variational inequality theory,
network theory, game theory, optimization theory, and also projected dynamical
systems theory to develop oligopolistic models for the service-oriented Internet and
transportation networks in supply chains and to study the underlying dynamics.
Specifically, in Chapter 3, I considered a basic and a general game theory model
for a two-sided service-oriented Internet network. The basic model focused on a
noncooperative game between two profit maximizers, a content service provider and
a network service provider. Both providers optimized their profits as the difference
between their total revenue and total cost to set the best price and quality of service
for a demand market. The network provider’s quality of service was defined as the
expected delay according to Kleinrock function (Altman, Legout, and Xu (2011)).
Therefore, the total cost of transmission depended on the bandwidth usage and it
increased as the demand for higher quality intensified. The variational inequality of
this game was derived and the fee that the network provider charged the content
provider was analyzed. The result showed that if consumers at the demand market are
more sensitive to the price that the network provider charges them in comparison with
the price that the content provider charges them, then the network provider is better off
charging the content provider. The second part of Chapter 3 contained a general model
for a service-oriented Internet network, including multitiered network and content
providers and heterogeneous demand markets. In this network economic game theory
model, all providers were also profit maximizers and competed in a noncooperative
fashion to offer the best prices and quality levels to the demand markets. The users
187
at the demand markets signaled their preferences through demand functions which
increased (decreased) as the price (quality) decreased. The equilibrium model’s
equivalent variational inequality formulation with nice features for computational
purposes was provided and the Euler method was applied to solve some numerical
examples. The sensitivity analysis of the price, that the network providers charge the
content providers, demonstrated that the social welfare or summation of all providers’
utilities would be maximized if the network providers charge the content providers
equally.
In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, I extended the general model provided in the
second part of Chapter 3 to construct a dynamic network economic model of a
service-oriented Internet with price and quality competition using projected dynamical
systems theory. I captured the dynamics of both price and quality competition of the
content providers and the network providers. This continuous-time dynamic model
describes the evolution of the prices charged by the content providers and the network
providers, in addition to the quality levels of content and network transport provision.
The set of equilibrium/stationary points coincided with the set of solutions to the
associated variational inequality problem. Also, the conditions, under which the
dynamic of the continuous-time adjustment process approached a stationary point,
were investigated. Then, the qualitative results, including stability analysis along with
a discrete-time algorithm were provided for the iterative computation and tracking
of the prices and quality levels until the stationary point was achieved. The Euler
method, which provides a discretization of the continuous-time adjustment process
and yields closed form expressions for the prices and the quality levels at each iteration
step, was proposed to solve numerical examples.
Chapter 5 emphasized time-based pricing for a service-oriented Internet network. A
competitive oligopoly market of Internet network providers that captures the economic
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relationships, motivated by the ChoiceNet project, was formulated. The network
providers offered different network services and created contracts for their users
according to the users’ desires and needs. Three main criteria including the amount of
usage contracted per period of time (the usage rate), the quality level of service, and
the contract duration were considered for users’ contract selection. Here, I assumed a
reserved usage amount per unit of time. Then, the variational inequality formulation
of the service-oriented Internet network equilibrium was presented and the existence
and uniqueness of the result were discussed. After presenting the explicit formulae
and convergence for the equilibrium, the Euler method was used to solve multiple
problem sets. The numerical results were consistent with today’s Internet pricing from
service providers such as COMCAST. The outcome from sensitivity analysis revealed
that the network providers can benefit when they provide higher levels of quality to
their demand markets.
The similarities and analogies between the service-oriented Internet networks and
supply chain networks prompted me to also focus on supply chain networks in Chapter
6 of this dissertation. Chapter 6 developed game theory models in both equilibrium
and dynamic settings for a supply chain network with multiple manufacturers and
multiple freight service providers handling freight transportation. The manufacturers
and freight service providers competed in prices they offer for production and shipment.
Quality of the product was traced along the supply chain with consumers at demand
markets differentiating among the products offered by the manufacturers. In addition,
quality of freight service provision was accounted for with the model with the providers
competing on quality as well. In this model, multiple modes of transportation for each
freight service provider were allowed. A mode was considered in a general way and
can also correspond to intermodal transportation. The qualitative properties of the
equilibrium price and quality pattern were provided. Also, the underlying dynamics,
associated with the evolution of the prices and quality levels over time, were presented.
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The results from numerical examples demonstrated that to capture a higher market
share in an oligopoly market, manufacturers or freight service providers might try to
offer a lower price and a lower quality level. However, a lower quality level for the
product or freight service might not be able to sustain the market share.
7.2. Future Research
While there are certainly several possible and fruitful directions for my future
research, here I discuss topics I intend to pursue in the near future.
The model, developed in Chapter 3, provides a basic framework for the analysis of
price competition in service-oriented networks. Nowadays, the highly dynamic and
competitive business environment makes the decision-making of the networks’ entities
increasingly complex. To survive and thrive, the providers need to have intelligent
and consistent strategies to provide optimal decisions today and benefit from them in
the future (Friesz et al. (2008)). I plan to extend the general model in Chapter 3 for
analyzing the price and quality levels over the multi-period planning horizon (see Liu
and Nagurney (2012)), not only in the Internet network but also in other networks
including freight transportation networks, tourism supply chains, and the hospitality
industry where quality of service is an emerging matter of fact (Tian et al. (2013)).
The dynamics of the flows in the Internet network and freight transportation
network not only change over time (multi-period horizon), but also are time-dependant
(Nagurney, Parkes, and Daniele (2007)). Emerging new services and applications in
communication and transportation networks fluctuate the customers’ demand and
result in time-varying demand rate pattern. I plan on expanding the theoretical
framework of Chapter 6 to consider an evolutionary variational inequality formulation.
In this case, time-dependant demand functions will be considered to study dynamic
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problems and represent model adjustment processes and equilibria with lags in the
Internet and freight transportation networks.
I am also interested in theoretically and empirically exploring and expanding
the research on modeling multitiered networks where multiple decision-makers face
conflicting objectives in a competitive economic environment. In the future, we can
expect to see more dynamic service offerings, as Internet users move from long-term
service provider agreements to more opportunistic service models. Inspired by the
work in Nagurney et al. (2013a) and Saberi, Nagurney, and Wolf (2014), I would like
to develop innovative modeling frameworks for pricing Internet services which involve
uncertainty in the network demand, hierarchical structure of service-providers in the
network, and spectrum sharing issues among providers.
As was discussed in Chapter 4, because of various limitations in the current Internet
architecture, new network architectures are being explored. For any new network
architecture design, there is a critical need to point to the real-world challenges such
as path selection across domains or proper economic relationships between entities
operating and using the network (Jain, Durresi, and Paul (2011) and Wolf et al.
(2014)) and to deploy innovative solutions for these challenges. Nagurney, Dong, and
Zhang (2002) modeled a competitive supply chain network to handle many decision-
makers and their independent behaviors. This model captures both the independent
behavior of the various decision-makers as well as the effects of their interactions.
It can evaluate both price and product flows in this supply chain. To model the
competitive behavior of the network providers in the Internet, I plan to extend the
model of Nagurney, Dong, and Zhang (2002) to construct a novel oligopoly model
with multiple tiers of providers in both the Internet and in supply chain networks with
freight transportation and investigate and investigate the pricing strategies among
network providers and freight carriers in each such network, respectively.
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